History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson/Second/II:10

by Henry Adams

Chapter 10: The Rise of a British Party

"This six months' session has worn me down to a state of almost total incapacity for business," wrote President Jefferson to his attorney-general.^[1] "Congress will certainly rise to-morrow night, and I shall leave this for Monticello on the 5th of May, to be here again on the 8th of June." More earnestly than ever he longed for repose and good-will. "For myself," he said,^[2] "I have nothing further to ask of the world than to preserve in retirement so much of their esteem as I may have fairly earned, and to be permitted to pass in tranquillity, in the bosom of my family and friends, the days which yet remain to me." He could not reasonably ask from the world more than he had already received from it; but a whole year remained, during which he must still meet whatever demand the world should make upon him. He had brought the country to a situation where war was impossible for want of weapons, and peace was only a name for passive war. He was bound to carry the government through the dangers he had braved; and for the first time in seven years American democracy, struck with sudden fear of failure, looked to him in doubt, and trembled for its hopes.

Fortunately for Jefferson's ease, no serious opposition was made in the Republican party to his choice of a successor. Giles and Nicholas, who managed Madison's canvass in Virginia, caused a caucus to be held, January 21, at Richmond, where one hundred and twenty-three members of the State legislature joined in nominating electors for Madison. Randolph's friends held another caucus, at which fifty-seven members of the same legislature joined in nominating electors for Monroe. To support the Virginia movement for Madison, a simultaneous caucus was held at Washington, where, January 20, Senator Bradley of Vermont issued a printed circular inviting the Republican members of both Houses to consult, January 23, respecting the next Presidential election. Bradley's authority was disputed by Monroe's partisans, and only Madison's friends, or indifferent persons, obeyed the call. Eighty-nine senators and members attended; and on balloting, eighty-three votes were given for Madison as President, seventy-nine for George Clinton as Vice-President; but the names of the persons present were never published, and the caucus itself seemed afraid of its own action. About sixty Republican members or senators held aloof. John Randolph and sixteen of his friends published a protest against the caucus and its candidate:—

"We ask for energy, and we are told of his moderation. We ask for talents, and the reply is his unassuming merit. We ask what were his services in the cause of public liberty, and we are directed to the pages of the 'Federalist,' written in conjunction with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, in which the most extravagant of their doctrines are maintained and propagated. We ask for consistency as a Republican, standing forth to stem the torrent of oppression which once threatened to overwhelm the liberties of the country. We ask for that high and honorable sense of duty which would at all times turn with loathing and abhorrence from any compromise with fraud and speculation. We ask in vain."^[3]

Jefferson had commanded the warm and undisputed regard of his followers; Madison held no such pre-eminence. "Every able diplomatist is not fit to be President," said Macon. George Clinton, who had yielded unwillingly to Jefferson, held Madison in contempt. While Monroe set up a Virginia candidacy which the Republicans of Randolph's school supported, George Clinton set up a candidacy of his own, in New York, supported by Cheetham's "Watch-Tower," and by a portion of the country press. Before long, the public was treated to a curious spectacle. The regular party candidate for the Vice-presidency became the open rival of the regular candidate for the Presidency. Clinton's newspapers attacked Madison without mercy, while Madison's friends were electing Clinton as Madison's Vice-president.

In this state of things successful opposition to Madison depended upon the union of his enemies in support of a common candidate. Not only must either Monroe or Clinton retire, but one must be able to transfer his votes to the other; and the whole Federalist party must be induced to accept the choice thus made. The Federalists were not unwilling; but while they waited for the politicians of Virginia and New York to arrange the plan of campaign, they busied themselves with recovering control of New England, where they had been partially driven from power. The embargo offered them almost a certainty of success.

From the first moment of the embargo, even during the secret debate of Dec. 19, 1807, its opponents raised the cry of French influence; and so positively and persistently was Jefferson charged with subservience to Napoleon, that while a single Federalist lived, this doctrine continued to be an article of his creed. In truth, Jefferson had never stood on worse terms with France than when he imposed the embargo. He acted in good faith when he enclosed Armstrong's letter and Regnier's decision in his Embargo Message. Turreau was annoyed at his conduct, thinking it intended to divert public anger from England to France in order to make easier the negotiation with Rose. Instead of dictating Jefferson's course, as the Federalists believed, Turreau was vexed and alarmed by it. He complained of Armstrong, Madison, and Jefferson himself. The Embargo Message, he said, exposed the Administration in flank to the Federalists, and gave the English envoy free play. "For me it was a useless proof—one proof the more—of the usual awkwardness of the Washington Cabinet, and of its falsity (fausseté) in regard to France."^[4] His contempt involved equally people, Legislature, and Executive:—

"Faithful organs of the perverse intentions of the American people, its representatives came together before their usual time, in accordance with the President's views, and in their private conversation and in their public deliberations seemed entirely to forget the offences of England, or rather to have been never affected by them. This temper, common to the men of all parties, proved very evidently what was the state of popular opinion in regard to Great Britain, against whom no hostile project will ever enter into an American's thoughts. The Annual Message was not calculated to inspire energy into the honorable Congress. All these political documents from the President's pen are cold and colorless."^[5]

The result of Rose's negotiation confirmed Turreau's disgust:—

"It can be no longer doubtful that the United States, whatever insults they may have to endure, will never make war on Great Britain unless she attacks them. Every day I have been, and still am, met with the objection that the decrees of the French government have changed the disposition of the members of the Executive, and especially of members of Congress. Both have seized this incident as a pretext to color their cowardice (lâcheté), and extend it over their system of inaction; since it is evident that however severe the measures of the French government may have been, they weigh light in the balance when set in opposition to all the excesses, all the outrages, that England has permitted herself to inflict on the United States.^[6]

During the winter and spring nothing occurred to soothe Turreau's feelings. On the contrary, his irritation was increased by the President's communication to Congress of Champagny's letter of January 15, and by the "inconceivable weakness" which made this letter public:—

"Although I could hardly have calculated on this new shock, which has considerably weakened our political credit in the United States, I well knew that we had lost greatly in the opinion of the Cabinet at Washington and of its chief. After Mr. Rose's departure,—that is to say, about three weeks before the end of the session,—I quitted the city for reasons of health, which were only too well founded. I had seen Mr. Jefferson only a week before I went to take leave of him. Perhaps I should tell your Excellency that I commonly see the President once a week, and always in the evening, a time when I am sure of finding him at home, and nearly always alone. I never open upon the chapter of politics, because it seems more proper for me to wait for him to begin this subject, and I never wait long. At the interview before the last I found him extremely cool in regard to the interests of Europe and the measures of the Powers coalesced against England. At the last interview he asked me if I had recent news from Europe. I told him—what was true—that I had nothing official since two months. 'You treat us badly, he replied. 'The governments of Europe do not understand this government here. Even England, whose institutions have most analogy with ours, does not know the character of the American people and the spirit of its Administration,' etc. I answered that Great Britain having violated the law of nations in regard to every people in succession, the nature and the difference of their institutions mattered little to a Power which had abjured all principles. He interrupted me to say: 'When severe measures become necessary we shall know how to take them, but we do not want to be dragged into them (y être entrainés).' Although this was directly to the address of the minister of France, I thought best to avoid a retort, and contented myself with observing that generally France gave the example of respect for governments which sustained their dignity, and that the object of the coalition of all the European States against England was to constrain that Power to imitate her. The rest of the conversation was too vague and too insignificant to be worth remembering. Nevertheless, Mr. Jefferson repeated to me what he tells me at nearly every interview,—that he has much love for France."

Turreau drew the inference "that the federal government intends to-day more than ever to hold an equal balance between France and England." Erskine saw matters in the same light. Neither the Frenchman nor the Englishman, although most directly interested in the bias of President Jefferson, reported any word or act of his which showed a wish to serve Napoleon's ends.

The interests of the Federalists required them to assert the subservience of Jefferson to France. They did so in the most positive language, without proof, and without attempting to obtain proof. Had this been all, they would have done no worse than their opponents had done before them; but they also used the pretext of Jefferson's devotion to France in order to cover and justify their own devotion to England.

After the failure of Rose, in the month of February, to obtain further concessions from Madison, the British envoy cultivated more closely the friendship of Senator Pickering, and even followed his advice. As early as March 4 he wrote to his Government on the subject,^[7]—

"It is apprehended, should this Government be desirous that hostilities should take place with England, it will not venture to commence them, but will endeavor to provoke her to strike the first blow. In such a case it would no doubt adopt highly irritating measures. On this head I beg leave, but with great diffidence, to submit the views which I have formed here, and which I find coincide completely with those of the best and most enlightened men of this country, and who consider her interests as completely identified with those of Great Britain. I conceive it to be of extreme importance in the present state of the public mind in this nation, and especially as operated upon by the embargo, such as I have endeavored to represent it in preceding despatches, to avoid if possible actual warfare,—should it be practicable consistently with the national honor, to do no more than retort upon America any measures of insolence and injury falling short of it which she may adopt. Such a line of conduct would, I am persuaded, render completely null the endeavors exerted to impress upon the public mind here the persuasion of the inveterate rancor with which Great Britain seeks the destruction of America, and would turn their whole animosity,—goaded on, as they would be, by the insults and injuries offered by France, and the self-inflicted annihilation of their own commerce,—against their own Government, and produce an entire change in the politics of the country. A war with Great Britain would, I have no doubt, prove ultimately fatal to this Government; but it is to be feared that the people would necessarily rally round it at the first moment and at the instant of danger; and an exasperation would be produced which it might be found impossible to eradicate for a series of years. Their soundest statesmen express to me the utmost anxiety that their fellow-citizens should be allowed to bear the whole burden of their own follies, and suffer by evils originating with themselves; and they are convinced that the effects of punishment inflicted by their own hands must ere long bring them into co-operation with Great Britain, whilst if inflicted by hers, it must turn them perhaps irrevocably against her."

"The best and most enlightened men of the country,"—who "considered her interests as completely identified with those of Great Britain," and who thus concerted with Canning a policy intended to bring themselves into power as agents of Spencer Perceval and Lord Castlereagh,—were Senator Pickering and his friends. To effect this coalition with the British ministry Pickering exerted himself to the utmost. Not only by word of mouth, but also by letter, he plied the British envoy with argument and evidence. Although Rose, March 4, wrote to Canning in the very words of the Massachusetts senator, March 13 the senator wrote to Rose repeating his opinion:^[8]—

"You know my solicitude to have peace preserved between the two nations, and I have therefore taken the liberty to express to you my opinion of the true point of policy to be observed by your Government toward the United States, in case your mission prove unsuccessful; that is, to let us alone; to bear patiently the wrongs we do ourselves. In one word, amidst the irritations engendered by hatred and folly, to maintain a dignified composure, and to abstain from war,—relying on this, that whatever disposition exists to provoke, there is none to commence a war on the part of the United States."

To support his views Pickering enclosed a letter from Rufus King. "I also know," he continued, "that in the present unexampled state of the world our own best citizens consider the interests of the United States to be interwoven with those of Great Britain, and that our safety depends on hers. . . . Of the opinions and reasonings of such men I wish you to be possessed." He held out a confident hope that the embargo would end in an overthrow of the Administration, and that a change in the head of the government would alter its policy "in a manner propitious to the continuance of peace." A few days afterward he placed in Rose's hands two letters from George Cabot. Finally, on the eve of Rose's departure, March 22, he gave the British envoy a letter to Samuel Williams of London. "Let him, if you please, be the medium of whatever epistolary intercourse may take place between you and me."^[9]

To these advances Rose replied in his usual tone of courteous superiority:—

"I avail myself thankfully of your permission to keep that gentleman's [Rufus King's] letter, which I am sure will carry high authority where I can use it confidentially, and whither it is most important that what I conceive to be right impressions should be conveyed. It is not to you that I need protest that rancorous impressions of jealousy or ill-will have never existed there; but it is to be feared that at some time or another the extremest point of human forbearance may be reached. Yet at the present moment there is, I think, a peculiarity of circumstances most strange indeed, which enables the offended party to leave his antagonist to his own suicidal devices, unless, in his contortions under them, he may strike some blow which the other might not be able to dissemble."^[10]

No senator of the United States could submit, without some overpowering motive, to such patronage. That Pickering should have invited it was the more startling because he knew better than any other man in America the criminality of his act. Ten years before, at a time when Pickering was himself Secretary of State, the Pennsylvania Quaker, Dr. Logan, attempted, with honest motives, to act as an amateur negotiator between the United States government and that of France. In order to prevent such mischievous follies for the future, Congress, under the inspiration of Pickering, passed a law known as "Logan's Act," which still stood on the statute book:^[11]—

"Every citizen of the United States, whether actually resident or abiding within the same, or in any foreign country, who, without the permission or authority of the government, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government, or any officer or agent thereof, with an intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government, or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the government of the United States; and every person . . . who counsels, advises, or assists in any such correspondence, with such intent, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during not less than six months, nor more than three years."

When Pickering defied fine and imprisonment under his own law, in order to make a concert of political action with George Canning to keep the British government steady in aggression, he believed that his end justified his means; and he avowed his end to be the bringing of his friends into power[.] For this purpose he offered himself to Canning as the instrument for organizing what was in fact a British party in New England, asking in return only the persistence of Great Britain in a line of policy already adopted, which was sure to work against the Republican rule. Pickering knew that his conduct was illegal; but he had in his hands an excuse which justified him, as he chose to think, in disregarding the law. He persuaded himself that Jefferson was secretly bound by an engagement with Napoleon to effect the ruin of England.

Then came Pickering's master-stroke. The April election—which would decide the political control of Massachusetts for the coming year, and the choice of a senator in the place of J. Q. Adams—was close at hand. February 16, the day when Rose's negotiation broke down, Pickering sent to Governor Sullivan of Massachusetts a letter intended for official communication to the State legislature.^[12] "I may claim some share of attention and credit," he began,—"that share which is due to a man who defies the world to point, in the whole course of a long and public life, at one instance of deception, at a single departure from Truth." He entered into speculations upon the causes which had led Congress to impose the embargo. Omitting mention of the Orders in Council, he showed that the official reasons presented in the President's Embargo Message were not sufficient to justify the measure, and that some secret motive must lie hidden from public view:—

"Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals? Has he required that our ports, like those of his vassal States in Europe, be shut against British commerce? Is the embargo a substitute, a milder form of compliance, with that harsh demand, which if exhibited in its naked and insulting aspect the American spirit might yet resent? Are we still to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declarations and avowed designs of the French Emperor, although these may strike at our liberty and independence? And in the mean time are we, by a thousand irritations, by cherishing prejudices, and by exciting fresh resentments, to be drawn gradually into a war with Great Britain? Why amid the extreme anxiety of the public mind is it still kept on the rack of fearful expectation by the President's portentous silence respecting his French despatches? In this concealment there is danger. In this concealment must be wrapt up the real cause of the embargo. On any other supposition it is inexplicable."

Never was Jefferson's sleight-of-hand more dexterously turned against him than in this unscrupulous appeal to his own official language. In all Pickering's voluminous writings this letter stood out alone, stamped by a touch of genius.

"By false policy," he continued, "or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and subjugated to France as surely as by corruption. I trust, sir, that no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I say that I have some knowledge of public men and of public affairs; and on that knowledge, and with solemnity, I declare to you that I have no confidence in the wisdom or correctness of our public measures; that our country is in imminent danger; that it is essential to the public safety that the blind confidence in our rulers should cease; that the State legislatures should know the facts and the reasons on which important general laws are founded; and especially that those States whose farms are on the ocean and whose harvests are gathered in every sea, should immediately and seriously consider how to preserve them."

To those Federalists leaders who had been acquainted with the plans of 1804, the meaning of this allusion to the commercial States could not be doubtful. Least of all could Pickering's colleague in the Senate, who had so strenuously resisted the disunion scheme, fail to understand the drift of Pickering's leadership. John Quincy Adams, at whose growing influence this letter struck, had been from his earliest recollection, through his father's experience or his own, closely connected with political interests. During forty years he had been the sport of public turbulence, and for forty years he was yet to undergo every vicissitude of political failure and success; but in the range of his chequered life he was subjected to no other trial so severe as that which Pickering forced him to meet. In the path of duty he might doubtless face social and political ostracism, even in a town such as Boston then was, and defy it. Men as good as he had done as much, in many times and places; but to do this in support of a President whom he disliked and distrusted, for the sake of a policy in which he had no faith, was enough to shatter a character of iron. Fortunately for him, his temper was not one to seek relief in half-way measures. He had made a mistake in voting for an embargo without limit of time; but since no measure of resistance to Europe more vigorous than the embargo could gain support from either party, he accepted and defended it. He attended the Republican caucus January 23, and voted for George Clinton as President; and when Pickering flung down his challenge in the letter of February 16, Adams instantly took it up.

Governor Sullivan naturally declined to convey Senator Pickering's letter to the Legislature; but a copy had been sent to George Cabot, who caused it, March 9, to be published. The effect was violent. Passion took the place of reason, and swept the Federalists into Pickering's path. Governor Sullivan published a vigorous reply, but lost his temper in doing so, and became abusive where he should have been cool.^[13] When Pickering's letter was received at Washington, Adams wrote an answer,^[14] which reached Boston barely in time to be read before the election. He went over the history of the embargo; pointed out its relation to the Orders in Council; recapitulated the long list of English outrages; turned fiercely upon the British infatuation of Pickering's friends, and called upon them to make their choice between embargo and war:—

"If any statesman can point out another alternative I am ready to hear him, and for any practicable expedient to lend him every possible assistance. But let not that expedient be submission to trade under British licenses and British taxation. We are told that even under these restrictions we may yet trade to the British dominions, to Africa and China, and with the colonies of France, Spain, and Holland. I ask not how much of this trade would be left when our intercourse with the whole continent of Europe being cut off would leave us no means of purchase and no market for sale. I ask not what trade we could enjoy with the colonies of nations with which we should be at war. I ask not how long Britain would leave open to us avenues of trade which even in these very Orders of Council she boasts of leaving open as a special indulgence. If we yield the principle, we abandon all pretence to national sovereignty."

Thus the issue between a British and American party was sharply drawn. Governor Sullivan charged Pickering with an attempt to excite sedition and rebellion, and to bring about a dissolution of government. Adams made no mention of his colleague's name. In Massachusetts the modern canvass was unknown; newspapers and pamphlets took the place of speeches; the pulpit and tavern bar were the only hustings; and the public opinions of men in high official or social standing weighed heavily. The letters of Pickering, Sullivan, and Adams penetrated every part of the State, and on the issues raised by them the voters made their choice.

The result showed that Pickering's calculation on the embargo was sound. He failed to overthrow Governor Sullivan, who won his re-election by a majority of some twelve hundred in a total vote of about eighty-one thousand; but the Federalists gained in the new Legislature a decided majority, which immediately elected James Lloyd to succeed J. Q. Adams in the Senate, and adopted resolutions condemning the embargo. Adams instantly resigned his seat. The Legislature chose Lloyd to complete the unfinished term.

Thus the great State of Massachusetts fell back into Federalism. All, and more than all, that Jefferson's painful labors had gained, his embargo in a few weeks wasted. Had the evil stopped there no harm need have been feared; but the reaction went far beyond that point. The Federalists of 1801 were the national party of America; the Federalists of 1808 were a British faction in secret league with George Canning.

The British government watched closely these events. Rose's offensive and defensive alliance with Timothy Pickering and with the Washington representatives of the Essex Junto was not the only tie between Westminster and Boston. Of all British officials, the one most directly interested in American politics was Sir James Craig, then Governor of Lower Canada, who resided at Quebec, and had the strongest reason to guard against attack from the United States. In February, 1808, when the question of peace or war seemed hanging on the fate of Rose's mission, Sir James Craig was told by his secretary, H. W. Ryland, that an Englishman about to visit New England from Montreal would write back letters as he went, which might give valuable hints in regard to the probable conduct of the American government and people. The man's name was John Henry; and in reporting his letters to Lord Castlereagh as they arrived, Sir James Craig spoke highly of the writer:—

"Mr. Henry is a gentleman of considerable ability, and, I believe, well able to form a correct judgment on what he sees passing. He resided for some time in the United States, and is well acquainted with some of the leading people of Boston, to which place he was called very suddenly from Montreal, where he at present lives, by the intelligence he received that his agent there was among the sufferers by the recent measures of the American government. He has not the most distant idea that I should make this use of his correspondence, which therefore can certainly have no other view than that of an unreserved communication with his friend who is my secretary."^[15]

Sir James Craig had something to learn in regard to volunteer diplomatists of Henry's type; but being in no way responsible for the man, he read the letters which came addressed to Ryland, but which were evidently meant for the Governor of Canada, and proved to be worth his reading. The first was written March 2, from Swanton in Vermont, ten miles from the Canada border:—

"You will have learned that Congress has passed a law prohibiting the transport of any American produce to Canada, and the collector at this frontier post expects by this day's mail instructions to carry it into rigorous execution. The sensibility excited by this measure among the inhabitants in the northern part of Vermont is inconceivable. The roads are covered with sleighs, and the whole country seems employed in conveying their produce beyond the line of separation. The clamor against the Government—and this measure particularly—is such that you may expect to hear of an engagement between the officers of government and the sovereign people on the first effort to stop the introduction of that vast quantity of lumber and produce which is prepared for the Montreal market."

From Windsor in Vermont, March 6, Henry wrote again, announcing that the best-informed people believed war to be inevitable between the United States and England. From Windsor Henry went on to Boston, where he found himself at home. Acquainted with the best people, and admitted freely into society,^[16] he heard all that was said. March 10, when he had been not more than a day or two in Boston, he wrote to Ryland, enclosing a Boston newspaper of the same morning, in which Senator Pickering's letter to Governor Sullivan appeared and the approaching departure of Rose was announced. Already he professed to be well-advised of what was passing in private Federalist councils.

"The men of talents, property, and influence in Boston are resolved to adopt without delay every expedient to avert the impending calamity, and to express their determination not to be at war with Great Britain in such a manner as to indicate resistance to the government in the last resort. . . . Very active, though secret, measures are taken to rouse the people from the lethargy which if long continued must end in their subjection to the modern Attila."

March 18 Henry wrote again, announcing that the fear of war had vanished, and that Jefferson meant to depend upon his embargo and a system of irritation:—

"It is, however, to be expected that the evil will produce its own cure, and that in a few months more of suffering and privation of all the benefits of commerce the people of the New England States will be ready to withdraw from the confederacy, establish a separate government, and adopt a policy congenial with their interests and happiness. For a measure of this sort the men of talents and property are now ready, and only wait until the continued distress of the multitude shall make them acquainted with the source of their misery, and point out an efficient remedy."

These letters, immediately on their receipt at Quebec, were enclosed by Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh in a letter marked "Private," dated April 10, and sent by the Halifax mail, as the quickest mode of conveyance.^[17] Meanwhile Henry completed his business in Boston and returned to Montreal, where he arrived April 11, and three days afterward wrote again to Ryland at Quebec:—

"I attended a private meeting of several of the principal characters in Boston, where the questions of immediate and ultimate necessity were discussed. In the first, all agreed that memorials from all the towns (beginning with Boston) should be immediately transmitted to the Administration, and a firm determination expressed that they will not co-operate in a war against England. I distributed several copies of a memorial to that effect in some of the towns in Vermont on my return. The measure of ultimate necessity which I suggested I found in Boston some unwillingness to consider. It was 'that in case of a declaration of war the State of Massachusetts should treat separately for itself, and obtain from Great Britain a guaranty of its integrity.' Although it was not deemed necessary to decide on a measure of this sort at this moment, it was considered as a very probable step in the last resort. In fine, every man whose opinion I could ascertain was opposed to a war, and attached to the cause of England."

That Henry reported with reasonable truth the general character of Federalist conversation was proved by the nearly simultaneous letters of Pickering to Rose; but his activity did not stop there. In a final letter of April 25 he gave a more precise account of the measures to be taken:—

"In my last I omitted to mention to you that among the details of the plan for averting from the Northern States the miseries of French alliance and friendship, individuals are selected in the several towns on the seaboard and throughout the country to correspond and act in concert with the superintending committee at Boston. The benefits of any organized plan over the distinct and desultory exertions of individuals are, I think, very apparent. Whether this confederacy of the men of talents and property be regarded as a diversion of the power of the nation, as an efficient means of resistance to the general government in the event of a war, or the nucleus of an English party that will soon be formidable enough to negotiate for the friendship of Great Britain, it is in all respects very important; and I have well-founded reason to hope that a few months more of suffering and the suspension of everything collateral to commerce will reconcile the multitude to any men and any system which will promise them relief."

May 5 the second part of Henry's correspondence was forwarded by Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, who could compare its statements with those of Pickering, and with the reports of Rose. The alliance between the New England Federalists and the British Tories was made. Nothing remained but to concentrate against Jefferson the forces at their command.

References

1. Jefferson to Rodney, April 24, 1808; Works, v. 275.
2. Jefferson to Monroe, March 10, 1808; Works, v. 253.
3. Address to the People of the United States, National Intelligencer, March 7, 1808.
4. Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
5. Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
6. Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
7. Rose to Canning, March 4, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
8. Pickering to Rose, March 13, 1808; New England Federalism, p. 366.
9. Pickering to G. H. Rose, March 22, 1808; New England Federalism, p. 368.
10. G. H. Rose to Pickering, March 18, 1808; New England Federalism, p. 367.
11. Rev. Stat. sec. 5335. Cf. Act of Jan. 30, 1799; Annals of Congress, 1797-1799, p. 3795.
12. Letter from the Hon. Timothy Pickering to His Excellency James Sullivan (Boston, 1808).
13. Interesting Correspondence (Boston, 1808).
14. Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis, by John Quincy Adams (Boston, 1808).
15. Sir J. H. Craig to Lord Castlereagh, April 10, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
16. Quincy's Life of Josiah Quincy, p. 250.
17. Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, April 10, 1808; MSS. British Archives, Lower Canada, vol. cvii.