History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 17

2602008History of Mexico (Bancroft) — Chapter 171883Hubert Howe Bancroft

CHAPTER XVII.

RAYON PRESIDENT; MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.

1812.

President Rayon at Tlalpujahua — His Relations with the Villagranes — Royalist Successes on the North of Mexico — Affairs in Michoacan — Father Salto and his Execution — Venegas' Sanguinary Decree — Insurgent Priests Deprived of their Immunity — Episcopal Indifference — Excitement in Mexico — Second Anniversary of Independence Celebrated — Ramon Rayon's Profitable Movements — Attack against Ixmiquilpan a Failure — Rayon's Arrangements with Royalist Traders — Proposed Negotiations for Peace — Assault of Yanhuitlan — Siege of Huajuapan — Trujano's Brilliant Defence — Morelos Comes to the Rescue and Wins a Victory — Gates of Oajaca Opened to Him.

The president of the supreme junta, Ignacio Rayon, had meanwhile established his headquarters at Tlalpujahua, upon a hill called El Gallo, and fortified it. He raised troops, and extended his authority to the districts near and surrounding the province of Mexico, as well as to those on the east.[1] The town of Ixtlahuaca, to which the viceroy's sway extended, as before stated, became thus the frontier of the territory ruled over by Rayon from Tlalpujahua.

Having described the military operations which culminated with the restoration of the viceregal authority in the valley of Toluca and the regions near, as well as to the south-west of Mexico, I will now speak of those on the north of the capital.[2] Various columns of royalist troops having been concentrated under Domingo Clavarino,[3] he retook Pachuca without resistance on the 10th of May, 1812; after which he resolved to recover the neighboring places, such as Real del Monte, El Chico, and Atotonilco el Grande, after placing himself in communication with Colonel Piedras commanding at Tulancingo. Accompanied by Madera, former commander of Pachuca, he marched on Atotonilco the 21st of May, and broke up the insurgent force assembled there, capturing eleven guns, of which six were of brass, taken from the royalists at Pachuca and Real del Monte, one culverin made in Seville, and four of lead.[4] Clavarino published and granted the amnesty; and after destroying a factory of artillery at Real del Monte, established there by the tribunal de mineria under the skilful Flemish machinist, La Chaussée, returned to Pachuca, where a garrison was placed. Meantime, while Piedras was aiding Clavarino in his operations against Atotonilco, the insurgents under Villagran, Serrano, Osorno, Canas, Anaya, Espinosa, and Gonzalez attacked Tulancingo, and kept up a fire on the town for six days, causing much damage. But owing to the successful sallies made by the garrison, and to the approach of Clavarino, the assailants retired. A portion of them were overtaken, however, on the plain of Zacatepec by Llorente's cavalry, and a large number killed.[5] In Mexico Tulancingo had been considered as lost, and the viceroy hastened to send Clavarino the Guanajuato battalion to render that place and Pachuca secure. With this force Clavarino extended his operations to the plains of Apam, dislodged the insurgents from Calpulalpan, and defeated them at Irolo on the 24th of June. These advantages were counterbalanced by the defeat of Samaniego at Zacatlan, where he ran great risk of being completely undone. The insurgents were beaten in several other petty encounters; yet in the latter part of September, notwithstanding the loss of Pachuca, they were masters of the plains of Apam, and Osorno held Zacatlan, whence his soldiers overran the country in various directions.

Now, more than ever before, perhaps, this revolution, begun at Dolores by Hidalgo and Allende, and continued by Morelos, Rayon, and others, was assuming the form of a continual succession of minor battles and skirmishes. There was a fight in one province or another almost every day, and often in several provinces at the same time. As long as the revolutionists could not or would not concentrate, the royalists were obliged to scatter themselves through out the land. And so all over Mexico war became chronic. In Michoacan the insurrectionary forces had become greatly increased, and frequently advanced to the gates of Valladolid, committing hostilities and stopping supplies as heretofore. The royalist commander, bent on their destruction, had detached several bodies of troops from the garrison to pursue them. Two of these detachments were commanded respectively by Manuel de la Concha and Juan Pesquera. Concha on the 17th of April occupied Cocupao, capturing there Father Vicente Ochoa, a mariscal de campo, whom he took to Valladolid. He also found in the place Colonel Caballero and fifteen other insurgents,

whom he shot; after which he marched on to Tzintzuntzan and Pátzcuaro, where he ordered other executions.[6] Captain Pesquera approached the line of Guanajuato, where the combination was made for the capture of Albino García; and later, on the 7th of May, was directed to look after and bring in as a prisoner the clergyman José Guadalupe Salto, ex-vicar of Teremendo, who had found refuge in a cave,[7] at the entrance of which he was overtaken by Pesquera's soldiers. It is said that he then cried out, "Do not kill me; I am a minister of Christ," at the same time thrusting a lance into one of the soldiers, and began defending himself from the inside of the cave. The soldiers fired; and entering the cave found Salto on the ground with a bullet through his body, and by his side two women whom he had been holding as prisoners. Pesquera had the wounded man conveyed on a bed to Valladolid, where, by order of Trujillo, he was executed the next day.[8]

The revolution, having been begun by an ecclesiastic, had from its incipiency many members of the clergy, both secular and regular, among its leaders; and it may be said that at this time the war was kept up almost wholly by them.[9]There was hardly a battle in which priests were not found acting as leading officers. Notwithstanding this well established fact, Viceroy Venegas had hitherto abstained from publicly issuing any decree regarding them, though he had circulated orders to the commanders of royal troops to shoot all priests that fell prisoners into their hands. But these orders had rarely been carried out. In the case of Father Hidalgo, we have seen that his execution was pursuant to a regular sentence, after he had been tried and all ecclesiastical formalities observed. Some leaders, however, exasperated at encountering hostile priests everywhere, had disreregarded their cloth, and without ado despatched them to their long home.[10] Others, among them Tovar at San Luis Potosí with respect to Father Zimarripa, had with their reports placed the viceroy under the necessity of decisive action. After consulting the real acuerdo, fourteen of whose fifteen members had expressed the same opinion, at the petition of the crown's counsel and with the concurrence of the military and naval auditores, the viceroy published an edict on the 25th of June, declaring amenable to the military jurisdiction all persons who had made or should thereafter make resistance to the king's troops, whatever might be their rank, status, or condition; and ordering that such offenders should be tried by the ordinary courts-martial composed of officers of the division or detachment that effected the capture, and referring the case with the proceedings had thereon to the viceroy for his final decision. This restriction, if faithfully carried out, would have averted many arbitrary acts; unfortunately it was nullified by the freedom allowed commanders to execute sentences without first obtaining the viceregal sanction, when roads were intercepted or circumstances demanded a prompt example.[11] As the provisions of this bloody edict had been all along practised in regard to insurgents generally, they would not have excited any particular attention but for the clauses touching the ecclesiastics, in whom they produced a deep impression;[12] the bishops being mostly royalists or time-servers made no move in the matter. In later years they showed more spirit in claiming their rights or privileges, even to the pitch of fulminating anathemas against measures that did not concern religion. The revolutionary authorities, it must be acknowledged, had not on their part shown much better treatment to priests whose leanings were toward the royalist cause.[13]

It is now time to return to Tlalpujahua, where we left the president of the supreme junta engaged in fortifying his camp and making preparations for an active campaign. From his headquarters he kept up a correspondence with the guadalupes in Mexico, and with Morelos and other military chieftains. With the double view of rousing the inhabitants of the territory under his sway, and of securing the obedience, heretofore doubtful, of the Villagranes, Rayon left Tlalpujahua on the 26th of August, taking with him printing material for issuing proclamations and other documents to fire the hearts of the people. After inspecting the fortifications and manufactory of arms on the Nadó hill he continued his march, being the object of popular ovations everywhere. In Huichapan, where he arrived the 13th of September, the marks of respect and loyalty were such as a king might have been proud of. At all his public acts he was accompanied by José María Villagran, generally known as El Chito, whom he had recently commissioned as a mariscal de campo, giving at the same time to his father, Julian Villagran, who kept himself in Zimapan and the surrounding country, the rank of lieutenant-general. Rayon resolved to celebrate here the second anniversary of Mexican independence, September 16th, in a manner worthy of the occasion, and as well as the resources of the place would permit.[14] In this connection there was published, not on the 16th of September though bearing that date, but shortly after Rayon's return to Tlalpujahua, a manifesto sent him already prepared from the city of Mexico.[15] It purported to be a picture of the situation, and a narrative of the events that took place in Mexico from the beginning of the struggle to the day of its date. It may have served its purpose to awaken the enthusiasm of the masses in favor of the cause of independence, and to inspire courage in its defenders for further sacrifices of blood, treasure, and the enjoyments of home life; but as a historical document it is worthless, every statement in it being inexact, and evidently dictated by the spirit of partisanship. And indeed, in this respect it is about on an equality with hundreds of writings issued at this time by the viceregal government, its servants, partisans, and sycophants, none of which are entitled to the slightest credence, as systematic lying was a part of the governmental policy.

The president's brother, General Ramon Lopez Rayon, commanding the district of Tlalpujahua, had been no less active, often making excursions to the country lying between Querétaro and Mexico, or between the former and Valladolid. In one of those excursions he signally defeated an archroyalist captain named Maríano Ferrer[16] at El Salitre, and took him prisoner. Immediately afterward he marched on Jerécuaro and took the place, together with two guns, a large number of muskets, ammunition, and nearly 100 prisoners, all of whom were conveyed to the hacienda of Tepustepec, where the president then was. Ferrer and five others were shot on the 4th of September. The rest joined Rayon's force, and a few of them who afterward deserted and were captured paid the penalty of the desertion with their lives. That same year Ramon Rayon attacked at San Juan del Rio 600 royalists, who were escorting a large herd of sheep and cattle bound to Mexico, dispersed them with some casualties, and captured the whole property.[17]

Most favorable results were obtained in some quarters that will be given at length. They were in a great measure due to the spirit of union, unselfishness, and surbordination to their commanders shown by the officers and men. But in other parts, where rivalry, arising from personal ambition and leading to bickerings, divided counsels, and a wanton disregard of all superior authority existed, disappointments and disasters naturally followed. I have already spoken of the friendly reception extended by Villagran at Huichapan to the president of the junta, which led the latter to believe that his orders would be respected and obeyed in that quarter. Acting under this conviction, Rayon resolved to attack Ixmiquilpan, a wealthy town, and quite friendly to the viceregal government, whose garrison consisted of a small detachment of line troops and the companies of patriots, all of whom were determined to fight to the last. Their commander was Rafael Casasola, in whom they had full confidence. Rayon started from Huichapan on the 15th of October with a regiment of well equipped infantry, whose colonel was José María Lobato.[18] The cavalry was under Epitacio Sanchez, a brave man; and the artillery, consisting of four pieces, was in charge of a competent officer, with the requisite number of skilled men to manage it. Together with these troops were Villagran's men; and at the hacienda Astillero they were joined by the forces of Father Correa and Polo. Rayon appeared before Ixmiquilpan on the 18th of October, and occupied the most convenient points for attack. From one of these points, the Media Luna hill, Casasola endeavored to dislodge the independents, but was driven off with heavy loss. Rayon demanded surrender within two hours, under guarantees of life, liberty, and property to all, including the Spaniards, if they took the oath of allegiance; otherwise he would take the town by assault and put the inhabitants to the sword. The royalists, remembering the violated pledges of five months before to the prisoners of Pachuca, turned a deaf ear to Rayon's proposal, Casasola returning a haughty answer.[19] Early next morning the independents made vigorous assaults; Correa and Lobato in the afternoon succeeded in possessing themselves of two parapets, where they waited some time, under the heavy fire of the royalists from the third line of defences, for reënforcerments under Villagran that would enable them to advance farther. But as none came, and night was approaching, they retreated in good order. During the night silence reigned in the independents' camps. But Casasola, apprehending it might be a ruse to draw him out, kept a watchful eye within his intrenchment. The next morning no enemy was in sight; and news soon was brought to the town that Rayon and his army were fairly on the way to Huichapan.[20] On arriving at this place in advance of his division, Rayon seriously reprimanded Villagran for his violation of orders. The latter made no reply, but resolved to avenge forthwith what he deemed an insult from one whose authority he held in contempt. He ordered the drawbridges to be raised, and called his men to arms to seize the president and his escort before his troops arrived. But Rayon, mistrusting the movements around him, visited the barracks at once and managed to have his superior authority recognized and his orders obeyed. Villagran seeing his designs frustrated fled with twenty of his accomplices. The failure to capture Ixmiquilpan and Villagran's mutinous course filled the president with grief, and he returned to Tlalpujahua.

The Chito did not abandon his purpose of wreaking vengeance on Rayon and his friends. He relentlessly persecuted the latter, and Cura Correa, who for his gallantry had been promoted to mariscal de campo, had to flee to Nopala, and thence to Chapa de Mota. From this time the Villagranes were again masters of the whole country extending from San Juan del Rio and Cuesta de Tula to the sierra de Zimapan; from which we must conclude that the elder, who had been supposed to disapprove of his son's course on the 22d of October, had taken no pains to check his unjustifiable career.[21] The younger, however, in due time thought over the matter, and

Seat of War.

concluding that nothing was to be gained by going counter to recognized authority sought reconciliation through the agency of two clergymen.[22] To this Rayon was well disposed; but he answered that Villagran's future good conduct would be accepted as his. best excuse and secure him both forgiveness for the past and his country's gratitude. Still, he had but little hope that the father or son, or other insubordinates, could be brought to accept proper discipline.[23]

As Rayon was anxious to procure resources for sustaining his troops, and the merchants in Mexico being on the other hand interested in obtaining a free passage for their merchandise, relations were opened between some of the most prominent and the president. The latter wrote Morelos manifesting his wish that the rich cargo of the China ship lying at Acapulco should be permitted a pass into the interior, as the merchants needed the goods and were willing to pay quite a respectable sum of money. He also consulted the officer who was besieging that town by land on the propriety of acceding to their proposal. Morelos answered in the negative, and the Rey Fernando then went to San Blas where she landed her cargo. Rayon made an arrangement with the marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo, commanding a royalist battalion in Mexico, and whose son, the conde de San Pedro del Álamo, was serving at Valladolid under Trujillo, by which the marqués was allowed to pass into Mexico a large flock of sheep upon paying $20,000, part in clothing and arms for the independent troops and the rest in specie.

Venegas, it has been said, either to render Rayon suspicious in the eyes of his troops or to divert his attention from military operations, or from some other motive, manifested a disposition to enter into negotiations with him. To this effect instructions were given, under solemn guarantees, to a lawyer named Juan Raz y Guzman; and it was even resolved to hold a conference at the hacienda de Tultenango. Rayon being advised that a merchant named Juan Bautista Lobo, duly instructed by the viceroy, would meet him in that place.[24] Although the members of the supreme junta were scattered and Rayon as the president acted in its name, he never pretended to determine any important government affair without consulting his colleagues. He laid the viceroy's pretensions before them, and the only answer I have found is that given by Liceaga, written by Doctor Cos, in which Rayon is advised to confine his efforts to secure a suspension of arms so as to take advantage of it for organizing and drilling troops to prosecute the war and cripple Spain's resources in her resistance, against the French. Mexico would be thus enabled to attain her independence. But as the conferences appointed for Tultenango never took place, the whole project went out of mind.[25]

The viceregal government, since the fall of Cuautla, had, as we have seen, kept its troops engaged in operations within the provinces of Puebla and Vera Cruz, to the neglect necessarily of the south and of Oajaca. To enable the reader to arrive at a clear understanding of the coming events in those regions, I must revert for a few moments to the occurrences of November, 1811. Morelos had sent Valerio Trujano to occupy Silacayoapan, which was effected without opposition, and the revolution spread throughout Mizteca, the portion of Oajaca bordering on Puebla. Desirous of checking the advances of the independents, Brigadier Bernardo Bonavía gave the command of a force organized ad hoc to a native of Santander, in Spain, named José María de Régules Villasante, an old resident of Nochistlan, not a soldier by profession, but a hearty royalist, and possessed of much activity and a thorough knowledge of the ground in that mountainous country—qualifications more useful, perhaps, for that kind of warfare than a regular military training. Régules, together with other land owners friendly to the royal cause, raised and disciplined a considerable force from the laborers of their own estates. The bishop of Antequera, Antonio Bergosa y Jordan, a stanch royalist, who had been promoted to archbishop of Mexico and was making preparations to depart for his new field of episcopal duties, was requested by the ayuntamiento and some prominent citizens of Oajaca, at this critical period not to leave the diocese, where his influence would have great weight. He not only acquiesced and influenced public opinion in favor of the royal cause with his pastorals and sermons, but raised and armed a body of ecclesiastics. The independents, on the other hand, wasted no time. They organized a considerable body, and in January, 1812, deeming themselves strong enough to face the royalists in their lair, at Yanhuitlan, where Régules commanded and had erected strong fortifications, marched to the attack, 3,000 strong with three pieces of artillery, on the 8th and 9th of January, and met with defeat and the loss of their artillery, together with forty or more killed, and seventy prisoners, besides fifty mules laden with provisions and ammunition.[26] The victorious Régules started in pursuit of the insurgents, and on the 26th of February met those of Bobadilla at San Juanico Teposcolula, whom he defeated, capturing their guns and a number of prisoners, whom he ordered shot. He also caused to be destroyed all the grain and other provisions stored in the town.[27] While these events were taking place, the independent chiefs Miguel and Nicolás Bravo, Father Mendoza, and Valerio Trujano met at Tamasulapan, and resolved to assault Yanhuitlan a second time and punish Régules and his fellow-royalists. They besieged the

Mizteca In Oajaca.

place, and in a few days had possession of nearly the whole town, placing their guns in the street crossings. Régules defended himself in the cemetery, occupying at the same time a few buildings. From the 11th to the 15th of March the assaults were constantly repeated till the besieged were in a desperate condition. The success of the besiegers was assured, when they suddenly raised the siege and retired. The royalists could not understand it; but seeing the independents march away in perfect order, they did not venture out to pursue them.[28] The cause was an order from Morelos to the Bravos to hasten to his relief at Cuautla. Régules after this supposed that the independents had entirely abandoned the Mizteca, but he soon discovered his error; the day when he must atone for his many cruel acts was not far distant.

Trujano continued his excursions in the Mizteca country for some time, his field being chiefly the road from Yanhuitlan to Cuicatlan. After defeating Manuel Guendulain, a rich man of Oajaca who had armed his negroes, killing the leader and many of his men, and capturing their arms,[29] Trujano established his headquarters in Huajuapan, the chief town of the Mizteca, important for its large trade in dried goat's meat and grease with Puebla. He availed himself of the resources the place afforded to augment and support his force. Bonavía, the royalist commander at Oajaca, on his part concentrated all his available men at Yanhuitlan, to employ them in dislodging Trujano from Huajuapan. The force thus gathered together exceeded 1,000 men,[30] with 14 pieces of artillery and a good supply of ammunition. The chief command was given to Régules,[31] who on the 5th of April appeared before the villa of Huajuapan where Trujano had erected fortifications. The day being Sunday enabled the revolutionary commander to augment the number of defenders with Indians from the surrounding country who had come to market and whom he detained. The royalists took up their positions, the gallant Caldelas with the coast negroes occupying the Calvario cemetery, a commanding point on the north of the town.

For some days the royalists were engaged in perfecting the siege and cutting off the communications, and on the 10th of April opened bombardment. Trujano, having no artillery, had three guns made from the town bells, and for balls used the rounded cobble stones picked up out of the rivulet close by, besides the shot fired at him by the enemy. The guns and ammunition were defective, but the decision and courage of the besieged made amends. The besiegers made several assaults, and once entered the place by boring their way through the houses; but were beaten back. In one of the assaults a Dominican friar perished on the royalist side, and in another an Augustinian fighting for the independents. Bonavía sent Régules reënforcements and two more pieces of artillery. Trujano had provisions for some time, a large quantity of dried meat having been discovered in the warehouse of the tithe gatherer; and to prevent waste, he personally served out the rations, as well as the ammunition, which was limited.

The situation of the besieged was becoming precarious. Trujano managed to make it known to Father José María Sanchez, who was with his men at Tehuacan. Sanchez and the cura Tapia forthwith started with a considerable force, nine guns, and a supply of provisions to his relief. Caldelas, on hearing of their approach, concealed his coast negroes in a thick palm grove. It was the 17th of May. The independents came on, marching in a careless manner, and on nearing the town were fiercely attacked by the negroes and completely broken up. Sanchez and Tapia escaped at full gallop, leaving all their artillery and the provisions. Of their force a number were killed, others captured, and the rest, except a few who followed the leaders, became scattered. Weeks passed by, and at last Trujano's only hope lay in getting word to Morelos, a most difficult task. The Indian hunter of Noyó, who shot the Dominican friar alluded to, undertook to convey a message to Morelos, promising, if successful in crossing the lines, to send off from a certain height two rockets. Trujano waited anxiously. In due time he saw the rockets, and his hopes revived. The Indian found Morelos in Chilapa, whither he had proceeded from Chautla, and the chief of the south at once marched with a strong force to relieve Huajuapan. The same Indian brought back the glad tidings.[32]

Régules, judging from the manifestations that succor was at hand, summoned a council, and advocated raising the siege, but was opposed by Caldelas. Morelos detached Miguel Bravo with the force that Sanchez and Tapia had again gathered, with orders to pass along one side of the town. Bravo did so, and was suddenly assailed by Caldelas and his negroes, losing his guns and having to retreat. On the 23d of July, in the afternoon, Morelos with his whole force appeared before Huajuapan. One of the bodies of his troops was commanded by Hermenegildo Galeana, A battle ensued, which for its fierceness was one of the most noted of the war. Trujano made a vigorous sally, while Morelos charged at the front. The royalists were thus between two fires; but they made a stout defence, Caldelas particularly with his 400 coast negroes. He perished pierced by the enemy's lances.[33]

All was now lost. Régules and his subordinate Esperon fled. In the escape Régules struck his head against the branch of a tree and was thrown down, vomiting blood. One of the cavalry soldiers picked up his senseless commander and conveyed him to Yanhuitlan,[34] the place he had so lately left flushed with pride and hate. Trujano pursued the fleeing royalists to the very gates of Yanhuitlan giving no quarter. Canon San Martin then assumed the command of the place; but when the soldiers that had been left behind saw their beaten comrades returning panic-stricken, they began to hasten from the impending danger; and the officers, after holding a council of war, departed with the troops for the city of Oajaca.[35] Morelos' triumph was complete; all the royalist artillery, a large quantity of muskets and other arms, ammunition, and baggage fell into his hands, together with 170 prisoners, some of whom joined his service, and the rest were sent to the prisoners' pen at Zacatula.[36] The siege of Huajuapan lasted 111 days. The town was much damaged[37] by the artillery of the enemy, there being evidences to be seen everywhere of the heroic defence made by Trujano and the garrison. Morelos recruited his army from these men who had displayed such devotion to the cause, and created a regiment that he called the San Lorenzo,[38] the command of which was given to Trujano.

The victory in the Mizteca opened to Morelos the gates of Oajaca; but though advised by Trujano and others to attempt its capture, he declined. It was thought by some that he apprehended a strong resistance, which would have delayed his plan of capturing Tehuacan, which he could reach before Llano, at that time engaged in conveying the convoy to Vera Cruz, could arrive. Others say that he wished above all to organize the troops within the territory placed under his command by the supreme junta.

We will now for a while leave Morelos after his victory in Oajaca, and the royalist commanders campaigning in Guanajuato, Puebla, and Vera Cruz, to devote our attention to parliamentary matters in Spain, which are intimately connected with the events of that period in Spanish America.

  1. The Nadó hill, near Aculco, deemed impregnable, was further strengthened and a factory of arms established there. The president's four brothers greatly aided him. Ramon Lopez Rayon not only established another manufactory of arms in El Gallo, a position chosen by himself, at which many men were at work, but also constructed and set up a new war engine of his own invention. Mora, Revol Mex., iv. 419-20; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 199-201.
  2. The viceroy's authority was now in these regions paramount everywhere except in Zimapan and Izúcar; the latter protected from attack more by fear on the part of the royalists, who had been so often defeated there, than by the insurgent force existing in the place.
  3. Before this, one of his officers, Captain Rafael Casasola, on Palm-Sunday, March 21st, marched to Alfajayucan, where the people, whom he qualifies as rebels, were assembled on market-day, entered the place unresisted, killed 150 peaceable persons, took possession of all the coin and other effects which he distributed among his men, and then returned to Ixmiquilpan. See Casasola's report of March 24th, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 334-6.
  4. Clavarino's report of May 22d, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 557-61.
  5. Llorente's report says that the plain to the extent of two leagues was strewn with the slain; 164 prisoners were taken, among them many wounded; only 15 or 20 horsemen escaped. His casualties were, two privates wounded and four patriots contused: 'No habiendo quedado un solo individuo que no haya teñido en sangre enemiga su sable, lanza ó bayoneta.' Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 687-8.
  6. Concha's report, May 4th, to Col. Trujillo. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 604-6.
  7. Father Salto bore the reputation of a man of exemplary virtue, who was persecuted by the government because he had a brother who was a colonel among the independents, and early in April 1811 imprisoned. He was afterward pardoned and released, but fearing re-arrest concealed himself. At the end of five months he appealed in writing to Bishop-elect Abad y Queipo for protection, pleading his innocence and sufferings, which petition was unheeded. Salto was then commissioned as a colonel of the independent forces on the 1st of April, 1812. He was accused of horrid crimes, among them the murder by his instigation of forty wounded royalists, together with their attendants, in the hacienda del Tecacho. Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., in Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 211. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 155, denies that Salto ever committed any offence—'no era criminal, ni habia motivo para perseguirlo como á una fiera'—and charges Abad with sacrificing him to curry favor with Venegas and Trujillo.
  8. Trujillo notified Bishop Abad, and said that on no account would he extend the time. The bishop waived the formal degradation. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 607-14. The prisoner was carried on a bed to the scaffold, and garroted, and then shot. Castillo Negrete, Mex., v. 47-57; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 213.
  9. Some of them bore nicknames significant of habits not the most exemplary; one was called Padre Chinguirito, or drum of rum; another, Padre Caballo flaco; a third, Padre Chocolate. Zamacois, Hist. Hex., viii. 400.
  10. Calvillo shot Padre Tirado at Tenango; and recently Trujillo did the same with Salto.
  11. The penalty of being shot to death was, according to this decree, to be inflicted, without giving more time than was necessary to prepare for death as Christians, on leaders, in whatever number; on officers from and including sub-lieutenants up; on all who engaged in mustering men to serve the revolution; ecclesiastics, whether secular or regular, who had taken part or served in the revolution with whatever title or office, that of chaplain inclusive; and the editors of gazettes or publishers of incendiary documents. Those who were not leaders, but had committed hostilities against the royal troops, with out any excuse to screen them from capital punishment, were to be decimated; such as were spared by lot from death, and such as were not subject to capital punishment by the clauses of the edict, were to be sent to the viceroy, circumstances permitting it; but if there should occur any obstacle, then each commander was authorized to dispose of them as he might deem best without subjection to rules, which could not be prescribed for all cases. Ecclesiastics captured while in arms against the royal forces were to be tried and executed without the formality of degradation. These clauses were grounded on the principle set forth in the edict itself, that respecting the head men no risk was incurred of punishing the innocent, nor of inflicting excessive punishment, 'por ser todos verdaderos bandidos, anatematizados por la iglesia y proscriptos por el gobierno, á quienes por lo mismo puede quitar la vida qualquiera impunemente.' In regard to those who were to be decimated, it was stated that this was strictly in conformity with the military ordinances, and counselled by sound reason, when the number of guilty ones was large. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 685-7; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 98-101; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 134-5; Puente, P., Reflexiones, 1-243, etc.; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 41; Cedulario, i. 97.
  12. A representation, written by Licenciado Bernardo Gonzalez Angulo, legal adviser of the artillery department, was laid before the ecclesiastical chapter of Mexico, asking for its action on behalf of their fueros. The petition gave rise to meetings and discussions of the chapter; but all ended in nothing, owing to pressure from superior authority. The chapter had a full meeting on the 30th of June to discuss whether some step should be taken in defence of ecclesiastical immunity, but it was decided under present circumstances to be inexpedient to act. On this becoming known, 110 members of the secular clergy laid before the chapter on the 7th of July a demand for the protection of their rights; among the subscribers were nearly all the parish priests of the capital, many outside of it, several doctors of divinity, and other distinguished clergymen. The chapter referred it to Doctor Sanchez, the promoter fiscal, who pronounced it an asonada, or attempt at rebellion. On the viceroy hearing of the matter, he demanded the surrender of the documents, which were referred to the royal council, and from the latter to the crown's counsel, who called for the arrest of Gonzalez Angulo; he had concealed himself, and Villalpando, for having taken a marked part in the affair, was imprisoned. Of the priests who had signed their names, fifteen made a formal retraction. However, it was decided to present another representation that was to be drawn by Medrano; but Bataller, president of the junta de seguridad, wanted the signers to insert therein their hatred of Morelos and of the principles of the revolution. All refused their assent to a clause so entirely disconnected with the object of the representation. Much had been written on the subject, both for and against. The Spanish Franciscan friar José Joaquin de Oyarzábal, in Notas sobre la representation del clero, ridiculed the representation, and was answered in Vindication del clero Mexicano vulnerado by J. J. García Torres, and by Oidor Puente in a 4º volume of 243 pages entitled Reftexiones sobre el bando de 25 de Junio. Venegas, to avert further trouble, allowed the matter to drop, and never had his edict carried out at the capital; so that no ecclesiastic was ever executed there till after the independence. The agitation in Mexico was great, and the junta de seguridad was the object of popular execration, which was made manifest in an attempt in open day to assassinate Bataller, and in many other ways. See Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., considered very reliable upon events occurring in the capital. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 214-20.
  13. A list of the cases of Fathers Bustamante, Estavillo, Flores, and others appears in Bringas, Impugn. Manif. Dr Cos, 47-8. From this time we have an insurgent source to draw from, in the form of a Diario de gobierno y operaciones militares de la secretaria y ejército al mando del Exmo Sr presidente de la suprema junta y ministro universal de la nacion, Lic. D. Ignacio Lopez Rayon. It begins on the first day of Aug. 1812, and ends on the 6th of Sept. 1814, and seems to have been kept by Rayon's secretary, José Ignacio Oyarzábal. The original is supposed to have been in the possession of Licenciado Ignacio Rayon, the general's son, and a full copy of it appears in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 614-84. The first event therein recorded, on the 5th of Aug., is the destruction of a town called San Agustin, near Actopan, for its leanings to the viceregal authority. Captain Rosillo with 50 men attacked the royalists, killing 53 in the action, and capturing two leaders, whom he shot, and finally destroying the place by fire. A royalist commander, Fernandez, reported that a Captain José Antonio Zamora had been on the 16th of July at the town, and shot 13 loyal Indians before the eyes of their friends; and that he, Fernandez, pursued Zamora and his party, overtook them, and killed Zamora and fourteen others, taking 25 prisoners, most of whom were wounded. Three had already died. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 843-4.
  14. There was a high mass attended by Rayon and his officers and guard of honor. The sermon was preached by the brigadier Reverend Doctor Francisco Guerrero. After the religious ceremonies, there were public amusements, ringing of bells, firing of guns, and in the night illuminations.
  15. Issued from the Palacio Nacional de América, signed by Lic. Ignacio Rayon, presidente, and countersigned by José Ignacio Oyarzábal, secretario. Full copy in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 307-15; iv. 148-57.
  16. This man's life was saved by Abasolo's wife at Dolores, Sept. 10, 1811. He was a brother of the lawyer José Antonio Ferrer, who had on the 29th of Aug. of the same year been put to death by the garrote in Mexico, for being mixed up in the plot against Venegas. The two brothers had different political views. The one who was a royalist was active in his operations, and had done considerable harm to the independents, having caused many of its supporters to be shot.
  17. If we are to believe the account as recorded by the independent government, Rayon killed 27 of the enemy, wounded a number of them, and took ten prisoners, besides 20,000 head of sheep, 200 of cattle, a quantity of laden pack-mules, and some arms. Diario de Operac. (1812, Dec. 11), in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 628; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 155.
  18. He had been a corporal of the royalist regiment Tres Villas, and being made a prisoner at Zitácuaro joined the independents, and was promoted from time to time till he attained his present rank. Later he became a general, and figured in the early years of the republic.
  19. He had brave men with arms and ammunition to defend their lives and homes; he would never surrender to 'bandidos indignos de merecer ni aun su firma entera. Casasola.' This answer and Rayon's demand appear in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col Doc., iv. 633; Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1131-2.
  20. Bustamante expressed the belief that Rayon's retreat was caused by the receipt of a letter summoning him to a conference with envoys from Venegas at the Tultenango hacienda. Cuad. Hist., ii. 235-9. He is evidently mistaken. Correa's report attributed their ill success to Villagran's failure to cooperate, and the precipitate retreat of his men, which is also alluded to by Rayon's secretary. Rayon certainly went to Huichapan, which carried him away from Tultenango. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 345-8; Diario de Operac., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 298, 622-3. Whatever the cause of the retreat, it was fortunate for Casasola, who had lost about 100 men of the garrison.
  21. Rayon's secretary, at the time that both father and son were given high military rank, recorded that they were rewarded for good service rendered the national cause in the north; now El Chito was called an 'alevoso, ingrato á los beneficios recibidos,' who had acted as he did 'para entregarse sin estorbo á su libertinaje, arbitrariedad y escesos con que ha desolado estos contornos.' Diario de Operac., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 614, 623; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 161-2; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 348-51.
  22. The secretary says the priests made a warm intercession. Diario de Operac., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 629-30.
  23. Rayon wrote Morelos, who answered from Oajaca Dec. 31st, that from Cuautla he had tried to bring the Villagranes to order, and they had replied, 'con pretextos como los demás del Norte,' adding that they all seemed to be acting in accord. Osorno seemed inclined to be obedient, but the others influenced him against subordination, and therefore a heavy hand should be laid on them. He had promised himself to do so at some day; but for the present, 'será ménos malo dejarlos que hagan boruca por su rumbo, instándoles siempre á que llamen la atencion á Máxico miéntras hacemos negocio.' Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 351.
  24. Bustamante speaks of this negotiation and gives Liceaga's answer to Rayon on the project. He and Mendíbil are the only ones that mention the subject. Rayon's secretary says nothing of it in his diary. Cuad. Hist., ii. 315-17; Resumen Hist., 154-5, 162.
    hist. mex., vol. iv. 28
  25. On the day fixed for the commissioners to meet, no representative from Venegas appeared. The viceroy had changed his mind when he heard of Villagran's mutiny, and now expected to derive the advantages he desired from discord and anarchy. Intrigues were accordingly set in motion to create ill feeling between Rayon and Morelos, and between the former and his colleagues of the junta. Rayon, however, conducted himself with much circumspection.
  26. During the action the first day the governor and alcalde of Indians of the town attempted to join the enemy, were discovered, and shot. The second day Régules made a vigorous sally and put his assailants to flight. He also had his share of loss. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, 54-5, 121-4; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 86.
  27. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 261-2. These acts were avenged by Colonel Valerio Trujano, an extraordinary man, who had been an humble muleteer, but a born soldier, said to be originally from Tepecuacuilco, who had begun with small parties which by his courage and successes soon acquired the proportions of an army. Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., i. 381-2.
  28. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 239-42. Régules sent the viceroy a long report extolling the valor of his troops. He claimed to have done much damage to the enemy, capturing one gun, 30 other fire-arms, and 20 prisoners, besides killing upwards of 300, and wounded a very large number. As to his own casualties they were 18 slain and 42 wounded. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 391-6.
  29. One of Trujano's lucky hits on that road was the capture once of 100 good muskets, a most important prize at a time when fire-arms were so scarce.
  30. Infantry battalions of Oajaca and Campeche; the coast negroes under Caldelas; Bishop Bergosa's 'legion sagrada,' made up of clergymen and friars, under command of Canon José de San Martin; and the garrison of Yanhuitlan. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 243.
  31. He was a ferocious beast, of the same stamp as Arroyo on the independent side. With the view of striking terror in the hearts of those who were friendly to the revolution and had rendered aid to the independents when they besieged him, before leaving Yanhuitlan he mutilated a number of Indians; 'mandó cortar las orejas á veintitantos indios,' and kept the victims pilloried a whole day under the gibbet. Previous to this horrid act of barbarity he caused a large number of natives to be hanged. Ib.; Carriedo, Estud. Hist., ii. 18.
  32. It is said that both times he went through the royalist lines disguised as a hog. Carriedo, Estud. Hist., 19. His arrival occurred under circumstances that were attributed to a special providence. Trujano had ordered a novena to the image of the Señor de los corazones, or Lord of Hearts, venerated in the town, praying for divine protection. It was on the 9th day that the Noyó Indian returned with the news that relief was on the way, which convinced all that their prayers had been granted. Joy followed the deep despondency; and it was manifested by the ringing of bells, firing of cannon and rockets, illuminations, and music. The besiegers could not understand such a proceeding; but Régules' suspicions of the truth were awakened. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 243-5.
  33. It was said that Caldelas, indignant at finding himself neglected at the moment of greatest danger, was seeking Régules with pistol in hand to slay him. Caldelas was a Spaniard, had been a resident of the southern coast, and was much esteemed by his neighbors. Morelos, though a foe, admired his gallantry and other high qualities, and regretted his death. Bustamante calls him 'el bravo Caldelas;' and Alaman says of him: 'Fué uno de los oficiales mas bizarros que hubo en esta guerra.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 99-100, 180-4; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 249-52; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 367; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 121-3; Zamacois, Hist. Mex., viii. 436-45.
  34. Carriedo, Estud. Hist., ii. 20. Bonavía did not hold him in high esteem. He recovered and continued his services at Oajaca.
  35. One hundred prisoners of the jail were offered their liberty if they would take care of 60 wounded on the journey, which service they rendered, but on arrival at Oajaca the pledge was violated.
  36. Bustamante gives the number of slain at 400. Morelos in his declarations merely says there were some killed on both sides. Rayon's secretary's record has it that Trujano held the place two months with only 100 men; that Régules had upwards of 500, of whom 100 were slain and 300 captured, together with 400 muskets, 16 cannon, and other things. Diario de Operac., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 617.
  37. Bustamante, who saw the town soon after, states that it 'quedó hecha un harnero.'
  38. Because they had been exposed to fire on all sides; named after Saint Lawrence who was put on a hot gridiron and slowly broiled. Rivera, Gob. Mex., ii. 54.