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Historic Highways of America/Volume 8/Appendixes

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Appendixes

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APPENDIX A

PORTIONS OF CLARK'S MEMOIR[1] WHICH REFER TO THE MARCH TO KASKASKIA

" . . on the [24th] of June 1778 we left our Little Island and Run about a mile up the River in order to gain the main Channel and shot the Falls at the very moment of the sun being in a great Eclipse which caused Various conjectures among the superstitious as I knew that spies were kept on the River below the Towns of the Illinois I had resolved to march part of the way by Land and of course left the whole of our baggage, except as much as would equip us in the Indian mode. The whole of our force, after leaving such as was Judged not competent to the expected fatiegue, Consisted only of four companies, commanded by Captns Jno. Montgomery, ​J. Bowman, L. Helm, and W. Harrod my force being so small to what I expected owing to the various circumstances already mentioned I found it necessary to alter my plans of operations, as post St. Vincent at this time was a Town of considerable force consisting of near four Hundred militia with an Indian Town adjoining and great numbers continually in the Neighborhood, and in the scale of Indian affairs of More Importance than any other. [I] had thought of attacking it first but now found that I could by no means venture near it Resolved to begin my career in the Illinois where there was more Inhabitants but scattered in different Villages, and less danger of being immediately overpowered by the Indians, and in case of necessity, [we could] probably make our retreat good to the Spanish side of the Mississippi, but if Successful here [we] might pave our way to the possession of Post St. Vincent. . . As I intended to leave the Ohio at Ft. Massiac 3 leagues below the Tennessee I landed on Barritaria a small island in the mouth of that River in order to prepare for the march. . . having every thing pre​pared we moved down to a little gul[ley] a small distance above Massiac in which we concealed our Boats and set out a Northwest course, nothing remarkable on this rout, the weather was favorable, in some parts water scarce as well as game, of course we suffered drought and Hunger but not [to] excess, on the third Day, John Saunders, our principal guide, appeared confused we soon discovered that he was totally lost without there was some other cause of his present conduct I asked him various question, and from his answers I could scarcely determine what to think of him, whether or not he was sensible that he was lost the thought of which [?] or that he wished to deceive us the cry of the whole Detachment was that he was a Traitor, he beged that he might be suffered to go some distance into a plain that was in full view to try to make some discovery whether or not he was right. I told him he might but that I was suppitious [suspicious] of him from his conduct that from the first of his being employed always said that he knew the way well that there was now a different appearance that I saw the nature of the Cuntry ​was such that a person once acquainted with it could not in a short time forget it that a few men should go with him to prevent his escape—and that if he did not discover and take us into the Hunters Road that lead from the East into Kaskaskia that he had frequently described that I would have him Immediately put to death which I was determined to have done, but after an Hour or two's search he came to a place that he perfectly knew and we discovered that the poor fellow had been as they call it bewildered. On the eavining of the fourth of July we got with in a few miles of the Town."

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APPENDIX B

ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CLARK'S PLACE OF CROSSING THE "TWO WABASHES"[2]

Mr. Draper founds his conclusion that the "two Wabashes" were the Little Wabash and the Fox wholly on present-day (1878–90) reports[3] of the nature of the country at the Little Wabash above the mouth of the Fox and above the mouth of the Big Muddy. The reports he received from residents of the neighborhoods carry evidence that the ground between the Little Wabash and Fox most nearly agrees with Clark's and Bowman's descriptions of the crossing-place.[4] This is true, and is of importance. But Clark's and Bowman's use of the word "heights" was merely relative; Mr. Draper's correspondents speak of high grounds and low grounds as the land ​lies today. With water but three or four feet deep, a few acres of land might have been uncovered, though not sufficiently elevated today to be termed a hill or even high ground. There is a point on the Little —abash above the mouth of the Fox that can be made to answer in a general way Clark's and Bowman's descriptions—going on the doubtful supposition that their descriptions were entirely accurate. In order to find a spot where Clark saw nearly five miles of water before him, Mr. Draper suggests a point about two miles above the mouth of the Fox, where there is a wide bottom on the west of the Little —abash, another bottom between that stream and the Fox, and another east of the Fox.[5] The possibility that the distance was exaggerated by Clark (who said Vincennes was two hundred and forty miles from Kaskaskia when it was not over one hundred and seventy-five) is not considered. As a matter of fact, the whole plan of finding today five miles of low ground from any point west of the Little —abash to the east of either the Fox or the Big Muddy, is over​thrown by Clark's statement in the Memoir that (on the western side of the Little Wabash) "we formed a camp on a height which we found on the bank of the river." Mr. Draper's objection to the Little Wabash and Big Muddy crossing-place was because the high ground on the bank of the Little Wabash (seemingly here referred to by Clark) prevented there being five miles of low ground to the opposite side of the Big Muddy.[6] If Clark and Bowman gave the distance of width of water correctly, the crossing-place was two miles above the mouth of the Fox, and Clark's statement of forming a camp on a height on the river bank is totally inexplicable—for there is no height at this point to answer such a description. If, by "nearly" five miles, Clark meant three miles, misjudging distance on water inversely with the usual way, his camp could have been on the immediate high bank of the Little Wabash above the mouth of the Big Muddy.[7]

Certain other considerations have a ten​dency to influence the present writer in believing that the crossing-place was here—above the mouth of the Big Muddy. It was exceedingly wet from the day Clark left Kaskaskia; even on the watersheds he found deep standing water. On reaching the Petit Fork he found the rivers at flood-tide. By turning north to the Clay County route he would strike the Little Wabash at a more northerly point, and would almost completely head the deep little Bonpas which lay between the Fox and the Big Wabash. The Clay County route was in one sense, then, a watershed route, compared with the Wayne County route. It is difficult to believe that Clark's guides would ignore this after having been compelled to cross the Petit Fork on felled trees. Again, on the second day out from the crossing-place of the Little Wabash, Bowman records: "16th. Marched all day through rain and water; crossed Fox river." If this entry is correct, of course the Little Wabash and Big Muddy crossing-place is completely established. Mr. Draper, holding that the Fox was crossed simultaneously with the Little Wabash on the fifteenth, suggests ​that Bowman meant Bonpas for Fox.[8] Choosing between possible errors, the present writer finds it easier to believe that Bowman misjudged the width of water crossed on the fifteenth, than that he called the Bonpas the Fox. For on the seventeenth the heads of the Bonpas are specifically accounted for by Bowman as follows: "17th. Marched early; crossed several runs, very deep." Mr. Draper does not account for these, and it is difficult to do so if they were not the heads of the Bonpas. For, if Clark crossed the Little Wabash just above the mouth of the Fox, his route, after crossing the Bonpas, was northeast, and would, without any sort of question, have been on watersheds between little tributaries, first of the Bonpas, and then of the Embarras. Again, by every account, it is sure Clark and Bowman expected to strike the Embarras, and strike it at about seven or eight miles due west from Vincennes. If, as Draper believed, they were pursuing an old trail, which, it is well known,[9] ran from the crossing-place of the Little Wabash ​two miles above the mouth of the Fox to the Wabash just below the mouth of the Embarras, how can it be explained that the army reached, or ever intended to reach, the Embarras seven or eight miles above its mouth? The very name would warn them away and it seems highly improbable that, if what was later known as the southern route was traversed, the army would ever have seen the Embarras.

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APPENDIX C

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY ON THE MAUMEE AS GIVEN IN THE IRWIN MANUSCRIPT[10]

"The next Day after the rear arrived a Detachment of 400 men was ordered out under the Command of Col. Trotter of Kentucky with orders to assertain what Course the Indians had went to Draw 2 Days provisions and Be out over night I was a volunteer in Sd. Detachment There was about 25 Mounted men attached to the Same a short Distance after we crossed the St Joseph River from where part of the Town stood fell in with 2 Indians Killed Both and Lost one man marched all Day after in good order Seen considerable Signs Could not assertain which way They had gone The Six pounders was Shot about Sun Set at the main Camp The Col Concluded it was Done to Call the Com​mand in we returned to Camp a short time after Dark Lay out side of Camp all night had our own guards out, Turned out next morning to perform the 2d Day under Command of Col Hardin went a northwest Course from whence we Crossed sd river after going 3 or 4 mile found a Large fresh Indian trail pursued it with all Speed in Single file or in any way they Could get allong from front to the rear was over half a mile The Indians retreated with a view to draw the front into ambuscade which they Done Completely with Two fires Cut off the front Entirely our Company being in front the first Day had to take the rear the Second Day when the front was Cut off we formed a Line in the rear Cols Hardin Hall and Major Fountain was all on horse Back halted with us when we formed, The Indians pursued the front untill they Come within one hundred yards Then halted we had But about 75 in our Company had all treed in Line across the trace They Could see the officers on horse Back with us we Stood in that situation untill near Dark Then Covered the retreat got into Camp a short time after Dark I ​never could assertain how many men we Lost in that Scrap a Captn Scott son of Gen or governor Scott of Kentucky was killed in that Scrap our Troops was very much scattered a Number Came in after Night as the Cannon was fired Every hour through the Night at the main Camp perhaps there was 15 or 20 killed, perhaps more or Less The Commencement was one of the most unexpected Surprises Ever any troops met with Two of us went out and Examined their Encampment where their trace was first Discovered over 2 mile on this Side where the Battle was as there was there a general Halt for a short time I would have Said there was 4 or 5 hundred Indians and we had not Near as many Men that Day as was out the Day Before There was Experienced officers along that ought to have known Better they was too anxious on the pursuit the Troops should have Been marched in such a Situation that no advantage Could have Been Taken of them as was the Case the Day Before The army remained in Camp perhaps 2 Days making ready to return to Fort Washington when the army moved from Camp perhaps about ​the 10th or 12th of November 1790 four or five mounted men with an officer placed themselves on a high Eminence so that they could see over all the place where the Indian town Stood about two hours after the army Cleared out the Indians Came in from Different Quarters to get provision as they had Considerable hid under ground Said Spies remained there untill Dark Came into Camp which was about 4 or 5 mile Informed Harmar and the officers what Discoveries they had made a Detachment of 4 or 5 hundred men was Drafted from the Different Companies of sd army that Night to be on the ground Next morning by Day Light and to Be placed under the Command of Col Hardin the plan of attack was made By the officers previous to their march and was well Executed By the officers and troops Engaged in the Same There was too few troops in said Detachment for the number of the Enemy they had to Contend with if 200 men had arrived there about Sunrise they would have give the Enemy a Complete Defeat They give them a pretty good Drubing as it was There was about 60 regulars under the ​Command of Major —— They fought well Done great Execution Lost Their major and Lieutenant in the Battle. Col Hardins post in The aforesaid plan was on The west side of The St. Joseph river opposite to where The Indian town stood he was There in good Time The other Troops Crossed the Maumee went right to where The Town Stood The Indians was Encamped in and round where it stood Major Fountain had the Command of The Light horse and mounted men he Charged right in among The Enemy fired off his pistols and Drew his Sword Before They Could recover The Shock George Adams informed them that he was Near The Major at That Time That it appeared when The Enemy got over Their surprise Ten or Twelve Indians Discharged Their guns at him The Major kind of fell or hung on his horse They then Discharged Several Guns at said Adams he received Several flesh wounds But recovered By this Time The Militia and regulars Come up. The Indians fought with Desperation was Drove from Their Encampment By The Militia and regulars Down The Bank into the river which was ​perhaps 20 yards wide and perhaps 6 inches Deep Col Hardins men on The opposite Side which placed them Between two fires The Indians charged on Hardins troops having no other Chance to Escape Hardins troops give way and retreated the Same way They went out and was not in That Battle any more. Some of the Troops informed me That Major Fountain was Living when our Troops Drove the Indians from The Battle ground. Major Mcmillin of Kentucky Collected The Troops and Tarried on The Battle Ground untill They Indians had entirely Disappeared and not one to Be Seen or heard I never understood what was the Number of our Troops Killed by the Enemy on That Campaign Though it was Considerable my oppinion is There was more Indians Killed in That Battle Than was Killed when Genl —ayne defeated Them in 1794 if Harmar had Sent out a Detachment of Six hundred men Next Day to Collected The Dead and Buried Them and assertained how many of The Enemy was Killed I think There would have Been no risk in it as The Indians was So Completely Cut up on The Day of The ​Battle Such a move would have Been an honor and Credit to that Campaign I can Never agree That Harmars Campaing was a Defeated one."

  1. ↑ See ante, page 18, note 2. The original of Clark's Memoir is found in the Draper MSS., xlvii J, fols. 1–128.
  2. ↑ See ante, page 53.
  3. ↑ Draper MSS., xxv J, fols. 14–60
  4. ↑ Id., xxiv, fol. 9; xxv, fols. 14–20, 60.
  5. ↑ Id., fols. 14, 43.
  6. ↑ Id., xxiv, fol. 9.
  7. ↑ Id.
  8. ↑ Id., fols. 49, 50.
  9. ↑ Id., xxiv, fol. 13.
  10. ↑ See ante, page 101, note 86. The extract here given is from Draper MSS., iv U, fols. 3–17.
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