History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 32

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XXXII.

INVESTMENT OF MEXICO.

May-June, 1521.

Phases of Heroism — The Brigantines upon the Lake — Division of Forces between Alvarado, Sandoval, and Olid — Desertion, Capture, and Execution of Xicotencatl — Departure of the Troops from Tezcuco — Naval Battle — Possession Taken of the Causeways — At One Point Cortés unexpectedly Gains Entrance to the City — But is Driven out.

The ideal heroic character is to be viewed from two standpoints: the effect of heroism on the hero, and on the world. A very bad person may do mankind a great service. An evil-minded man, while sinking his soul yet deeper in corruption, may bring benefactions upon society. But even a fairly good man cannot increase his innate nobleness of character while doing injury to his fellows.

I do not know that the claim of good man was ever advanced for Hernan Cortés, except, indeed, by that strange fanaticism which, dazzled by one object, fails to see other objects, or the terrible means for their attainment. He and his followers formed a sad mixture of good and evil, in which the latter predominated, if judged by the moral standard which they had formed for themselves as soldiers of the cross. The grossest injustice, the most horrible wickedness constituted part of their moral ideal, so that while fighting for the highest morality they were the most immoral of men. Long after the conquest was consummated, under the ministrations of men of piety and ability, it would seem that the weapons used by these conquerors, who at times justified murder as the highest morality, were still instinct with blood, even as the cornel-wood spear with which the king of Thrace transfixed the unhappy Polydorus springs into life instinct with the blood of Priam's slaughtered son.

Cortés was not an idealist after the manner of Columbus. Both were full of egoism; the spiritual-mindedness of both was essentially selfish. They would both dictate terms to God and their king, that for so much service they must have so much reward. Both were full of the follies of their day; but Columbus displayed a grave, unconscious folly, while Cortés consciously indulged in all the follies of lust and cruelty that prudence admitted or his aim demanded. Cortés abandoned himself to ambition; Columbus to brooding thought. The insanity of reckless adventure was not the insanity of Columbus, who nevertheless was as mad as any lunatic in his own way. Commanding energy and practical daring were as conspicuous in Cortés as in Columbus; but it happened that the aims of Columbus were of greater import to the race than those of Cortés.

How alike, and yet how different, these men! Cortés was impetuous and extravagant; Columbus calm, calculating, and prudent. One was full of joyous activity, the simple exercise of which was his greatest pleasure; obligations of every sort sat lightly on him; the other was but an instrument in the hands of providence. Both were ambitious, both excessively religious; but Cortés, in the main, made religion subservient to advancement, as before noted, while mundane glories to Columbus were hollow indeed beside his heavenly aspirations. Both were exceedingly great men; both became eminent by a selfish adventure of self; but Columbus saw the New World through the glorious haze of immortality, while Cortés viewed Mexico under the lightly woven covering of personal ambition.

Cortés was an Antony rather than a Cæsar, nor did he lack that one great gift of Antony's, subordination, as we have seen. He was not so greatly in love with himself, stood not so greatly in awe of himself, as Cæsar; he was possessed of finer perceptions and feelings, and with consummate versatility could drop himself out of his plans as occasion required. Nor was Cortés without imagination and the æsthetic sense, though of a grosser and sensual kind; but it is not in great men that we are to look for the swelling harmonies of nature.

A turning-point was now reached in the campaign. The brigantines were completed, and the siege could begin. The day for the entry of the vessels into the lake was a gala day, inaugurated with the communion and festive with the concourse of gayly attired spectators.^[1] After prayer and a discourse the flags with name and royal arms were hoisted on each vessel,^[2] amid salvos and cheers, and the dams being broken, the gallant fleet floated down the canal to the placid lake.

While the mute bunting was thus proclaiming Spanish supremacy over these inland waters, a Te Deum, in which joined a thousand voices, echoed aloud the gratitude of every heart. Each vessel was placed in charge of a captain^[3] with twenty-four Spaniards, of whom about six were cross-bowmen and arquebusiers, some artillerists to manage the bronze gun, and twelve rowers, six to each side. The boats were evidently half-decked.^[4]

Active preparations were now made to begin the siege. Tlascaltecs, Huexotzincas, Cholultecs, Chalcans, and other allies were summoned to send in contingents by Whitsunday, the latter to assemble at Chalco, and the Tlascaltecs at Tezcuco. Though but ten days' notice was given, the last named presented themselves in the camp before the appointed time to the number of over fifty thousand, which was increased by later reënforcement.^[5]

As they approached Tezcuco under the guidance of Ojeda, and commanded notably by Chichimectatl and Xicotencatl junior, they spread out in one long serpentine file, bristling with iztli points and brilliant with shields and armor covered with variegated devices and flowing plumage, while at intervals waved high the banners of the different corps. Cortés went forth to meet them with grand demonstrations, and as they marched past loud vivas^[6] rent the air.

On the 28th of April Cortés had mustered his forces and found that, with the several reënforcements lately arrived, there were present over nine hundred Spaniards, of whom eighty-six were horsemen and one hundred and eighteen cross-bowmen and arquebusiers;^[7] the rest being armed with swords and shields and the more formidable pikes. They were well protected with cotton armor, many having cuirasses and corselets, and small weapons were not wanting. The artillery consisted of three heavy iron guns, fifteen smaller pieces of bronze, mostly distributed among the vessels, with ten quintals of powder and a quantity of shot, while some fifty thousand arrows had been furnished by the Tezcucan towns, all fitted according to pattern with copper tips.^[8]

Not only had the Spaniards, particularly the new recruits, been well exercised in cavalry movements, target practice, fencing, and pike drill, but the allies had been trained to a certain extent in European tactics. For efficiency and good conduct this army rose far above any yet mustered in the Indies. In the usual speech before the ranks, Cortés pointed out how God had favored them with constant victories and with reënforcements which had nearly doubled their number and resources. They might indeed be hopeful, for holy was their cause. Full of confidence they could march against the only stronghold yet opposed to them, avenge their slaughtered comrades, and win riches and glory for themselves.

On Whitmonday, the 20th of May, an apportionment of the troops was made to Alvarado, Olid, and Sandoval, who led the cavalry in person, but directed the movements of the infantry through captains, and of the allies through native chiefs. Each received from twenty-four to thirty horsemen, and one hundred and fifty infantry, divided into two or three battalions, with a proportionate number of arquebusiers, crossbowmen, guns, and ammunition, besides from twenty to forty thousand allies. To Sandoval was given the smallest number of horse and the largest number of allies, those gathered at Chalco having orders to await him, while Alvarado received a full half of the Tlascaltec force, with whom the Tonatiuh was a great favorite. To this leader Tlacopan was assigned for head-quarters; to Olid, Coyuhuacan; and Sandoval received orders to complete the destruction of Iztapalapan, and then to advance through Coyuhuacan and along one of the southern causeways, and there to select his head-quarters, under the protection of the brigantines. These appointments and orders underwent several changes during the siege. For himself Cortés selected the management of the fleet, whereon so much depended during the opening of the siege, and in addition to its ships' companies of three hundred men he was supported by several thousand allies, chiefly Tezcucans under Ixtlilxochitl, who attended in a large number of canoes. This selection hardly pleased the army, which considered their operations the most important and dangerous, and therefore in need of Cortés' supervision. But he evidently never intended to remain with the fleet except at the beginning.^[9] The following day the allied forces apportioned to Alvarado and Olid were ordered to march in advance, for greater convenience, to the border of Tezcuco province and there await the Spaniards. Not many hours after their departure a messenger appeared with the announcement that Xicotencatl, the companion general of Chichimecatl, had disappeared. Inquiries revealed that shortly before his cousin Piltecuhtli had been severely and wantonly struck by a soldier during a quarrel over some carriers. In order to save the soldier from the wrath of Cortés, Ojeda, the Spanish inspecting officer over the allied forces, smoothed the matter and sent the injured nobleman home. It was claimed by some that this outrage had so wounded Xicotencatl that he followed his cousin. Others assumed that both chiefs were in love with the same woman, and that Xicotencatl could not bear to leave his rival alone in the field. But the true reason lay no doubt in his dislike to fight for the Spaniards, whom he had never ceased to oppose, openly and in secret, as invaders bent on the enslavement of the whole country. This idea, if faint at first, had become more fixed with every fresh blow against his personal ambition, such as the first series of defeats which plucked from him his just renown; the equal or perhaps superior position assigned in the native army to Chichimecatl, of whom he appears to have been deeply jealous;^[10] and the prospect of a wearisome and unprofitable campaign, wherein he must be content to figure as a subordinate, not only of Alvarado, but subject perhaps to the orders of petty Spanish officers. All this became too galling to his proud spirit, and with a few followers he turned toward his mountain home.

It would never do to countenance desertion, and by so prominent a man, at the very opening of a campaign; and Cortés immediately sent a number of troopers in pursuit, with instructions to represent to the chief the gravity of his offence, which cast a heavy stain on Tlascaltec honor, and to persuade him to return. They speedily overtook him, only to meet with insolence. He would not go back; if his people had listened to him they would not now be tools and servants of a horde of foreigners. With this reply the troops were forced to return. "This cacique is incorrigible," exclaimed Cortés, "and will ever be a traitor and counsellor to evil. I have had enough of him!" The troopers were at once sent back, accompanied by an alguacil and some trusty Tlascaltec nobles, with orders to arrest the fugitive and bring him to Tezcuco. In a letter to the republican lords, Cortés at the same time complained of the desertion and its grave influence, and declared that according to Spanish law the penalty was death. They replied that the sane punishment obtained in Tlascala; and not only do they appear to have actively aided in surrendering the culprit, but they declared all his property, including wives and slaves, confiscated to the crown, against which he had sinned.^[11] Indeed, the arrogance of the young chief does not seem to have endeared him to the other rulers. Instantly on his arrival he was sentenced and hanged on a very high gallows, while the crier and interpreter announced his crime.

The execution of so prominent a chief, heir to one of the rulers among his best allies, was an act which few besides Cortés would have ventured on; but he saw the necessity for a firm observance of discipline, and was not deceived in the salutary effect which it had on the allies.^[12] There were not many Tlascaltecs left in Tezcuco, or a serious demonstration might have occurred; as it was, the mantle and maxtli of the deceased were secured, and an eager contest ensued for them as relics. Axayacatzin Xicotencatl had achieved fame before the advent of the Spaniards.^[13]

Alvarado and Olid had set out from Tezcuco for Tlacopan with their Spanish forces on the 22d of May,^[14] taking the same route by which Cortés had returned from the Xochimilco campaign, and though longer than that north of Tezcuco Lake, yet it was easier and safer. On approaching Acolman, Olid sent a party in advance to secure quarters, and when Alvarado arrived he found every house bearing the green bough on the roof, which indicated occupancy. This raised a tumult between the parties, and even the captains would have come to blows but for the interference of friends. Informed of the trouble, Cortés took steps to reconcile them, although the two leaders never renewed their former intimacy.

On the evening of the fourth day they reached Tlacopan, which was deserted, as were all the towns along the route.^[15] Late as was the hour, forages and reconnoissances were made, involving a skirmish with the Mexicans. The following day, Šunday, Olid proceeded to Chapultepec to cut the aqueduct which supplied the city, a task which involved another encounter wherein a score of Mexicans fell. Meanwhile the canals were filled and other obstacles removed which might impede a free advance, and foraging tours were made. The Mexicans continued to harass the operations with repeated sallies, and finally Alvarado, with characteristic rashness, pursued them until his troops were well advanced between the houses and bridges. The Mexicans, who had retreated on purpose, now rolled back upon his front and flanks. The roofs, hitherto deserted, teemed with slingers and archers, who showered their missiles with terrible effect, while from the lanes and openings between the houses sprang numbers who assailed the cramped soldiers with their long lances, swords, and clubs, and leaped back into their holes and canoes and behind breastworks whenever they were pressed. The allies were ordered back, and the Spaniards slowly retreated, with a loss of eight killed and fifty wounded, glad to be relieved from their strait.

Olid was highly incensed with Alvarado for his rashness, and regardless of all remonstrance he seized the pretext to hasten the departure to his own camp at Coyuhuacan. He established his head-quarters on Corpus Christi day, the 30th of May, and from this date, accordingly, Clavigero and many others date the beginning of the siege. The causeway leading thence to Mexico was broken, and he sought for several days to cover the breaches and gain a footing upon it, but without success. The Mexican warriors displayed great spirit, and their leaders are to be blamed for not energetically assuming the offensive and attacking the two camps.

 

The Mexicans had not quite understood the drift of Cortés' delay and preliminary manœuvres. When they found two camps established, the aqueduct destroyed, and earnest preparations in progress for investment, their eyes were opened; but they were then too bewildered to act with promptness and precision. The chronicles relate that Quauhtemotzin held a grand council to consider the situation, and to sound the spirit of the people for peace or war, so that there might be no faltering when necessity came. A number indeed of the elder and wiser lords, particularly of the Montezuma faction, spoke of the formidable enginery and strength of the Spaniards, and their host of allies, and expressed fears of failure. With the occupation of all the surrounding territory, and the influx of people from abroad, the food supply might fall short, and famine and sickness ensue. But the young men and the warriors, as might be expected, would listen to no counsellor whose words implied cowardice; they were enthusiastic for resistance, and formed too numerous a party to allow the entertaining of peace proposals. Quauhtemotzin cautiously refrained from committing himself,^[16] but reminded the assembly that the oracles of their gods and heroic ancestors had above all to be listened to in so important a matter as the preservation of the homes and sacred temples intrusted to their care. He knew well what answer would come from the priests, whose possessions, wealth, and honors depended on the exclusion of invaders, aiming above all at the overthrow of their religion. "My people shall not fear the enemy," spake the war-god Huitzilopochtli, "for the allied hosts will not persevere long in the siege, and I will scatter the Castilians now as hitherto." This utterance suited many views, and the declaration for war was solemnized by sacrifices of human beings, including the four Spaniards lately captured.^[17]

Renewed efforts were made to fortify and supply the city, and canoes were collected to aid in the defence. With insolent assurance, derived from the oracles, corps of warriors would advance close to the Spanish camps and vent their feelings with insults and menaces, "Men of evil, you shall pay for your madness! Behold, the gods have already feasted on your bodies!" they cried, flinging in among the horrified soldiers pieces of their sacrificed comrades. "Our snakes shall drink your blood, and our tigers devour your flesh, though they are already satiated therewith. And you, infamous Tlascaltecs, slaves and traitors! you shall atone for your misdeeds; you shall die a bad death, and furnish flesh for our banquets! Behold!" And therewith they threw in disjointed pieces of dusky human bodies. "We shall not rest till your land is desolated, and not a man or woman left to perpetuate your vile race." Unabashed by this tirade the Tlascaltecs told them not to threaten like women, but to act like men. Still it were better for them to yield unless they wished to be destroyed.

 

Cortés had been delayed till the fleet should be fully prepared. On the 31st of May, following Corpus Christi day, he was able to despatch Sandoval, who, reënforced by some forty thousand allies awaiting him on the Chalco border, marched against Iztapalapan. Although severely crippled by Cortés' expedition, this town still figured as a stronghold of too great importance to be left in the rear. Advised of the movement, the Mexicans hurried by road and water to aid in covering the retreat of the inhabitants. Suddenly smoke columns were observed in different parts of the lake, and cries of alarm ran through the town. Yet more and more hurriedl the people fled, and while one body of warriors retired along the causeway to Mexico, others departed in canoes. The Spanish forces pressed onward in close pursuit, and slaughter, pillage, and torch accompanied them. The chief cause of the panic was the appearance of the brigantines, which had set sail shortly after Sandoval's departure, attended by a large number of Tezcucan canoes^[18] whose object was to coöperate against Iztapalapan. On approaching it the vessels passed close to a steep rocky isle, the Tepepulco, since known as El Peñol del Marqués,^[19] occupied by a large number of fugitives who shouted defiance, and showered stones and arrows. Finding that Sandoval required no aid, Cortés solved to inflict a lesson on the insolent islanders. The Mexicans appeared confident in the impregnable strength of the rock, and gave so warm a reception to the hundred and fifty men with whom Cortés began to climb it, that fully a score were wounded at the onset. The brigantines turned their guns upon them, however, and under this cover the soldiers speedily gained the summit, there to wreak bloody vengeance. Not a man was spared, only the women and children. "It was a beautiful victory!" exclaims Cortes.

While they were pillaging, a large fleet of canoes, five hundred at the lowest estimate,^[20] was seen to approach from the direction of Mexico, bristling with iztli points, which found a gleaming reflection in the smooth waters of the lake. Cortés ordered an immediate return to the brigantines, and rowed them forward into an extended line. He had longed for an opportunity like this, to meet a formidable fleet upon which the brigantines might inflict a lesson severe enough to open the eyes of the enemy to their invincible power; for "in them lay the key of war," as he expressed it. Unfortunately the wind was so light as barely to flap the sails. The hostile fleet had already drawn up in good order just beyond range, evidently puzzled at the passive attitude of the monster vessels, yet shouting defiance.^[21] Cortés stood chafing with impatience, for without wind his greatest advantage would be lost, and his position even become precarious. Just then the waters rippled and a breeze came from abaft which speedily freshened. "Ah, God favors us!" he cried, and with a grateful gaze toward heaven he gave orders to advance under full sail. As they came close to the enemy a blinding volley was sent pouring in upon them from the whole line, from guns, arquebuses, and cross-bows, and while the natives were trying to recover from their confusion, from out the smoke burst the ponderous bows, crashing into the lines of canoes, overturning, breaking, and sinking. In the vessels' wake were wrecks and struggling bodies, while the few canoes which had escaped by passing between the ships struggled to escape the Tezcucan boats in the rear. At the first encounter the canoes in the farther lines turned in hot haste for home, as did a vast number of others which had ventured forth, partly with reënforcements, partly with spectators. But the clumsy-looking vessels sped faster, pursuing their career of destruction for three leagues, into the very canals of the city, whence they turned back to pick up captives. The victory exceeded the wildest hopes of the Spaniards, as Cortés admits, for not only did the Aztecs lose a great number of their foremost warriors and their best canoes, but they surrendered forever to the formidable craft sovereignty over the lake waters, and with it the hope of assistance from trans-lacustrine allies.

Encouraged by this success, Olid advised Alvarado, and both hastened to take advantage of the panic to advance along the causeways and effect considerable execution, impelled as they were with emulation and fresh courage.^[22] Olid had advanced close to Fort Xoloc, which with its stout battlemented walls and towers guarded the junction of the southern causeways, when the brigantines approached it from the eastern side. It was already after vespers; nevertheless Cortés landed to coöperate with his lieutenant and pursue the advantage gained. A breach was made in the wall with one of the heavy guns, and under cover of the fleet's artillery the place was soon carried. Cortés had intended to make Coyuhuacan his head-quarters, but such were the obvious advantages of Xoloc, in strength and in position, for it lay but half a league from Mexico and was connected in the rear with the mainland by three causeways, that he at once decided to establish his camp there, making it also his naval station.

Enraged rather than discouraged by the several defeats, Quauhtemotzin ordered a night attack on Xoloc, contrary to native custom. They approached both by sea and land, but owing to their noise they were observed, and driven back by the artillery. The fort was not very strong on the northern side, and the force within was small; but in the morning half of Olid's troops came to reënforce him, together with fifty of Sandoval's infantry. The addition was opportune, for the Mexicans were advancing in swarms along the causeway as well as by water, this time on the inner side of the road where the vessels could not reach them. The heavy guns soon cleared a space on the roadway, but as the soldiers pursued they suffered severely from the canoes, which not only showered missiles but afforded retreat for the sallying parties. Orders were accordingly given to cut a passage through the embankment, so that the four brigantines might enter to clear the inner basin. By this means the Spaniards were able to advance to the very entrance of the city and inflict some damage, while the remaining vessels explored the waters beyond, and drove back canoes and fired buildings in the suburbs.

Sandoval at the same time advanced along the causeway from Iztapalapan to Coyuhuacan. It was a league and a half in length, and a quarter of a league from shore it passed through an island town, which was captured and burned. Advised of this, Quauhtemotzin directed a fleet to cut the causeway and entrap the Spaniards; but before long two of the vessels were able to relieve Sandoval, who thereupon left a portion of his troops, including the allies, at Coyuhuacan, and joined his chief with the remainder. Nearly a week was occupied in strengthening Fort Xoloc, arranging the camp, and bringing in supplies, during which time desultory skirmishings were maintained, wherein Sandoval among others received. wounds. The brigantines roamęd incessantly and inflicted great damage, entering on one occasion for a long distance a canal which led into the suburbs.^[23] Canoes no longer ventured abroad when a sail was in sight, and the Mexicans began to protect the water approaches and channels with stakes.

 

In order to complete the investment of the city it was only necessary to occupy the northern causeway to Tepeyacac, along which the besieged maintained a steady intercourse with the mainland. Advised of this neglect by Alvarado, the general ordered Sandoval to form a camp at that town^[24] with one hundred and forty Spaniards, of whom twenty-three were horsemen, and a full proportion of allies. Alvarado had half as many more infantry and a few more cavalry, while two hundred infantry were quartered at Xoloc, supported besides by a cavalry force in the rear, and by Olid's party, with whom remained the largest proportion of allies, now over eighty thousand, according to Cortés' own statement. The fort could not hold them, and they accordingly encamped at Coyuhuacan, which lay more convenient for supplies, and must be occupied to watch the hostile shore and lake towns clustered in this quarter. The brigantines carried at least two hundred and fifty men.^[25]

Everything being prepared, Cortés ordered a simultaneous attack from all the camps, so as to divide the attention of the Mexicans and gain all possible advantage. He himself advanced along the Iztapalapan causeway with the greater part of his infantry, attended by several cavaliers on foot, and by over eighty thousand allies, while a vessel skirted the road on either side. There was more than one breach in the road, behind which were posted large forces of warriors protected by intrenchments of earth and inasonry.

Without the vessels it would have cost much time and many lives to cross; but the well-directed fire from the guns and arquebuses on the flanks and rear of the enemy soon wrought disorder, which enabled the sallying parties to obtain a foothold. Meanwhile a number of infantry had swum across the channel and aided to drive the Mexicans beyond the next breach. The same manœuvre was repeated at this and the other chasms, till the army found itself at the very entrance of the city, protected by a wider channel than the preceding, with more extensive fortifications, commanded by a temple tower. This with its swarms of slingers and archers made the capture difficult, and the Mexicans also showed more determination; but the guns and fusillade could not be resisted, and soon the Spaniards stood within the city for the first time since the memorable Noche Triste. Revenge seemed already secured, and the lost treasures almost within the invaders' grasp. Cortés, however, did not permit himself to be carried away by a momentary success. He saw the main street beyond thronged with warriors fiercely bent on resistance, streets as far as the distant temple of the war-god bordered with buildings, each a fortress in itself, while many a barricaded channel blocked the way.

A large force of allies had been left to fill the chasm and level the ground as the army advanced, using for this purpose the captured intrenchments and buildings, or even material from the causeway itself. This work was under the direction of Diego Hernandez, a man of herculean strength, who could throw a stone with a force and precision, it was said, approximating those of cannon.^[26] This filling of the chasms enabled the horses to be brought forward, and they now led the charge against the dense masses of natives, after the arquebuses had effected the preliminary clearing. Cortés had not underestimated the annoyance to be encountered from the archers and slingers covering the roofs on either side; but the operations of the cavalry left the many arquebusiers and cross-bowmen at liberty to cover the points of approach through which the allies in particular poured in countless numbers with side-arms and fire-brands. The progress so far had surpassed all anticipation; but now the Spaniards came to a canal from which the retreating Mexicans removed the few planks remaining of the bridge, leaving a solitary beam. Here the warriors were massed in greater confidence, free as they were from the attack of vessels and sheltered by strong intrenchments, while the adjoining roofs, equally protected by the canals, teemed with missile-throwers. The soldiers tried again and again to cross the chasm, only to be driven back with injury. The volleys from cross-bows and fire-arms could effect but little damage against the well sheltered warriors, while their arrows and stones came in rattling showers. Finally two cannon were brought forward. This changed the issue, for a breach was speedily made in the intrenchments, and now the small-arms were able to coöperate with great execution.

After a delay of two hours the soldiers were across; and while the allies filled the canal they again pursued their advance along the avenue, though suffering considerably from the roof missiles. They now came to the last channel in the street, close to the main plaza, wherein stood the famous temple of Huitzilopochtli.

The advance of the Spaniards had been so unexpected and rapid that the Mexicans had not thought of fortifying this canal, and little difficulty was met in crossing. But beyond, the plaza was filled with files of defenders, determined to save their deities and that sacred ground. Greatly frightened, the priests cried out to them: "Behold! it was here upon this spot you fought these beings infernal before, and drove them forth in shameful flight; the gods will help you again ľ" Even the Spanish soldiers were impressed by the words and gestures of the frantic devotees, and noted their effect in the gleaming eyes and pressed lips of the warriors, and they paused. But presently a gun was brought forward and directed against the packed throng. This effected a backward movement. "There is no time for rest or fear!" shouted Cortés, as with shield in hand he rushed forward. With a thundering Santiago the soldiers followed. The charge was irresistible, and already startled by the mowing cannon-balls the Mexicans took refuge within the temple enclosure and in the by-streets.

The Spaniards followed the crowd within the sacred grounds, slashing and thrusting. It seemed a repetition of Alvarado's massacre, and the war-god, thirsting for blood, might now have his fill. In a few moments not a warrior was left round the temple, only prostrate bodies. Then the soldiers prepared to ascend the pyramid to hurl down the idol and its defenders. But the deity was aroused. The sombre notes of the sacred drum struck their fearful appeal on every heart, "Rouse ye to your imperilled hearths and temples" It was but now the Mexicans observed that the death-dealing horsemen were not present, for the last channel had not yet been filled to afford a crossing. This lent them courage, and on the foe they quickly rushed from lanes and houses, while down from the temple-top came a doubly inspired avalanche. The shock was overwhelming. The Spaniards were forced to retire, partly in disorder. Cortés made frantic efforts to stay the flight, and at the gate a momentary rally was made by a few; but what availed that handful against the torrent sweeping onward, headed by the renowned band of Quauhtin? Perforce they must yield and join the troops which were in such hasty flight from the plaza that they even abandoned the cannon. Cortés was on foot in the crowd, and his voice was drowned in the tumult. He could but follow with the wild current, which threatened to lead into another disaster. Just then cries of alarm burst from the crowds on the roofs, and there was a lull in the shower of stones and darts, and the pressure of pursuers relaxed. The next moment the ears of the wandering Spaniards caught the clatter of hoofs.

The cavalry had come up; a revulsion set in. They were but a few,^[27] but enough to bring back to the minds of the Mexicans their original and ever present fear of the monsters, for they knew not how many might be coming down upon them.

The infantry followed the horsemen with inspiring cheers, and bore unresisted onward, for the late bravery of the foe was now turned to cowardice. Before long the Spaniards had penetrated through the plaza and occupied once more the temple court. Once more their looks were upward toward the summit of the lofty pyramid consecrated during their former occupation to the holy virgin; and while the main portion of the troops fought the now rallying Mexicans, a sturdy handful undertook the capture of the sanctuary. A dozen chiefs held possession, but naught could stay the fury of the soldiers, and in a few moments the last defender had yielded his spirit in defense of his faith.

The Spaniards looked in vain for any trace of their own altar and symbols, round which they had so oft congregated in prayer. In their stead rose a new idol glittering with ornaments and hideous with devices, while fresh stains of blood spread horror over all. The gleam of gold proved all absorbing, however, and hastily the jewels and the golden mask were torn away, and then the head of the idol was struck off and sent clattering below.^[28]

There was time for nothing more, for on finding so few horsemen present, the Quauhtin knights had again made an effective rally, pressing the troops closely. Fortunately a larger force of cavalry came up again to turn the tide of battle and inflict a severe lesson. As it was late by this time, there remained no choice but that of returning to camp. This movement gave fresh confidence to the Mexicans, who followed in swarms, harassing from roofs and lanes, on front and flanks, rushing forward with renewed fury after every charge by the cavalry which covered the rear. But for the horses the soldiers would have suffered severely; as it was, the retreat proceeded in good order, and as many houses as possible were fired with a view to make the next entry safer. On approaching the causeway the canoe crews, composed of selected warriors, fell on the flanks and created no little confusion before they were driven back. After this no difficulty was experienced in reaching camp, thanks to the foresight of Cortés, who had ordered the channels filled.^[29] The other captains, Alvarado and Sandoval, had performed their share in the day's work, and although they do not appear to have reached even the suburb, detained by the many breaches and other obstacles on the causeways, yet the diversion created by their attacks proved of great service to Cortés. One reason for their slower advance was the want of coöperation from the vessels, which had been of such great assistance on the Iztapalapan road. This was at once remedied by the detachment of three brigantines each for the Tlacopan and Tepeyacac camps.^[30]

 

 

1. Several leading authors assume this to have occurred on the 28th of April, when Cortés mustered his forces. He says nothing about the formal launch on that occasion, and it is hardly likely that two such performances could have been effected in one day.
2. 'Las vanderas Reales, y otras vanderas del nombre que se dezia ser el vergantin.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 138. Ixtlilxochitl assumes that the flag-ship was named Medellin, Hist. Chich., 313-14, but this appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Herrera, who places Villafuerte 'of Medellin' at the head of the list of captains. Vetancurt believes that the vessels were named after the apostles, to whom Cortés was so devoted. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 156. If so, the flag-ship may have been called San Pedro, after his patron. When all were floated a storm came which threatened to break them one against the other. Torquemada, i. 532.
3. Their names appear to have been Juan Rodriguez de Villafuerte of Medellin, Juan Jaramillo of Salvatierra, Francisco Rodriguez Magariño of Merida, Cristóbal Flores of Valencia, Juan García Holguin of Cáceres, Caravajal of Zamora, Pedro Barba of Seville, Gerónimo Ruiz de la Mota of Búrgos, Pedro de Briones of Salamanca, Rodrigo Morejon de Lovera of Medina del Campo, Antonio de Sotelo of Zamora, Juan de Portillo of Portillo, and Miguel Diaz de Auz. Martin Lopez, the ship-builder, also joined, in the character of chief pilot. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. xxi., has Francisco de Verdugo, of Arévalo, instead of Diaz de Auz, but Bernal Diaz names him as one of the company captains under Olid, and he ought to know better in this respect. He also names a second Caravajal, Zamora, a ship-master, afterward settled in Oajaca, Colmenero, Gines Nortes, and Lerma. Hist. Verdad., 138.
4. The smallest was soon set aside as useless. There was some trouble in obtaining rowers, owing in a great measure to the employment in Spain of criminals in that capacity. Hidalgos shrank from anything that could be regarded as common labor, and even ordinary sailors refused to handle a branded implement. In this dilemma a list was made of all natives of seaports, and of those known to be able fishermen, and finally the selected number were ordered to take the oar, regardless of caste.
5. So says Cortés, Cartas, 208. Bernal Diaz as usual implies a smaller number by stating that Cortés sent to ask for only 20,000 men from the republics. Hist. Verdad., 137-8. The Cholultecs, he says, who had maintained a neutral attitude since the massacre there, sent a small force under their own captain. Gomara allows 60,000 allies to come; Vetancurt 90,000, of whom 60,000 are Tlascaltecs; Clavigero limits the arrival to 50,000 Tlascaltecs, the whole number of allies swelling gradually to over 200,000, while Herrera makes that number arrive within two days; Ixtlilxochitl names thirteen chiefs, who commanded the 50,000 Tlascaltecs (a misprint gives 5000), and some of those leading the 10,000 Huexotzincas; he also allows 10,000 Cholultecs; of his own Tezcucans he claims over 200,000 to have come, 50,000 each being furnished by the provinces of Tezcuco, Otumba, Tziuhcohua, and Chalco, with Tepeaca, Quauhnahuac, etc.; 8000 chiefs or nobles joined besides from Tezcuco, and 50,000 laborers in addition, it seems. Hist. Chich., 313; Hor. Crueldades, 20.
6. 'Viua el Emperador nuestro señor, y Castilla, Castilla, Tlascala, Tlascala!' Bernal Diaz, loc. cit. It took three days for the auxiliaries to enter, says Ojeda, and great as was Tezcuco, there was not room for them. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. Bernal Diaz reduces the days to hours.
7. Cortés, Cartas, 206. Gomara agrees, Hist. Mex., 191, but Bernal Diaz gives the number as 84 horsemen, 650 soldiers with swords, shields, and lances, and 194 archers and arquebusiers. loc. cit.
8. Some half a dozen towns furnished 8000 each within eight days. The feathers were fastened by the archers with glue from the cactle root. They kept two strings and as many catches, and maintained their skill by target practice. Id.
9. The distribution of forces as given by Cortés stands thus: To Alvarado, 30 horse, 18 arquebusiers and archers, 150 sword and shield men, and over 25,000 Tlascaltecs; to Olid, 33 horse, 18 archers and arquebusiers, 160 sword and shield men, and over 20,000 allies; to Sandoval, 24 horse, 4 arquebusiers, 13 archers, 150 sword and shield men, and over 30,000 allies from Huexotzinco, Cholula, and Chalco. Cartas, 207. Others differ more or less, some giving details that hardly accord with the totals. Bernal Diaz names as Alvarado's three captains his brother Jorge de Alvarado, Gutierre de Badajoz, and Andrés de Monjaraz, the latter an agreeable, bright-faced fellow of about 32 years, always suffering from a Lotharian disease which prevented him from doing anything. The three captains under Olid were Andrés de Tápia, a growing favorite of Cortés', Francisco Verdugo, the unconscious fellow-conspirator of Villafañe, and Francisco de Lugo, the natural son of a prominent estate-holder at Medina del Campo. Sandoval had but two captains, the insinuating Pedro de Ircio, and Luis Marin of San Lúcar, a muscular and dashing fellow, of Monjaraz' age, with an open blonde face, somewhat pitted, and possessed of a voluble tongue. Hist. Verdad., 139, 240, 246. Ixtlilxochitl gives a longer list, which is clearly wrong in many respects, and he adds some names of native leaders. Alvarado kept the Tlascaltecs of Tizatlan and Tepeticpac; Olid those of Ocotelulco and Quiahuiztlan. Hist. Chich., 313-14. He further states that his namesake joined Cortés' fleet with 10,000 canoes, containing 50,000 Tezcucans, of whom 8000 were nobles. Hor. Crueldades, 21. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows this author in many respects, improving somewhat on the names. Herrera names five of the sub-captains, among them Hernando de Lerma of Galicia. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii.
10. 'Iva a tomar por fuerça el Cacicazgo, e vassallos, y tierra del mismo Chichimecatecle,' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 139, which must be an idle rumor.
11. Some time later when Ojeda went to Tlascala for supplies he brought back the confiscated property, including a quantity of treasure, and 20 women, the daughters, servants, etc., of Xicotencatl. Torquemada, i. 558. The Tlascaltec laws were severe, 'E l'odio particolore, che portavano a quel Principe, il cui orgoglio nou potevano più soffrire.' Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 195. Some Tlascaltecs say his father had warned Cortés against his son, and urged his death. Bernal Diaz, loc. cit. Herrera observes that he could hardly have been seized without Tlascaltec aid. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.
12. Ojeda, in Herrera, loc.cit. . Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 379, thinks that it would have been hazardous to hang him at Tezcuco, where many Tlascaltecs were gathered; but he forgets that nearly all this people had already set out for Mexico. His supposition is based on Bernal Diaz, who intimates that he was not hanged in Tezcuco. Alvarado had pleaded for his life, and Cortés, while pretending compliance, secretly ordered the alguacil to despatch him. Hist. Verdad., 139.
13. Cortés divided the lordship of the chieftain afterward between his two sons, and the name of Xicotencatl has been perpetuated by more than one line, as Camargo shows in his Hist. Tlax. Two officers of that name figured during the American invasion of 1847 in defence of their country. Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 447.
14. Most writers say the 10th, misled by an error in Cortés, Cartas, 208; and this error causes Prescott, among others, to fall into more than one mistake, which he upholds with vain arguments. On earlier pages in the Cartas are given dates in connection with religious festivals which show that Whitsunday fell on the 19th of May, and the departure took place three days later. Bernal Diaz gives the 13th, and says that the Xicotencatl affair had detained them a day. He afterward varies the date.
15. They passed round Zumpango Lake, through Quauhtitlan and Tenayocan. Cortés, Cartas, 210; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 139.
16. 'Jamàs quisieron Paz [the Aztecs]; y aunque à la postre la recibieron, el Rei no la aceptò, porque al principio, contra su Consejo, la rehusaron.' Torquemada, i. 572. Gomara says the same, but Duran, the historian of his dynasty, declares that he loved too much to rule and to display his personal valor ever to listen to peace proposals. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 490. On the following pages he gives a speech by this ruler, painting the shame and evil of surrender. Before this, according to the native records of Sahagun, Cortés had invited Quauhtemotzin, under promise of security, to a conference, order to explain his motives for the campaign. Not wishing to appear afraid, the Aztec monarch came to the rendezvous near Acachinanco, in a state barge, attended by several nobles. Cortés arrived in a brigantine. He reviewed the allegiance tendered to the Spanish sovereign, the revolt, precipitated by Alvarado's effort to anticipate the murderous plot, and the subsequent slaughter of Spaniards and robbery of treasures. These unjustifiable and inhuman outrages he had come to avenge; and he would not stay his hand till the enemies of his king and God had been driven forth. Quauhtemotzin merely replied that he accepted war, and thereupon returned to the city. Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 147-50. Torquemada, i. 543, and Brasseur de Bourbourg adopt this story, the latter stating that the Aztec ruler proposed to consult his council. But Clavigero rightly assumes that the interview never took place. All other records say that Quauhtemotzin persistently refused ever to speak with Cortés, even from behind his walls.
17. Many captives had been secured during recent raids on Chalco and Tezcuco, and other parts, so that there was no lack. The native victims numbered 4800, it is said. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii. 'All boys,' says Oviedo, iii. 515. 'Yo bien creo que fuero muchas, mas no tantas.' Gomara, loc. cit. The limbs of the Spaniards were sent to different provinces to frighten the inhabitants. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 135.
18. Ixtlilxochitl states in one place that his namesake remained at Tezcuco to raise troops and to arrange for regular trains of supplies for the Spanish camps. In another relation he allows him to accompany Cortés with 16,000 canoes. Hor. Crueldades, 21; Relacion, 314. The canoes which now attended the fleet appear to have served chiefly as transports.
19. Owned even under republican rule by the heirs of Cortés, as a tetzontli quarry.
20. Cortés, Cartas, 211. Bernal Diaz raises the number to 4000, Peter Martyr to 5000, while Vetancurt assumes that the 500 were merely the van. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 158.
21. Oviedo writes that they were sacrificing boys to propitiate the gods. iii. 516. 'La flota q͏̄ les parecio no dar batalla con tan pocas y cansadas,' observes Gomara, Hist. Mex., 194.
22. Alvarado advanced as far as the first wide bridge, but lost three men. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 141.
23. Probably behind the great southern levee. See Native Races, ii. 564.
24. Gomara calls it wrongly Xaltoca, and Robertson confounds it, singularly enough, with Tezcuco. Hist. Am., ii. 114.
25. Cortés, Cartas, 216-17. The greater number of the allies came daily from their camp at Coyuhuacan to join Cortés as warriors and sappers. Digging and similar work was done chiefly by Tezcucans. Herrera states that the vessels of Flores and Ruiz de la Mota were placed at a broken causeway between the camps of Alvarado and Sandoval. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.
26. 'Asserrador ... trabajò mas que mil Indios.' Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xviii.
27. Only three, says Cortés and others.
28. Ixtlilxochitl allows his namesake and Cortés to figure in this scene, the former cutting off the idol's head while the general secured the mask. He states that the temple was captured during the first entry into the court. When the Mexicans rallied, Ixtlilxochitl managed to kill their general, which o so enraged them that they rushed madly on and drove back the Spaniards till the horse arrived. Hor. Crueldades, 29-30. His version is adopted in the main by Prescott and others; but there are several discrepancies. The death of a general as a rule discouraged native armies. Cortés, who would not have failed to claim the overthrow of the idol, states that it was effected by four or five Spaniards, after the second capture of the court. Cartas, 218. His presence was needed below to direct operations. Gomara's text must have misled Ixtlilxochitl and others. Hist. Mex., 197-8. Herrera and Torquemada adhere better to Cortés.
29. Cortés speaks of an ambuscade by the horsemen wherein 30 Mexicans fell. Cartas, 218. How many of his own were lost he prudently abstains from mentioning, though admitting many wounded. 'Dexaron perdido los Españoles esta vez el tiro grueso,' says Torquemada, i. 548, but this is unlikely.
30. 30 Cortés, Cartas, 221. Bernal Diaz states that Alvarado received four and Sandoval only two. Hist. Verdad., 141.