Louisville Trust Company v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

by David Josiah Brewer

United States Supreme Court

174 U.S. 674

Louisville Trust Company  v.  Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company

The questions in this case are novel and important. They arise on the foreclosure of certain railroad mortgages, and suggest to what extent the same rules and considerations obtain in them as in the foreclosures of ordinary mortgages upon real estate. It goes without saying that the proceeding in the foreclosure of an ordinary mortgage on real estate is simple and speedy. No one need be considered except the mortgagor and mortgagee, and if they concur in the disposition of the foreclosure it is sufficient, and the court may properly enter a decree in accordance therewith. Other parties, although claiming rights in antagonism to both or either mortgagor and mortgagee, may be considered outside the scope of the foreclosure, and whatever rights they may have may properly be relegated to independent suits.

But this court long since recogni ed the fact that in the present condition of things (and all judicial proceedings must be adjusted to facts as they are) other inquiries arise in railroad foreclosure proceedings accompanied by a receivership than the mere matter of the amount of the debt of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. We have held in a series of cases that the peculiar character and conditions of railroad property not only justify, but compel, a court entertaining foreclosure proceedings to give to certain limited unsecured claims a priority over the debts secured by the mortgage. It is needless to refer to the many cases in which this doctrine has been affirmed. It may be, and has often been said, that this ruling implies somewhat of a departure from the apparent priority of right secured by a contract obligation duly made and duly recorded, and yet this court, recognizing that a railroad is not simply private property, but also an enstrument of public service, has ruled that the character of its business, and the public obligations which it assumes, justify a limited displacement of contract and recorded liens in behalf of temporary and unsecured creditors. These conclusions, while they to a certain extent ignored the positive promises of contract and recorded obligations, were enforced in obedience to equitable and public considerations. We refer to these matters, not for the sake of reviewing those decisions, but to note the fact that foreclosure proceedings of mortgages covering extensive railroad properties are not necessarily conducted with the limitations that attend the foreclosures closures of ordinary real-estate mortgages.

We notice, again, that railroad mortgages, or trust deeds, are ordinarily so large in amount that on foreclosure thereof only the mortgagees, or their representatives, can be considered as probable purchasers. While exceptional cases may occur, yet this is the rule, as shown by the actual facts of foreclosure proceedings, as well as one which might be expected from the value of the property and the amount of the mortgage.

We may not shut our eyes to any facts of common knowledge. We may not rightfully say that the contract of mortgage created certain rights, and that when those rights are established they must be sustained in the courts, and no inquiry can be had beyond those technical rights. We must therefore recognize the fact, for it is a fact of common knowledge, that, whatever the legal rights of the parties may be, ordinarily foreclosures of railroad mortgages mean, not the destruction of all interest of the mortgagor, and a transfer to the mortgagee alone of the full title, but that such proceedings are carried on in the interests of all parties who have any rights in the mortgaged property, whether as mortgagee, creditor, or mortgagor. We do not stop to inquire, because the question is not presented by this record, whether a court is justified in permitting a foreclosure and sale which leaves any interest in the mortgagor, to wit, the railroad company and its stockholders, and ought not always to require an extinction of all the mortgagor's interest, and a full transfer to the mortgagee, representing the bondholders. Assuming that foreclosure proceedings may be carried on to some extent at least in the interests and for the benefit of both mortgagee and mortgagor (that is, bondholder and stockholder), we observe that no such proceedings can be rightfully carried to consummation which recognize and preserve any interest in the stockholders without also recognizing and preserving the interests, not merely of the mortgagee, but of every creditor of the corporation. In other words, if the bondholder wishes to foreclose and exclude inferior lienholders or general unsecured creditors and stockholders, he may do so; but a foreclosure which attempts to preserve any interest or right of mortgagor in the property after the sale must necessarily secure and preserve the prior rights of general creditors thereof. This is based upon the familiar rule that the stockholder's interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of creditors. First, of secured, and then of unsecured, creditors. And any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.

Now, the intervening petition of the petitioner, duly verified, directly charged that the foreclosure proceedings were for the benefit alone of bondholder and stockholder, and under an agreement between the two for a sale and purchase for both, and with a view of thereby excluding from any interest in the property all unsecured creditors; that this agreement was entered into after and in consequence of the decree of the United States courts of appeals adjudging the New Albany Company liable on its guaranty. If that fact be true, would it not be-and we quote the language of the court of appeals-'a travesty upon equity proceedings'? Can it be that when in a court of law the right of an unsecured creditor is judicially determined, and that judicial determination carries with it a right superior to that of the mortgagor, the mortgagor and mortgagee can enter into an agreement by which, through the form of equitable proceedings, all the right of this unsecured creditor may be wiped out, and the interest of both mortgagor and mortgagee in the property preseved and continued? The question carries its own answer. Nothing of the kind can be tolerated.

Beyond the positive and verified statement of the petition of the Louisville Trust Company are many facts appearing in the record which strongly support this allegation. That a corporation whose stock consists of $16,000,000, $7,000,000, of which is preferred stock, all of which must be expected to be wiped out if a mortgage interest of $13,800,000 is fully asserted, hastens into court and confesses judgment on an alleged unsecured liability; on the same day responds to an application for a receiver, and assents thereto; makes no effort during the receivership to prevent default in interest obligations; tacitly, at least, consents to an order made on application of the receiver for the issue of $200,000 worth of receiver's certificates in aid of betterments on the road, when the same sum might have paid the interest and delayed the foreclosure; and, when foreclosure bills are filed, not only makes no denial, but admits all the averments of mortgage obligation and default,-in other words, seems a debtor most willing to have all its property destroyed, and this because of one short wheat crop,-these matters suggest, at least, that there is probable truth in the sworn averment of the petitioner that all was done by virtue of an agreement between mortgagee and mortgagor (bondholder and stockholder) to preserve the relative interests of both, and simply extinguish unsecured indebtedness. When, in addition to this fact, it appears that these proceedings are initiated within a few days after a decree of the circuit court of appeals,-a decree final, unless brought to this court for review in its discretion. by certiorari,-and that a large amount of unsecured indebtedness was by that decree cast upon the mortgagor, we cannot doubt that such a condition of things was presented to the trial court that it ought, in discharge of its obligations to all parties interested in the property, to have made inquiry, and ascertained that no such purpose as was alleged in the intervening petition was to be consummated by the foreclosure proceedings.

It is said by the appellee that the Louisville Trust Company was dilatory, and that by reason thereof it was not entitled to consideration in a court of equity. There is some foundation for this contention, and yet there was not such delay as justified the court in refusing to enter upon an inquiry. Indeed, it does not appear that either the circuit court or the circuit court of appeals considered the petitioner dilatory, or denied its pplication on the ground of delay. It must be borne in mind that the bill of complaint filed on August 24th by one who had that day become, by consent of the defendant, a judgment creditor, was affirmatively 'for the purpose of enforcing the rights of complainant and all other creditors of said insolvent corporation according to their due equities and priorities,' and to 'decree the rights, liens, and equities of each and all of the creditors of the said Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company as the same may be finally ascertained and decreed by the court upon the respective claims and interventions of several of such creditors or lienors in and to not only the said line of railroad appurtenances and equipment or any part of them, but also to and upon each and every portion of the assets and property of the said insolvent corporation.'

Although this bill was filed in the avowed interest of himself and all other creditors, no action was taken to notify any creditors, or to bring them into court to present their several claims. Any creditor might well have waited, even with knowledge of what had taken place, and after an examination of the bill thus filed, until publication or other notice. Whether this petitioner was in fact aware of these proceedings is not disclosed. Even if it were, its waiting a reasonable time for what in the ordinary course of procedure all creditors had a right to expect is not a neglect which destroys its equities. It and all other creditors might justly assume that this proceeding was initiated in good faith to subject the property of the common debtor to the payment of all its debts. Primarily it may be its secured debts, but also generally all its debts, secured or unsecured, and that whenever it was necessary due notice would be given, and all creditors called upon to present their claims. It would not have been justified in treating this proceeding as solely in the interest of the mortgagee and mortgagor (the bondholder and stockholder), and for the purpose of destroying all claims of unsecured creditors.

It is true that the filing of the bills of foreclosure was notice of an intent to subject the property belonging to the mortgagor to the satisfaction of the mortgage; and, for the purpose of the present inquiry, it may be conceded that the intervening petition disclosed no legal defense to the claims of the mortgagees to foreclosure. In other words, for the inquiry we desire to pursue we shall assume without question that the matters referred to in the petition in respect to the property in Illinois, the decision of the supreme court of that state and the effect of the attempted consolidation, and all other matters stated or suggested, separately or together, constitute no valid defense to the foreclosure bills. But this foreclosure proceeding did not, either directly or by suggestion, disclose any purpose to protect the mortgagor (the stockholder) at the expense of unsecured creditors; and, as heretofore stated, this unsecured creditor was not bound to presume that there was any such purpose in the minds of the two parties to the foreclosure. So that its failure to intervene at the first instant cannot be fatal delay or neglect.

It is also true that no evidence was offered by the petitioner in support of the allegations of its petition; but it is not true that in revising and reversing the final action of the circuit court we are acting on mere suspicion, or disturbing either settle rules or admitted rights. The allegations of this intervening petition as to the wrong intended and being consummated were specific and verified. The delay, under the circumstances, was not such as to deprive the petitioner of a right to be heard. The facts apparent on the face of the record were such as justified inquiry, and upon those facts, supported by the positive and verified allegations of the petitioner, it was the duty of the trial court to have stayed proceedings, and given time to produce evidence in support of the charges. Taking the as a whole, they are very suggestive, independent of positive allegation,-so suggestive at least that, when a distinct and verified charge of wrong was made, the court should have investigated it.

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that one claiming to be a general creditor for nearly half a million of dollars commences proceedings to establish his right, which, by the consent of the debtor, result on the very day in a judgment, execution, and return thereof unsatisfied, a bill for a receivership, and the appointment of a receiver; and yet, notwithstanding this was initiated in support of this large claim, as well as for the protection of other unsecured creditors, shortly thereafter foreclosure proceedings are instituted and carried on to completion, which absolutely ignore the rights of this alleged unsecured creditor, and leave as the result of the sale himself the actor who has brought on the possibility of foreclosure stripped of all rights in and to the mortgaged property. Was he a real creditor, and did that real creditor make a generous donation of this large claim? Were arrangements made with him and the stockholders to protect both, and by virtue of such arrangements was this foreclosure hastened to its close? Questions like these which lie on the surface of these proceedings cannot be put one side on the suggestion that they present only matter of suspicion.

It is no answer to these objections to say that a bondholder may foreclose in his own separate interest, and, after acquiring title to the mortgaged property, may give what interest he pleases to any one, whether stockholder holder or not; and so these several mortgagees foreclosing their mortgages, if proceeding in their own interest, if acquiring title for themselves alone, may donate what interest in the property acquired by foreclosure they desire. But human nature is something whose action can never be ignored in the courts, and parties who have acquired full and absolute title to property are not, as a rule, donating any interest therein to strangers. It is one thing for a bondholder who has acquired absolute title by foreclosure to mortgaged property to thereafter give of his interest to others, and an entirely different thing whether such bondholder, to destroy the interest of all unsecured creditors, to secure a waiver of all objections on the part of the stockholder, and consummate speedily the foreclosure, may proffer to him an interest in the property after the foreclosure. The former may be beyond the power of the courts to inquire into or condemn. The latter is something which on the face of it deserves the condemnation of every court, and should never be aided by any decree or order thereof. It involves an offer, a temptation, to the mortgagor, the purchase price thereof to be paid, not by the mortgagee, but in fact by the unsecured creditor.

We may observe that a court, assuming in foreclosure proceedings the charge of railroad property by a receiver, can never rightfully become the mere silent registrar of the agreements of mortgagee and mortgagor. It cannot say that a foreclosure is a purely technical matter between the mortgagee and mortgagor, and so enter any order or decree to which the two parties assent without further inquiry. No such receivership can be initiated and carried on unless absolutely subject to the independent judgment of the court appointing the receiver; and that court in the administration of such receivership is not limited simply to inquiry as to the rights of mortgagee and mortgagor (bondholder and stockholder), but, considering the public interests in the property, the peculiar circumstances which attend large railroad mortgages, must see to it that all equitable rights in or connected with the property are secured.

While not intending any displacement of the ordinary rules or rights of mortgagor and mortgagee in a foreclosure, we believe that, under the circumstances as presented by this record, there was error; that the charge, alleged positively and supported by many circumstances, of collusion between the bondholder and the stockholder to prevent any beneficial result inuring by virtue of the decree of the circuit court of appeals for the Sixth circuit in reference to the guaranty obligations of the New Albany Company, was one compelling investigation; and the order will therefore be that the decrees of the circuit court and of the circuit court of appeals be reversed, and the case be remanded to the circuit court, with instructions to set aside the confirmation of sale; to inquire whether it is true, as alleged, that the foreclosure proceedings were made in pursuance of an agreement between the bondholder and stockholder to preserve the rights of both, and destroy the interests of unsecured creditors; and, if it shall appear that such was the agreement between these parties, to refuse to permit the confirmation of sale until the interests of unsecured creditors have been preserved, and to take such other and further proceedings as shall be in conformity to law.

Decree accordingly.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM dissented.

Notes