Germania Iron Company v. United States/Opinion of the Court

by David Josiah Brewer

United States Supreme Court

165 U.S. 379

Germania Iron Company  v.  United States

Appellants contend that this bill cannot be sustained, because: First, no fraud is proved, or even charged, against the patentee; second, there is no showing that the other applicants for these lands had or have any rights superior to the patentee; third, that it is neither proved nor alleged that the patentee was not equitably as well as legally entitled to the lands; fourth, that the utmost that appears is the premature issue of a patent through mistake and inadvertence, and in disregard of one of the rules of the department, and that such matters lay no foundation for the interposition of a court of equity unless accompanied by a trespass on some substantial right. They msist that a vendor cannot ask the aid of a court of equity to avoid his deed on the mere ground of irregularity on the part of his agents unless he also shows that the grantee in such deed was not equitably entitled to the conveyance; that courts never attempt to do a useless thing; and that it would be idle to enter a decree canceling a patent when, for aught that appears, it would be the duty of the government, after some formal proceedings and compliance with certain regulations, to reissue to the patentee a patent for the same lands. In other words, their contention is that this whole litigation is merely a dispute about form and order of proceeding, and not about substantial rights. Many authorities from this court and others are cited showing the conditions under which courts of equity will interfere to cancel patents and deeds on the ground of fraud, or by reason of other facts showing that the patentee or grantee is not of right entitled to the land. We have no disposition to weaken the force of these authorities, or to question their control in cases to which they are applicable. A patent from the United States is a solemn muniment of title, not lightly to be challenged or set aside, and all that has been heretofore said in support of the sanctity of such an instrument we reaffirm.

But the theory of this bill is outside the scope of all such cases. It does not rest upon doubtful and uncertain testimony. The facts are conceded, and there is, therefore, certainty as to what they are. The only question presented is as to the right which flows from these undisputed and admitted facts. It is, in effect, a suit by the government to restore to a tribunal to which it has committed exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters that jurisdiction which, through inadvertence and mistake, it has been deprived of. 'Relief, when deeds or other instruments are executed by mistake or inadvertence of agents, as well as upon false suggestions, is a common head of equity jurisprudence.' Hughes v. U.S., 4 Wall. 232, 236. Congress has intrusted to the land department the disposal of the public lands, and has invested the officers of that department with exclusive jurisdiction over many things in connection with such disposition. Their determination in respect to questions of fact in all matters of contest is exclusive and final. The issue of a patent is, in effect, the final determination of that department in favor of the patentee and against the contestants of all disputed questions of fact,-a determination which it is not the function of courts to review except upon conditions of fraud, etc., which permit courts of equity to investigate and pass judgment upon all determinations of all tribunals. By inadvertence and mistake a patent in this case has been issued, and the effect of such issue is to transfer the legal title, and remove from the jurisdiction of the land department the inquiry into and consideration of such disputed questions of fact.

The contention of the appellants is, substantially, that the courts must consider and determine those disputed questions of fact, and exercise a jurisdiction not committed to them, before they restore to the land department the jurisdiction of which it has been wrongfully deprived. But why should the courts be called upon to consider and determine questions of fact, and, after a determination adversely to the patentee, relegate the matter for re-examination and determination in the land department? Is not the duty of the court fully performed when it ascertains that through such inadvertence and mistake the department which has jurisdiction over such matters has been deprived thereof? It restores to such department its lost jurisdiction, and leaves to the tribunal designated by congress the full power to discharge the duties conferred upon it. It is true that it does not affirmatively appear in this case that the patentee was not entitled equitably to the land, or that the contestants had any superior right thereto, but his rights and their rights depend upon questions of fact, such as priority of application, etc., the determination of which, by act of congress, has been committed to the land department. It, and not a court of equity, is the tribunal intrusted by the law with jurisdiction over such matters, and the latter may not inquire what ought to have been the determination of the former, but whether it has been wrongfully deprived of the power to make such determination.

The question is not one simply between the government and the patentee,-a vendor and vendee,-such as was presented in U.S. v. Central Pac. R. Co., 26 Fed. 479. In that case there were no adverse or contesting rights. Equitably, the patentee was entitled to the land, and the only real objection was that the patent had been prematurely issued. A court might properly decline to set aside a patent when it affirmatively appeared that immediately after such action it would be the duty of the department to issue a new one. Here there are adverse claimants; there are contestants of the patentee's right; and the mere existence of a question of contested fact, the mere fact of a dispute between several parties, is sufficient ground for a court of equity returning the matter for examination to the tribunal which congress has created for such purposes. This is not a mere matter of procedure between the government and the patentee, but a question of the forum for the adjudication of controversies between individual litigants.

The case of Badeau v. U.S., 130 U.S. 439, 9 Sup. Ct. 579, is not in point, for there the only question was one between the United States and the claimant, and involved simply the amount of money due to the latter. The case of Williams v. U.S., 138 U.S. 514, 11 Sup. Ct. 457, is more in point, for in that case this court sustained a decree canceling a patent, although no fraud was shown, and its issue was simply owing to inadvertence and mistake. We are of the opinion that the ruling of the circuit court and the court of appeals was correct; that the matters of fact involved in these contests should be settled by the land department; that when, through inadvertence and mistake, a patent has been wrongfully issued, by which the jurisdiction of the land department over these disputed questions of fact is lost, a court of equity may rightfully interfere, and restore such lost jurisdiction, to do which it becomes necessary to cancel the patent.

To deny relief in this case would open the door to many possibilities of wrong. It appears that, although an order had been made to suspend all action in respect to the application for this patent, somehow or other the clerk having charge of the proceedings in respect to it was ignorant of such order, and that, although in the paper handed to him was the formal entry of an appearance for a contestee, he failed to examine such instrument, and assumed that it was a mere entry of an appearance in behalf of the applicant. Upon the showing made in this case he was innocent of wrong intent, but, if such omission can be operative to deprive the land department of its appropriate jurisdiction, it affords too strong an inducement for an intentional omission, proof of which may well be beyond the power of the government. The decree of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Mr. Justice GRAY was not present at the argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.

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