Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 8
Chapter 8 - Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity
editAFTER taking over command of the Fleet my first and most important task was to draw up a plan for the future tactics of the High Sea Fleet and to work out a programme of operations. The success hitherto of the conduct of naval warfare lay in the effect produced by the existence of the Fleet, the coastal defence, the influence exercised on neutrals, and the support given to the Army. The conviction that English maritime power was a serious menace to our capability of resistance seemed to make it imperative that, if a successful issue of the war were to be expected, it must be waged far more energetically against that adversary. There was no question of England giving in unless she was made to feel the pressure of war at home much more forcibly than hitherto had been the case. After having carried out her transport of troops from overseas on a much larger scale than was anticipated, thereby imposing on the country great sacrifices both of money and men, her determination for war was bound to increase, in order to reap the benefits of those efforts and to compensate for the blunders made, such as the surrender of Antwerp and the abandonment of the Dardanelles enterprise. So far, the war, for England, was merely a question of money and men. There was no lack of either, thanks to the support from the Colonies, the systematic manner in which volunteers were pressed into Kitchener's Army, and the ruthless employment of coloured auxiliaries.
Thus England was better able to stand the war for a lengthened period than we were, if the hunger blockade were to continue to oppress the country. The English public never thought of urging the Fleet to more active warfare; its object was achieved without its being weakened or being forced to make undue sacrifices. The nation readily understood this, especially when it was made clear to them that the Fleet had succeeded in keeping open those overseas communications on which the country was so dependent. This fact was specially brought into prominence by the destruction of our cruiser squadron off the Falkland Islands.
The danger from the U-boat warfare, which at first appeared serious, was reduced to slight importance owing to the mutual interests with America. But when the danger really was recognised, England prepared to ward it off, and did splendid work in this connection. On our part, the conduct of naval warfare in 1915 was less satisfactory. Even though we succeeded in preventing the neutrals from joining our opponents, it always remained an open question to what cause it could be attributed. If the utility of our High Sea Fleet were not made more distinctly manifest, then its deeds were not sufficient to justify its existence and the vast sums exacted from the resources of our people for its maintenance. The principal task stood out clearly defined - to punish England in such a way as to deprive her speedily and thoroughly of the inclination to continue the war. That might be expected if success could be achieved either by a blow at her sea power centred in her Navy, or at her financial life - preferably both.
The continued numerical superiority of the English Fleet from the beginning of the war kept us at a disadvantage; but, from a purely tactical point of view, our Battle Fleet, by the addition of four ships of the "König" class, was very differently organised from formerly, when Squadron II had to form part of the fighting line and was confronted in battle with "Dreadnoughts" with which it could not possibly cope. From the beginning of 1915 we also had had a double squadron of "Dreadnought" ships at our disposal (Squadrons I and III) and were therefore better able to avoid bringing the ships of Squadron II into a situation in battle where they must inevitably have suffered losses. Certainly the English had added greatly to their fighting powers by ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class which must have been ready early in 1915. They carried guns of 38-c.m. calibre, were strongly armour-plated, and had a speed of 25 knots, in all of which they were nominally the same as our battle-cruisers, whereas in the strength of their attack they appeared to be vastly superior to all our vessels.
The then prevailing conditions of strength kept us from seeking a decisive battle with the enemy. Our conduct of the naval war was rather aimed at preventing a decisive battle being forced on us by the enemy. This might perhaps occur if our tactics began to be so troublesome to him that he would try at all costs to get rid of the German Fleet. It might, for instance, become necessary, if the U-boat war succeeded again in seriously threatening English economic life. Should the English thus manoeuvre for a decisive battle, they could fix the time so as to allow the full use of their vast superiority, whereas some of our ships would be either under repair or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in the Baltic for exercises, of which the enemy would be well informed.
But for us to get into touch with the English Fleet, a definite and systematic operation would have had to be carried out with the view of compelling the enemy to give up his waiting tactics and send out forces which would provide us with favourable conditions of attack. The methods previously employed had failed. Either they were undertaken with inferior forces - in the case of an advance by cruisers the Main Fleet could not intervene in time to be of use - or else, as in most of the 1915 enterprises, they had not pushed on far enough for an encounter with important units of the enemy Fleet.
If we wished to attempt an effective and far-reaching offensive, it was necessary that we should be masters in our own house. The waters of our coast must be so controlled that we could be left free to develop and have no fear of being surprised and called out against our will. With the exception of the Fleet, we had nothing that the enemy could attack, as unfortunately our maritime trade had been put down from the beginning. The enemy, however, was still vulnerable in so many places that it was surely possible to find ample opportunity to make him feel the gravity of the war!
The ways and means of effecting this were the U-boat trade-war, mines, trade-war in the North and on the open seas, aerial warfare and aggressive action of the High Sea forces in the North Sea. The U-boat and aerial warfare had already started; the three other factors were to be operated in combination. The activities in the near future were laid down in a programme of operations submitted to the Naval Staff and their general sanction obtained. Above all things, every leader, as well as each commander, was to be told his part, so as to facilitate and encourage independent action in accordance with the combined plan.
The first and most important task was the safety of the German Bight. Fresh rules were laid down dealing with the action of the Fleet when in the Bight, and instructions issued concerning protection and outpost duty. Arrangements were also made as to action under an enemy attack which would save waiting for lengthy orders in an urgent emergency, and would render it possible for all subordinate officers to play the part expected of them in such an event. The aim of the organisation was to keep the Bight clear by means of aeroplanes, outpost flotillas, mine-sweeping formations, and barrier-breakers, and regular reconnaissance, guard, and mine-searching service was established. The outpost-boats were to form a support for the active protective craft in the North Sea, be sufficiently strong to meet a surprise hostile attack and always ready to pick up at sea any forces returning to harbour. The command of the protective services was, as hitherto, retained by the Chief of the Reconnaissance. The actual aerial reconnaissance in the vicinity was undertaken by aeroplanes and airships from the stations at List - on the island of Sylt- Heligoland, and Borkum. The North Sea Outpost Flotilla, the Coastal Defence Flotilla from the Ems, and boats of the Harbour Flotilla, were ready for guard service; their duties consisted chiefly in driving away enemy submarines. As a rule, the following positions were occupied:-
- The List Group: The waters off List (to keep neutral fishing boats out of German coastal waters).
- The North Group: The Amrum Bank passage.
- Line 1: The Heligoland - Hever Line.
- Line 2: The Heligoland - Outer Jade Line.
- The Outer Group: The Jade - Norderney line and the barrier opening at Norderney.
- Heligoland boats: North and West of the island.
- Jade boats: Off the Jade.
- S. Group: Three boats (chiefly intended to fight enemy submarines, or for other special duties, as, for instance, the cutting of cables).
The chief object of these outpost boats was to search the Inner German Bight for enemy submarines, for which purpose they set out every day in groups from the lines where they were stationed. The service of the outpost boats, some eighty fishing steamers, was so arranged that half were on duty for three days and then had three days off. The Ems Coastal Defence Flotilla had the guarding of the waters off East and West Ems, and westward to about 6 degrees E. Longitude. The Harbour Flotilla boats joined in when there was a chase after submarines which might have shown themselves at the mouth of the river. A torpedo-boat flotilla stationed on the Ems also did duty when required, and helped further to ensure the safety of the sea area off the Ems.
The regular mine-sweeping service consisted of two Mine-sweeping Divisions and one Auxiliary Flotilla. The latter was composed of vessels that had only been requisitioned for the purpose since the war, and were mostly trawlers. They were specially suitable for the North Sea, owing to their sea-going qualities, but we lost several of them because of their deep draught. When a mine-sweeping division was off duty the crews were billeted at Cuxhaven, while the men on leave from the half-flotilla of the Auxiliary Flotilla were quartered at Wilhelmshaven. For their mine-sweeping duties all those boats were armed in order that they might be prepared to fight submarines. As soon as hostile sub- marines were sighted within their area they had to stop their mine-sweeping and take part in the chase.
The barrier-breaker service consisted of three groups of barrier-breakers to every four steamers, internally constructed so as to , enable them to keep afloat should they strike a mine. At the outbreak of war we had no apparatus whatever for sweeping up mines and protecting the steamers. Every effort was made, however, to invent such an apparatus, which, as soon as it had been tested, was at once supplied to the barrier-breakers and the mine-searching division.
Special credit is due to Captain Walter Krah, Chief of the Auxiliary Mine-Flotilla, who profited by much practical experience and was successful in his efforts to avert unnecessary losses in his flotilla. It was the duty of the barrier-breaker group to protect the navigation of certain channels, chiefly those where our mine-laying divisions had been at work, and to make sure that no mines had been laid by the enemy in the interval. The activity of our mine-layers could not be entirely concealed from the enemy. When they were working in the inner section of the Bight, the enemy submarines had every opportunity for their observations, and the farther the mine belt was pushed out in the North Sea the nearer it drew to the area of English observation planes. The English were in advance of us with the Curtis plane, a hydroplane which, even with a considerable sea running, was able to keep on the water and so husband its strength.
The search for, and the chasing of, hostile submarines was principally the business of the torpedo-boats. The outpost boats had, of course, to keep a look-out for submarines, and had to follow up on any occasion when there was a chance of fighting them; but they had not the speed, nor were their numbers sufficient to carry out a systematic search and pursuit. The torpedo-boats of the outpost service were told off for that purpose. The same flotillas were employed when there was a question of warding off the submarines from any ships or units engaged in special enterprises. The safety of the German Bight at night - to ensure which the guardships were too far apart besides being inadequate in armament - was further ensured by torpedo-boat patrols taken from the outpost service which cruised along the line of guardships and the shores of the German Bight.
In order not to keep the entire Fleet constantly under steam and thus overtire both men and machinery and use up material to no purpose, and yet provide that they should be ready with considerable forces for any enemy enterprises, an outpost service was organised. In the Jade there lay always in readiness a squadron of battleships, two battle-cruisers, a cruiser-leader of torpedo-boats, and a torpedo-boat flotilla; a scouting division of light cruisers were in the Jade and the Weser, a torpedo-boat flotilla in Heligoland harbour, half the ships of Squadron II in the Cuxhaven Roads, at Altenbruch; and, if sufficient torpedo-boats were available, another torpedo-boat half-flotilla was stationed on the Ems or in List Deep (at Sylt) - constituting approximately half the total forces of the High Sea Fleet. The ships were kept clear to put to sea from their station three-quarters of an hour after the order reached them. The torpedo-boat flotilla at Heligoland was held ready to run out immediately, and the flotilla on the Jade three-quarters of an hour after receipt of an order.
The outpost forces were under the command of the Senior Naval Commander stationed on the Jade. In the event of a sudden enemy attack, his duty was to arrange independently for the necessary measures of defence, and to exercise the command. If the High Sea Command had any duty to assign to him, it was restricted to a suggestion or general directions, as, for instance, to station torpedo-boats at such and such a place at daybreak, leaving the rest to be carried out by the Chief of the U-boat forces.
The other ships, not belonging to the outpost service, lay, half of them in harbour (about a fourth part of the fleet), the other half remaining on the inner roads at Wilhelmshaven or Brunsbuttel. The torpedo-boats off outpost duty were always allowed to enter harbours. The ships off duty had to seize that opportunity to carry out such necessary repairs as could be done by their own men; ships that had been long in dock for refitting and repairs were regarded as being in the same category. The usual preparedness of ships lying in the inner roads and in harbour was fixed at three hours. But whenever news came which seemed to necessitate the calling out of the ships, orders were issued to hurry the preparations, the entire crew remained on board, and the ships kept ready, on receipt of further orders, to weigh anchor at once.
These far-reaching measures for the protection of the German Bight were, above all, intended to ensure that the Fleet should be able to take up a position in line if it was deemed advisable to pass out in expectation of an enemy attack. General regulations were issued for two eventualities; the one, in case information and messages were received announcing an impending hostile attack, and the other, in case the enemy came entirely unexpectedly. It was not long before there was an opportunity to test them in practice.
Finally the defence resources of the German Bight were improved by adding to the already existing minefields, partly by laying them adjacent to those laid by the enemy, which he was forced to avoid. The intention of establishing a safe area for assembling within the line Horns Reef - Terschelling, was soon carried out, as the enemy laid his minefields in still further concentric rings outside that line.
Constant navigation and firing exercises by separate units as well as by the assembled Fleet, were carried on within this zone, and they were very rarely interrupted by an alarm of submarines. The dispatch of units for practice in the Baltic was no longer so necessary, and the readiness of the Fleet for action was perceptibly improved.
Heligoland, which at the beginning of the war was our advanced outpost, had thus assumed the character of a point of support in the rear, from which radiated a free zone extending over a radius of 120 nautical miles. Unfortunately the island never had occasion to use her excellent armament on the enemy. But the newly constructed harbour was of great service to the light forces of the Fleet, besides which the possession of the island was indispensable in order that a fleet might be able to leave our estuaries.
Even though security from enemy attacks was necessary and called for immediate action, nevertheless a still more important duty was that of attacking and injuring the enemy. To this end various enterprises were started. Foremost among these were nocturnal advances by light forces in the boundary area of the German Bight in order to destroy enemy forces stationed there, the holding up of suspicious craft, and readiness to afford help to airships raiding England, which always took place at night. These advances were carried out by several flotillas led by an escorting cruiser. They were supported by a scouting division of light cruisers sent either to the Ems or to a certain quadrant in the North Sea. The battle-cruisers were told off to the Schillig Roads, or deployed in line at sea; all other outpost ships were held in strictest readiness, and all measures were taken to ensure the speedy intervention of vessels lying in the Roads. In this way, the entire Fleet was kept in a certain state of tension, and unvarying alertness in view of eventualities at sea was maintained in order to be prepared at once to take part in the proceedings.
A further system of enterprise was to prolong these nocturnal sallies till daybreak in order to patrol a more extended area, in which case the entire Fleet had to be at sea as a support. The furthest advanced flotillas received support from Scouting Divisions I and II which, reinforced by one or two flotillas, followed them at a suitable distance. The extension of such enterprises was designed to reach to the Skagerrak and the Hoofden.
Finally; other important enterprises were planned, such as the bombardment of coastal towns to exercise a still greater pressure on the enemy and induce him to take counter-measures which would afford us an opportunity to engage part or the whole of his Fleet in battle under conditions favourable to ourselves.
In all these enterprises the co-operation of the Naval Corps in Flanders was desirable by stationing their U-boats along the nearest stretch of coast and thereby supporting the Fleet. This was carried out regularly, and with the greatest readiness.
The employment of our U-boats was of fundamental importance for our warfare against England. They could be used directly against English trade or against the English naval forces. The decision in the matter influenced the operations very considerably. It was not advisable to embark on both methods simultaneously, as most probably neither would then achieve success. Also the poor success resulting from our U-boat action on English warships in the North Sea seemed to point to a decided preference for trade-war. In military circles, there was no doubt that success in trade-war could only be looked for if the U-boat were empowered to act according to its own special methods; any restrictions in that respect would greatly reduce the chances of success. The decision in the matter lay in the political zone. It was therefore necessary that the political leaders should recognise what we were compelled to do to achieve our war aim. Hitherto our politicians, out of anxiety with regard to America or in order not to exasperate England to the utmost, had not been able to decide on energetic action against England in the naval war. The naval authorities, however, should have known what they had to reckon with in order to be able to beat down England's resistance. It was also their duty to protest against enterprises specially unsuited to the U-boat, which inevitably led to useless sacrifices.
The restricted form of U-boat warfare against English mercantile ships, adopted in the course of 1915, was extremely unsatisfactory. The damage caused thereby to her trade could be borne by England, and, on the other hand, the only result to us was vexation and disappointment, for our Fleet could obtain no support for its own enterprises from the U-boats. Co-operation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not be sufficiently well organised to prove dependable for certain operations. First of all, only temporary co-operation was possible in the case of enterprises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had a special duty, to be mutually supplemented but without exacting any tactical union. If, for instance, there was the intention to bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed that English fighting forces would at once rush out from different harbours where they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their peace. If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was presumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have had a chance of attacking.
Tactical co-operation would have been understood to mean that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of encountering the enemy, having the fixed intention of leading up to such an encounter, numbers of U-boats would be present from the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and torpedo-boats in a daylight battle to support the activity of the battleship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that respect, and it would have been a very risky experiment to take U-boats into a battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility of their not distinguishing between friend and foe.
The first-mentioned method, however, offered the most varied possibilities, and consideration was given as to what would be the most desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbours; how they could be used in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or otherwise render assistance.
In order to gain assurance in the use of U-boats and secure a basis for the activity of the Fleet, I went, in February, to Berlin to a conference with the Chief of the Naval Staff, in which Prince Henry of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic forces, also took part.
The result of this conference was the decision to come to close grips with England. Our chief maritime elements were to be centred absolutely in the North Sea, and the greatest restriction put on all active measures in the Baltic. Shortly afterwards an unrestricted U-boat warfare was to be instituted and the Naval Command was to make the necessary preparations. March i was the date on which it was intended to begin, as General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, recognising the importance of England's contribution to the hostile resisting forces, had given up his previous scruples concerning the unrestricted U-boat warfare.
On January 31, nine airships set out for an attack on England: "L" 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. On this occasion Liverpool was reached for the first time, where doubtless large quantities of war material from America were stored. Several other large factory towns in central England were also bombed, which they hardly expected although they were of great importance on account of their output of munitions and war material. A cruiser on the Humber was hit and badly damaged, which, according to subsequent information, was the new light cruiser Caroline (3,810 tons). The farther such air-raids spread over the country the greater would be the efforts made to defend the most important places, involving the withdrawal from the principal scene of war of guns, airmen, gunners and munitions to protect England from danger from the air.
Although the chief objective of every air-raid was London, where the Admiralty controlled the whole Naval war, and where the docks and the mouth of the Thames represented many other important objectives, to destroy which was highly necessary for the continuation of the war, still wind and weather did not always allow of its being attained. Sometimes during the flight of the airships they would be obliged to deviate from their plan of attack for other reasons than wind and weather. Therefore all airships that went up were given a general order to attack England in the south, centre and north. "South" signified the Thames, "centre," the Humber, and "north," the Firth of Forth. These three estuaries were the main points of support for the English Fleet, and were amply provided with all kinds of naval and mercantile shipbuilding works. The direction of the attack, whether south, centre or north, was determined by the wind, as the airships usually had the wind against them in going, in order, on the return journey, to have it behind in case they had to cope with damage or engine trouble.
Commander Odo Lowe, "L 19," never returned from an attack made during the night of January 31 - February 1, 1916. On the return journey the airship, owing to fog, found itself over Dutch territory, and was fired at, not being at a very great altitude. Owing to the damage done, when it again came over the water it was unable to rise on account of a strong northerly wind, and so was forced to come down at about 100 nautical miles from the English coast, in a line with Grimsby. It was seen there in a sinking condition by a steam trawler (King Stephen) which, although within hailing distance, allowed the helpless crew to perish in the waves. This shameful deed was publicly acclaimed by an English bishop - a strange manifestation of his Christian principles ! The behaviour of that bishop is so typical of English mentality that it is worth while adding a short comment on it. Two points are invariably and entirely lacking in English views on the war: they never admit the "necessity of war" for their opponent and never recognise the difference between unavoidable severity and deliberate brutality. The Englishman thinks it quite justifiable to establish a blockade in the North Sea which exposes his naval forces to a mere minimum of danger, and pays no heed to the rules of International Law. That the consequence of the blockade was to bring starvation on the entire German nation - the step indeed was taken with that avowed purpose - does not in the least affect his feelings for humanity. He employs the means that serve his war aims, and no objection could be raised did he allow the same to hold good for the enemy. But instead - whether in conscious or unconscious hypocrisy is an open question - he raises indignant opposition to all counter-measures. Our air-raids caused injury to civilians. It was inevitable, when institutions serving war purposes were so close to populous districts - perhaps with a view to secure protection for them. To the Englishman, it was of no moment that the airship crews exposed themselves to the greatest personal danger in thus fighting for their suffering Fatherland. Accustomed as he was to carrying on a war with hirelings, and mostly abroad, he considered any personal encroachment on his comfort as a crime against humanity and made a terrible ado to increase favour for his cause. English behaviour in the mine-war is an example of this.
At the second Peace Conference at the Hague, Satow, [1] an English delegate raised a violent protest against a decision authorising the laying of mines in the open sea, in view of the danger to neutral shipping. In spite of this, an extensive area at the eastern egress from the Channel was mined by the English. Success in war, in their view, stood higher than their former principles and professed consideration for the neutrals. Our mine-warfare along the English coast was cried down as a terrible crime, although it is distinctly allowed by the Hague regulations. The same hypocrisy concerning what the rights of war conceded to the one or the other belligerents is also prevalent in English professional literature. According to English ideas it is quite right and correct that the English Fleet, in spite of its double numerical superiority, does not consider it necessary to advance to the German coast. But when the weaker German Fleet refrained from committing what obviously would have been military errors, it was ascribed to lack of courage. When the English Fleet, as we see later, had in battle, in spite of twofold superiority, twice as many losses as the weaker adversary, it was still termed an English victory! What has become of all common sense? After this digression we must resume.
One of the first enterprises on the newly-drawn-up programme of operations was an encounter during the night of February 10 - 11 with English guardships off the Dogger Bank; they were in all probability stationed there in connection with our airship raids, either to give warning of their approach or to give chase on their way back. Torpedo-Boat Flotillas II, VI and IX, led by Captain Hartog, the First Leader of torpedo-boats, while patrolling at night came across a new type of English vessel which they at first took to be a cruiser, but finally decided it was a new vessel of the "Arabis" class. After a brief exchange of shots, the vessel was sunk by a torpedo; the commander, some officers and 28 of the crew were saved and taken prisoners. A second ship was also hit by a torpedo and observed to sink. The ships had only recently been built, were of 1,600 tons, had a crew of 78, slight draught, and a speed of 16 knots.
On February 11 an order from the Chief of the Naval Staff was sent to the Fleet regarding the action to be observed towards armed enemy merchantmen. At the same time a "Note from the Imperial German Government on the Treatment of Armed Merchantmen" was published in the Press. This Note contained uncontestable proof, gathered from instructions issued by the English Government, and various other sources, that the armed English merchantmen had official orders whenever they saw and were close to German U-boats, maliciously to attack and wage ruthless war on them. The Note concluded with the following notice:
>*Berlin, February 8, 1916.* > >"1 . Under the circumstances now prevailing, enemy merchantmen carrying guns have no longer the right to be considered as such. German naval forces will therefore, after a short respite in the interests of the neutrals, treat such ships as belligerents. > >"2. The German Government notifies the neutral Powers of the conditions in order that they may warn their subjects to desist from entrusting their persons and property to armed merchantmen belonging to the Powers at war with the German Empire."
The order to the naval forces, which out of consideration for the neutrals was not to come into force until February 29, was as follows: "Enemy merchantmen carrying guns are to be considered as warships and destroyed by all possible means. The officers must bear in mind that mistaken identity will lead to a breach with the neutrals and that the destruction of a merchantman because she is armed, must only be effected when the guns are clearly distinguished."
This new announcement from the Government, in which the Chief of the Naval Staff evidently had a share judging from his order to the Fleet, came as a surprise to me and appeared as though it were a reversal of the policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare which on February 1 had been promised for certain within a month, and which it now seemed doubtful would be carried out. The order imposed upon the officers that they should "distinguish" the guns made action very difficult for the U-boat officers, and it was they who were chiefly concerned. For at the distance necessary to secure this evidence the enemy, if he vindictively opened fire, could hardly miss. But if a U-boat when submerged were in a position to attack a steamer, and could only fire a torpedo when there was no doubt that she carried guns, the opportunity would almost always be lost.
I made known my objections to the order, both verbally and in writing, when I had occasion in the course of the month to go to Berlin; a violent north-westerly storm, which set in on February 16 - 17 had stopped all operations in the Fleet. I was informed that the intention shortly to open the unrestricted U-boat warfare still held good. An order to that effect sanctioned by the Emperor was already drawn up; it merely remained to fill in the date of starting. This appeared to me of the greatest importance, and, as meanwhile the Emperor had announced his intention of visiting the Fleet on February 23, I took that to mean that I need no longer entertain any doubts.
On the appointed day, at 10 A.M. His Majesty went on board the flagship Friedrich der Grosse lying in dock at Wilhelmshaven ready to put to sea. Besides his own personal suite, he was accompanied by Grand Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia, the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Department, Admiral von Tirpitz, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral von Holtzendorff. It was the second time during the war that the Emperor had visited the Fleet. A little more than a year before the Emperor had introduced to the Fleet my predecessor in command. I had occasion to give a long report on the situation in the North Sea and also to express my opinion on the conduct of the war, for which I took as basis the matter of the unrestricted U-boat warfare. The Emperor agreed with my statements and interpreted them to a meeting of admirals and officers, when he spoke in laudatory terms of the activities and deeds of the Navy during the previous year and gave an explanation of the orders that had caused the Fleet to be held back. His Majesty then took the opportunity to remark that he fully approved of the order of procedure submitted to him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.
This announcement was of great value to me, as thereby, in the presence of all the officers, I was invested with authority which gave me liberty of action to an extent I myself had defined. The intentions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet were thoroughly understood in this circle, as I had discussed in detail the programme of operations and had handed it in writing to those whom it concerned. The date for beginning the unrestricted U-boat warfare was, however, still uncertain. When I put the question to him, the Emperor remarked that he could not be influenced by the military suggestions only, though he recognised that they were justified, as besides his position as Chief War Lord, he was also responsible as Head of the State. Were he now to order the unrestricted U-boat war, it would probably meet with approval in the widest circles, but he must be careful that the entry into war Of America on the side of the enemy did not give rise to consequences that might outweigh the advantages of unrestricted U-boat warfare.
When convinced that this decision could not then be altered, and not knowing what the political counter reasons were, and since it was the business of the Naval Staff to come to an understanding with the Imperial Administration, I selected two U-boats to test the effect of the war under the new conditions in the war zone off the west coast of England, in order that a judgement might be formed for further plans. The commanders of the boats, "U32" (Baron von Spiegal) and "U 22" (Hoppe), gave me a verbal report on their return on March 18. "U 22" had sunk four steamers, with about 10,000 tons of cargo, three times as many neutral ships, but had been forced to let two passenger steamers get through. Owing to bad weather and damages "U 22" had no success. Meanwhile other U-boats were on the way to operate with the same intent. The success of their activities had not then been reported.
A wireless message on March 3 from the auxiliary cruiser Moewe was a surprising and joyful piece of news. She reported being stationed south-west of the Norwegian coast, and asked to be enrolled in the High Sea forces. This opportunity of practically testing the newly established outpost service was most opportune. It was a point of honour for the Fleet to preserve the intrepid and successful raider from a disastrous end off a home harbour. But great was the anxiety, as the Moewe had reported clouds of smoke sighted in clear weather, and evidently, from the appearance, belonging to a group of warships, but the distance was then too great to proceed to her assistance. The enemy, however, did not turn his attention to our cruiser, which endeavoured to give off as little smoke as possible, and when night fell had not been molested. Acting on the warnings given her, she happily escaped the further danger of striking any of the numerous English mines, that were unknown to her, between Horns Reef and Amrum Bank. Such ample protection was afforded her by a dense fog that she passed our first outposts unnoticed. But the fog lifted at the right moment to allow the ships sent out to meet her to escort her in triumph into the Jade, where she received a splendid welcome. The prudent and resolute behaviour of the commander, Count zu Dohna, his firm belief in the success of his undertaking - lightly called "luck" by some, though really based on the intrepid courage of the man, which spread to the entire crew - did not fail to make a deep impression on all of us who, on the first evening after his return, listened to the vivid description of his adventures. From January 1 to February 25, 1916, the Moewe captured 15 steamers, of a total tonnage of 57,835 tons. The first news received of her activities was the arrival of the prize Appam, under Lieut. Berg, of the Naval Defence, at Norfolk (Virginia), carrying the crews of the seven steamers sunk up to then. Further news of the Moewe's activities was the announcement that the steamer Westburn, under command of Badswick, had been taken into Teneriffe. After taking his 200 prisoners into port, he sank his ship the next day before the eyes of the English armoured cruiser Sutlej that was lying in wait, so that the prize might not fall into her hands. And now the Mcewe had got back to us in safety! We considered her most important success to be the sinking of the King Edward, the flagship of the 3rd English Battle Squadron, which, on January 3, struck a mine laid by the Moewe, and owing to the damage caused, sank between Cape Wrath and the west ingress to the Pentland Firth.
This encouraged our hopes that the Greif, an auxiliary cruiser sent out a few days previously under Captain Tieze, would have an equally successful trip. Unfortunately, news came to hand a few weeks later that she had been held up on the English guard- ship line between the Shetlands and Norway, and after a fierce fight had succumbed, but not until she had torpedoed and sunk the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, a vessel three times her size. This first encounter, in which the Greif had already suffered severely, attracted a second auxiliary cruiser, the Andes, and the light cruiser Comus, which came up with two destroyers and joined in the fight. Faced by such superior forces, Tieze, after a fierce fight lasting two hours, left the ship, with the surviving members of the crew, and sank her. While the English at first took part in the rescue of the crew, the Comus, according to the statements of prisoners since returned home, again opened fire on the lifeboats and rafts, asserting that a U-boat had been sighted. The result was that several others were killed, the commander among the number. Commander Nevetzky, First Lieut. Weddigen, and Lieutenant Tiemann, had already been killed in the battle. About two-thirds of the crew were taken prisoners by the English.
- ↑ Right Hon. Sir E. Satow.