CHAPTER I.
MAN, NOT GOD, THE AUTHOR OF MORAL EVIL.
SECTION I.
WHAT EVIL IS.
By "difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity," are meant all such considerations drawn from observation of life and the world, as tend to excite doubt in the mind whether the Author of life and of all things can be perfectly wise and good. Now, all such considerations may obviously be reduced to one, namely, the existence of evil; for evil, whether moral or physical, is that which causes pain and unhappiness to man; and it is the sight of pain and unhappiness which creates in the mind a doubt whether the Author of all things can be perfectly good and wise. For the observer argues thus:—If God be All-good, that is, Love, He must wish to see His creatures happy; and if He be All-wise, He must know how to carry His wish into effect: the consequence must be, that His creatures will be happy. This argument seems strictly logical. If then the expected consequence is not seen to follow, a doubt is excited whether the premises are sound: if unhappiness—much unhappiness, is found to exist in the world, a doubt arises in the mind whether the Creator of the world can be perfectly good and wise.
To remove such doubts—to obviate such difficulties—is the object of this Part of the present Work. And this, our purpose, we shall endeavour to effect in the following manner. First, by showing that God is not the author of the evil and consequent unhappiness that exist in the world, and that its existence is contrary to His wish and desire. If this point be made out, it will be evident, that difficulties in regard to His Goodness will be obviated. But, in the second place, it will be our endeavour to show (and in this part of our task the main difficulty will lie) that the existence of evil does not impeach even His Wisdom—when the subject is rightly viewed; and this we shall seek to accomplish, by showing that the existence of evil could not, in the nature of things, have been absolutely prevented; for that such prevention would imply positive contradiction. Now, it will be admitted by all who reflect, that even Omnipotence can not do what involves a contradiction—can not do, in the same place and at the same time, two things that are exactly opposite; for example (to use a common and familiar illustration) no power can create two neighbouring hills without a valley between them; for this implies a contradiction, since the two hills would not be two, but one, if there were no valley between. Or, to take a more suitable illustration: God is, indeed, Omnipotent, yet He cannot lie. And why can He not? Because He is Truth itself; and to lie, or to utter what is untrue, would therefore be contrary to His essential nature. Now, it is impossible even for the Divine Being to act against His essential Nature, because that implies a contradiction; for all action proceeds from an impelling power in the actor, and plainly there cannot be any impelling power in a being to do what is contrary to its essential nature, because that nature is itself the impelling power. If, then, this second point be made out, namely, that the prevention of evil would imply a contradiction, then the Creator cannot be charged with either a want of wisdom or of power, for not doing that which in the nature of things was impossible.
What then, it will be asked, is the contradiction that would have been involved in the absolute prevention of evil by the Divine Being? The argument, in brief, may be thus stated. Evil in its essence, is simply the perversion of the proper order of man's mind. Now, the power to pervert his own mind is necessarily inherent in man, as a being possessed of rationality and moral liberty. Then, it follows, that absolutely to prevent man's perverting his mind (or, in other words, to prevent evil) would imply the destruction of man's rationality and liberty, which would be to destroy his humanity,—since these two faculties are the characteristics of man, and distinguish him from the brutes, which, not having those faculties, cannot pervert the order of their nature. But, to destroy man's reason and moral liberty,—would be contrary both to God'a goodness and wisdom, for from that goodness and wisdom He endowed man with these faculties, as the means of his highest happiness. Now, to do what is contrary to His own goodness and wisdom, would be to act in opposition to Himself, for wisdom and goodness constitute God's very nature. And, to act in opposition to Himself involves a contradiction.
The argument is presented in this brief form, in order that the scope of it may be taken in at a glance. To render it satisfactory, however, will require explanation and elucidation. To this task we now address ourselves.
The first point of the argument consists in the definition of evil: and an exposition of this point will occupy the present Section. Evil, it has been affirmed, is, in essence, simply the perversion of the proper order of man's mind. Evil is evidently not a distinct thing, a sew substance; for if it were, then whoever produced it would be a creator. But this would imply the existence of two Creators: for it is impossible that the same Being should be the Author both of good and evil, because these are opposites; and opposites cannot proceed from the same source, because that which proceeds or is produced must be of the same nature with that from which it proceeds: then if two opposites proceeded, it would suppose the existence of two opposite natures in the Creator—which is impossible, because two opposites cannot exist together, but would neutralize or destroy each other.
It was on this ground, that certain ancient Oriental Sects supposed the existence of two distinct Creators or Creating Powers, the one being the author of good, the other of evil; the former, also, being the Creator of spirit, and the latter of matter. But this notion is contrary not only to Divine Revelation, but to right reason. As shown in a former part of this work, the universe, both spiritual and material, displays, on the whole, such a harmony and unity, as plainly to prove it a derivation from a single Source, the production of one Creator. The seeming variation from this general harmony, apparent in the existence of evil, is not sufficient to invalidate the great truth of there being but one Creator, especially since it can be shown that there is no necessity for ascribing the existence of evil to a distinct Source.
Evil is no more a distinct substance or existence, than disease is. The latter is simply a disorder in the arrangement or state of previously existing substances: the former is the same except that the substances, with which it is connected, are spiritual, not material. Evil is, in fact, moral disease.
That evil is, in truth, simply a perversion of the proper order of man's mind, may be seen from its opposition to goodness. Goodness—and consequent happiness—is simply the result of man's mind being in that true order and state in which it was created by, or proceeded from, the Divine Being, when it was in His image and likeness. He pronounced all things that He had made, good: while they remained, in the order in which they proceeded from Him, they were all, in their respective kinds and degrees, good. The reason was, that the Divine life and nature is in itself essential Goodness or Love, and consequent Joy. The things produced from it were of a nature corresponding, and were consequently good and joyful. To speak with more exactness, however, the things so produced from the Divine, or created, were not in themselves essentially goodness and joy, for then they would have been essentially Divine, which the created universe is not, in any part,—whether man or other creature. But the things created from the Divine Being, were substances and forms, spiritual and material, of a nature, not the same as the Divine, but correspondent to the Divine, so as to be capable of continually receiving the Divine life, which is essential goodness and joy. The diffeienoe between being the same as, and being in harmony with or correspondent to—is very manifest. For instance, a precious stone has its particles so arranged, as to be able to receive, and either to reflect or transmit, the light of the sun, and thus present that light, either glittering in its white brilliance, or divided into its component and beautiful colours. In this case, the stone may be said to correspond, or answer to, or be analagous to, the sun's light, so as, when receiving that light, to present it again in a beautiful reflected or transmitted form. But, on the other hand, let the same light fall on a black mass, and there is no such result, no beauty or splendour at all, but the rays are either suffocated, or turned into ugly appearances. Such a mass may be said to be non-correspondent: the patient does not reflect or present-again the agent, so as to affect the observer in a corresponding manner. Thus, then, the precious stone, before described, is correspondent with the sun's light: but this is wholly different from being the same as, or identical with it: the stone is not light at all—it merely receives the light.
But, to take a more perfect illustration. The human eye is a part of man's body, so constituted as to be a recipient of light—so formed as to answer or correspond to the light of the sun—to receive it and make use of it. Such a structure, it will be observed, is peculiar to the eye. The ear is not of such a structure, and therefore the light has no special effect upon it: the ear acts as well in the dark as in the light. Not so the eye: it is useless in the dark: it is wedded to the light, and thence it receives its stimulus to action. We say then, that the eye is a form correspondent to light. But still the eye is not light: its being correspondent to it, does not make it identical with, or the same as, light. Here, then, is the difference between being correspondent to a thing, and being the same as that thing.
Now, this is a most important difference and distinction, and one that needs well to be understood—for it is just this which constitutes the difference between the Creator and His creation—the distinction between God and man. Were any part of God's creation the same as, or identical with, God the Creator, then it would plainly be Divine. But this is not the case: all created things, from the highest to the lowest, are simply forms and substances, either spiritual or material, which correspond to the Divine nature; the effect of which correspondence is, that they can receive the life flowing every moment into them from the Divine Being, and so, if animate, be good and happy,—or, if inanimate, serve as means to the happiness of the animate. This is true of all things in the created universe, whether spiritual or natural, whether in heaven or earth. All are mere receptacles or recipients of the Divine life, and are not that life itself. Even man's soul or mind is not in itself in the least degree Divine, or partaking of the Divine substance; for, if it were, then man would be God:—for, as his soul is a part of himself, then, if his soul were Divine, he would be so far Divine. But, to say this, is as contrary to right reason as to Divine Revelation. Every thing Divine is infinite: but man's soul is not infinite; then it cannot be Divine. And the Scripture says, "there is none good but one, that is, God:" and it also declares that there is but one God; but if man's soul were Divine, there would be as many gods, as there are men. Man's soul or mind is simply a created spiritual organism, so formed as to be in correspondence with the Divine nature or life: that is, so as to be capable of receiving and perceiving and enjoying that life, as it flows in every moment from God; just as the eye is a created material organism, so formed as to be in correspondence with the light of the sun, which it every moment receives afresh from that sun, and, when in health, enjoys.
Goodness, then, with its accompanying happiness, we see, is not an attribute properly of man's own soul or mind, but is an effect of that mind's being in an orderly state; an effect of its being in such an order as to correspond to the Divine life, and thus to receive and enjoy it, as it continually flows in from God. This explains philosophically (so to speak) the meaning of the passage, "there is none good but one, that is, God."[1] The goodness belongs to God, not to man; for the goodness which appears in man, is but the effect of the continual action of God upon the soul; or to speak still more exactly, the goodness or love is the life itself from God continually flowing into man's soul when in an orderly state, and which man is allowed to feel and enjoy as his own, though, it is really God's in him. To make it evident that the goodness is God's and not man's,—suppose that life or Divine love were to cease for an instant to flow in, man's soul or spiritual organism would become cold and lifeless, it would enjoy nothing, perceive nothing, feel nothing. The created thing might still be there, but it would have no enjoyment or consciousness at all: it could neither be called good nor any thing else, except empty. It would be as the eye, when there is no light: there is the organism still: but it is not useful, or beautiful, or bright—nor can any quality be predicated of it: that which gave it all its life and beauty and usefulness is absent. The Æolian harp hangs there;—but without the wind to breathe upon it, it is no harp, it is but a piece of soundless wood. So, the soul of man, unless breathed upon every instant by the Spirit of God, is a lifeless thing: the heartstrings of themselves, give forth no harmony of love—the voice no tune. God alone is life: man is but a recipient instrument and organ of life. God alone is good: man is but a recipient, from moment to moment, of goodness from Him. Let no man, then, lay his hand upon his heart, and say, "I am good;" or on his head, and say, "I am intellectual." He is, in fact, neither: of himself he is nothing but an empty form: but so far as his spirit is in the order in which God intended it to be, so far he is able to receive the life from God, which consists of love and wisdom,—and to manifest that life to others, in the forms of goodness and truth, or of intellect and love. And for this,—let him not be proud, but rather, thankful.
Goodness, then, we perceive, as appearing in man, is simply the result of his soul or mind being in a state of spiritual order,—such that it is a form corresponding to the Divine life, and thus able to receive and manifest it as it flows in from God. Understanding this, we shall now be able to see, by contrast, what Evil is.
If we revert to the illustration of the precious stone and the black mass, we shall observe, that the different appearances which these two presented to us respectively, were not caused by any difference in the sun's light that shone upon them: that was precisely the same. The difference in their appearance, then,—the one being sparkling and beautiful, the other dark and ugly—was simply the effect of the difference in the nature and structure of the two recipient objects. Nay, we may say, that it was not necessarily caused even by a difference in their constituent particles, but only by a difference in the arrangement or order of those particles—a difference in the organization of the substances. A diamond, for instance, is, as we know, pure carbon: charcoal is the same. "The diamond," says chemical science, "is pure carbon, and differs from charcoal (leaving out of question its trifling impurieties) only in the arrangement of its molecules." Now, here is a very striking natural fact: two objects of precisely the same constituent substance, and differing only in the arrangement of the particles which compose that substance, yet, in consequence of that difference, present appearances in the highest degree contrasted and opposite—the one being transparent, brilliant, and white,—the other opaque and black. Such. is the power of arrangement merely: such is the wondrous effect of difference simply in organization or order, the constituent substances being absolutely the same. Nor is the difference confined to a passing appearance merely: but the current values of the two things among men are at similar extremes: the one being accounted of the highest price, and sometimes almost priceless,—the other of little value, comparatively worthless. We might fancy the molecules of a piece of charcoal, calling out, in their envy, to those of a neighboring diamond, "Cousins, how is this? are we not of the same family,—nay, of the very same blood and bone? are we not in fact every whit at good as you? How is it, then, that every body stares at you, as they go by,—ay, and stop and draw forth their purses, and offer nameless sums to possess you, while they do not even cast upon us so much as a glance?"—"It is the difference in our order," reply the diamond molecules; "'order is Heaven's first law:' the difference in arrangement is what constitutes the great distinction between us: you are huddled there together in none-can-tell what a chaotic mass,—there is no seeing through you at all; but we stand here arranged in an elegant and lucid order: it is no wonder that they look at us!"
Now, here, is a great truth, a profound truth, reaching further into the depths of things, than any one would, from its seeming simplicity, at first imagine, Order is indeed Heaven's first law: it is the great law that regulates all things natural and spiritual, in earth and in heaven: and according as they stand in relation to that law, so is determined their essential character. There is a standard of order: that is, the Divine,—God Himself. Things, as they were originally created from God,—consequently from that Order, and in forms correspondent to that Order,—were all good. They differed indeed; but they differed only in variety of beauty and excellence, as derived from different parts of the Divine Order: they differed only as the foot from, the hand, or the ear from the eye; each had its beauty, each its worth: all were good, and useful, and joyful—so to speak—in their several kinds and degrees of existence, as variously derived from the perfect and infinite Order, the Divine Being Himself. There was the difference only of variety: there was not the difference of opposition and contrariety. There was as yet no disorder and no evil. What first introduced disorder, or a perversion of true order, and thus originated evil, we shall by and by inquire: that is not the point immediately before us now. That point is, to show satisfactorily that what is called Evil is simply disorder, (or, more accurately speaking, the effect of disorder); that the constituent particles of the good soul and of the bad, as of the diamond and the charcoal, are essentially the same,—and must be, because there is but one essential substance, namely, God, and what is derived from God. But the order of the two things is different and opposite, and this constitutes the difference between the good and the evil. This great principle, will, when clearly seen and followed out, be found to explain satisfactorily the origin of evil.
Let us proceed, now, to adduce another illustration drawn from nature, which will render still more clear the principle just laid down. There is a strict analogy, it is to be remembered, between the material and the spiritual worlds, since they are derived from the same Creator; and it is from the existance of that analogy, that the laws of the one can be adduced as just illustrations of the laws of the other. Here is the true foundation of figurative writing. The poet pictures to us a flower as an emblem of a pretty thought, and presents delicious fruits as types of good deeds; and we readily admit the illustration, because there is an inward perception of the existence of an analogy between the worlds of matter and of mind. Keeping this in view, we will proceed with our illustration. An example of the distinct appearances of light, when manifested by the different recipient objects, has been presented in the instance of the charcoal and the diamond. We will now present one having reference to heat. With the coming heat of Spring and Summer, dead nature revives. All things in the vegetable kingdom start up, put forth presently their heads from the ground, and prepare to develop into full existence, and to perform their part on the theatre of nature. But the bad spring up as well as the good, weeds as well as flowers, the poisonous plant side by side with the delicious and the useful. The same heat of the sun vivifies both kinds. The same power or the same substance (whichever heat may in itself be) being received, taken up and assimilated, so to speak, by both, becomes in the one case, delicious nutriment,—in the other, deadly poison. Here we see, then, that the constitution or structure of the various recipient objects, has power to convert the inflowing influence or substance into a nature corresponding to its own, and thus cause it to nourish its own life, of whatever nature that life be, whether good or evil, ugly or beautiful. There is but one sun for all—but one light and heat for all—yet how various are the colours, how different the qualities, of the myriad objects in the natural world. It is plainly the differing organization and structure of the several recipient objects, which, modifying the influent heat and light of the sun, and at the same time the juices from the earth, produce all these differences.
Here, then, we discover a great natural law, to which there is a great correspondent spiritual law. God, as a Divine Sun, the "Sun of righteousness," is ever pouring forth His spiritual heat and light, His love and wisdom, alike on all His creatures: as it is declared, "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (for this passage is to be understood spiritually, as well as naturally). But each mind receives that inflowing love and wisdom, according to its own state, according to its own mental structure and organization. The good receive that Divine life, (for the Divine life, as before shown, is love and wisdom) into a mental organisation or form which is correspondent thereto; they receive that love or spiritual heat, and bring it forth again in the delicious fruits of good and benevolent actions; and they reflect that wisdom or spiritual light in the beautiful lights and colours of true, wise, and sparkling thoughts. While, on the other hand, the bad, receiving the same Divine life, or love and wisdom, into perverted or distorted mental forms and organizations, turn light into darkness and good into evil: the truth they distort into error and falsity, and the gentle flame of love they pervert into the furious fire of hate. Thus is the Lord's love turned into hatred—His wisdom into folly. Is God the author, then, of the folly and the hate?—No more than the sun is the source of blackness and of poison: the sun's light is not black, nor its heat poisonous; they are the opposite, being in themselves bright and healthful: but the recipient objects, perverting them, make them such. So God is not evil, nor the author of evil: it is man's distorted mental form, which, perverted from its original order, turns the inflowing life from God, which is in itself love and goodness, into its exact opposite, and thus produces and presents to view what we call Evil. Thus, Evil is love perverted: it is love, turned from its proper objects, namely, God and the neighbour, backwards and downwards toward self: in a word, evil in its essence is self-love.
- ↑ Matthew xix. 17.