International Association of Machinists v. Street/Concurrence Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

367 U.S. 740

International Association of Machinists  v.  Street

 Argued: Jan. 17, 18, 1961. --- Decided: June 19, 1961

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society. One who of necessity rides busses and street cars does not have the freedom that John Muir and Walt Whitman extolled. The very existence of a factory brings into being human colonies. Public housing in some areas may of necessity take the form of apartment buildings which to some may be as repulsive as ant hills. Yet people in teeming communities often have no other choice.

Legislatures have some leeway in dealing with the problems created by these modern phenomena.

Collective bargaining is a remedy for some of the problems created by modern factory conditions. The beneficiaries are all the members of the laboring force. We therefore concluded in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112, that it was permissible for the legislature to require all who gain from collective bargaining to contribute to its cost. ^[1] That is the narrow and precise holding of the Hanson case, as Mr. Justice BLACK shows.

Once an association with others is compelled by the facts of life, special safeguards are necessary lest the spirit of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments be lost and we all succumb to regimentation. I expressed this concern in Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467, 72 S.Ct. 813, 823, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (dissenting opinion), where a 'captive audience' was forced to listen to special radio broadcasts. f an association is compelled, the individual should not be forced to surrender any matters of conscience, belief, or expression. He should be allowed to enter the group with his own flag flying, whether it be religious, political, or philosophical; nothing that the group does should deprive him of the privilege of preserving and expressing his agreement, disagreement, or dissent, whether it coincides with the view of the group, or conflicts with it in minor or major ways; and he should not be required to finance the promotion of causes with which he disagrees.

In a debate on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, later adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, Mr. Malik of Lebanon stated what I think is the controlling principle in cases of the character now before us:

'The social group to which the individual belongs, may, like the human person himself, be wrong or right: the person alone is the judge.' ^[2]

This means that membership in a group cannot be conditioned on the individual's acceptance of the group's philosophy. ^[3] Otherwise, First Amendment rights are required to be exchanged for the group's attitude, philosophy, or politics. I do not see how that is permissible under the Constitution. Since neither Congress nor the state legislatures can abridge those rights, they cannot grant the power to private groups to abridge them. As I read the First Amendment, it forbids any abridgment by government whether directly or indirectly.

The collection of dues for paying the costs of collective bargaining of which each member is a beneficiary is one thing. If, however, dues are used, or assessments are made, to promote or oppose birth control, to repeal or increase the taxes on cosmetics, to promote or oppose the admission of Red China into the United Nations, and the like, then the group compels an individual to support with his money causes beyond what gave rise to the need for group action.

I think the same must be said when union dues or assessments are used to elect a Governor, A Congressman, a Senator, or a President. It may be said that the election of a Franklin D. Roosevelt rather than a Calvin Coolidge might be the best possible way to serve the cause of collective bargaining. But even such a selective use of union funds for political purposes subordinates the individual's First Amendment rights to the views of the majority. I do not see how that can be done, even though the objector retains his rights to campaign, to speak, to vote as he chooses. For when union funds are used for that purpose, the individual is required to finance political projects against which he may be in rebellion. ^[4] The furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which justified brining the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his fiancial support merely because he disagrees with the group's strategy. If that were allowed, we would be reversing the Hanson case sub silentio. But since the funds here in issuea re used for causes other than defraying the costs of collective bargaining, I would affirm the judgment below with modifications. Although I recognize the strength of the arguments advanced by my Brothers BLACK and WHITTAKER against giving a 'proportional' relief to appellees in this case, there is the practical problem of mustering five Justices for a judgment in this case. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134. So I have concluded dubitante to agree to the one suggested by Mr. Justice BRENNAN, on the understanding that all relief granted will be confined to the six protesting employees. This suit, though called a 'class' action, does not meet the requirements as the use or nonuse of any dues or assessments depends on the choice of each individual, not the group. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44, 61 S.Ct. 115, 119, 85 L.Ed. 22.

Notes

1. The problem of employees who receive benefits of union representation but who are unwilling to give financial support to the union has received much attention from Congress (see S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-7; H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 42-43) and from the courts. See Radio Officers' Union, etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 17, 74 S.Ct. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455.
2. Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, February 4, 1947, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/SR.14, p. 4.
3. We noted in the Hanson case, 351 U.S. 236-237, 76 S.Ct. 714, 720-721, note 8, various restrictions placed by union constitutions and by-laws on individual members. Some disqualified persons from membership for their political views or associations. Certainly government could not prescribe standards of that character.
4. Hostility to such compulsion was expressed early in our history. Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, wrote, 'Who does not see * * * that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?' II Writings of James Madison (Hunt ed. 1901), p. 186.

Jefferson in his 1779 Bill for Religious Liberty wrote 'that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.' See 12 Hening's Va.Stat. 85; Brant, Madison, The Nationalist (1948), p. 354.