XIII.
A FEW CONCLUSIONS OF ANARCHISM.
Such being the leading ideas of Anarchism, let us take now a few concrete illustrations, to show the place that our ideas occupy in the scientific and social movement of our own times.
When we are told that we must respect Law (written with a capital letter), because "Law is Truth expressed in an objective form," or because "the leading steps in the evolution of Law are the same as those of the evolution of Mind," or again, because "Law and Morality are identical, and only differ from each other in form"—we listen to such high-flown assertions with as little reverence as Mephistopheles did in Goethe's "Faust." We know, of course, that those who wrote them spent much effort of mind before they thus worded their thoughts, imagining them to be extremely deep; but we know also that these were nothing but unconscious attempts at broad generalisations, founded, however, on an altogether insufficient basis, and obscured by words so chosen as to hypnotise men by their high-style obscurity.
In fact, in ancient times men endeavoured to give a divine origin to Law; later on, they strove to give it a metaphysical basis; but to-day we are able to study the origin of the conceptions of Law, and their anthropological development, just as we are able to study the evolution of weaving or of the ways of honey-making by the bees. Having now at our disposal the work of the anthropological school, we study the appearance of social customs and conceptions of Law amongst the most primitive savages, and we follow their gradual development through the codes of different historical periods, down to our own times.
In so doing, we come to the conclusion, already mentioned on one of the preceding pages:—All laws have a double origin, and it is precisely this double origin which distinguishes them from customs established by usage and representing the principles of morality existing in a particular society at a particular epoch. Law confirms these customs: it crystallises them; but at the same time it takes advantage of these generally approved customs, in order to introduce in disguise, under their sanction, some new institution which is entirely to the advantage of the military and governing minorities. For instance, Law introduces, or gives sanction to, Slavery, Caste, paternal, priestly, and military authority; or else it smuggles in serfdom, and, later on, subjection to the State. By this means, Law has always succeeded in imposing a yoke on man without his perceiving it, a yoke which he has never been able to throw off save by means of revolutions.
Things came to pass in this way from the earliest time till our own; and we see the same going on now, even in the advanced legislation of our own days—in the so-called Labour legislation; because, side by side with the "protection of the worker," which represents their acknowledged aim, these laws surreptitiously insert the idea of compulsory arbitration by the State in case of a strike (compulsory arbitration—what a contradiction!); or they interpolate the principle of a compulsory working day of so many hours. They open the door to the military working of railways in case of a strike; they give legal sanction to the oppression of peasants in Ireland, by imposing high prices fur the redemption of the land; and so on. And such a system will flourish as long as part of society will make laws for the whole of society; and by this means they further extend the power of the State, which constitutes the principal prop of Capitalism.
As long as laws are made and enforced, the result necessarily will be the same.
We understand therefore why Anarchism, since Godwin, has disowned all written laws, although the Anarchists, more than any legislators, aspire to Justice, which—let us repeat it—is equivalent to Equality, and impossible without it.
When the objection is raised against us that in repudiating Law we repudiate Morality, as we do not recognise the "categorical imperative" about which Kant spoke to us, we answer that the language of this objection is in itself strange and incomprehensible to our mind.[1] It is just as strange and incomprehensible as it would be to a naturalist who studied Morality. Before entering into the discussion, we therefore ask our interlocutors this question: "What do you mean by this 'categorical imperative'? Cannot you translate your assertion into comprehensible language, as, for example, Laplace used to do, when he found the means of expressing the formulas of higher mathematics in words that every one understood? All great scientists do that; why do not you do as much?"
In fact, what is meant when the words “"universal law" or "categorical imperative" are used? Is it that all men accept the idea: "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you"? If so, very well. Let us begin to study (as Hutchinson and Adam Smith have done before us) whence came this moral conception, and how did it develop? Let us then study in what degree this idea of Justice implies Equality. A very important question, because only those who consider others as their equals can obey the rule: "Do not do to others what you do not wish them to do to you." A serf-owner and a slave merchant can evidently not recognise the "universal law" or the "categorical imperative" as regards serfs and negroes, because they do not look upon them as equals. And if our remark be correct, let us see whether it is possible to inculcate morality while inculcating ideas of inequality.
Let us analyse next, as Guyau did, the "sacrifice of self," and, having done that, let us see what were the causes and the conditions that have most contributed in history to the development of moral sentiment—both of that sentiment which is expressed in the commandment concerning our neighbour, and of that other feeling which leads to self-sacrifice. Then we shall be able to deduce which social conditions and institutions promise the best results in the future. We shall learn how much religion contributed to it, and how far the economic and political inequalities established by Law hamper it; what is the part contributed towards the development of these feelings by Law, punishments, prisons, judges, gaolers, and executioners.
Let us study all this in detail, separately, and then we shall be able to talk, with some practical result, of social morality and of moralisation by Law, by Tribunals, and by Superintendents of Police. But high flown words, that only serve to hide from us the superficiality of our would-be knowledge, had better be left alone. They may have been unavoidable at a certain period of history, though even then their having been useful is very doubtful; but now, fit as we are to undertake the study of the most arduous social questions in exactly the same way as the gardener on the one hand, and the physiologist on the other hand, study the most favourable conditions for the growth of a plant—let us do so!
Again, when an economist comes and says to us: "In an absolutely open market the value of goods is measured by the quantity of work socially necessary to produce those goods" (see Ricardo, Proudhon, Marx, and so many others), we do not accept this assertion as an article of faith for the reason that it was put forth by a particular authority, or that it may seem to us "devilishly Socialistic." "It is possible," we say, "that it is true. But do you not see that, in making this assertion, you maintain that the value and quantity of work necessary are proportional, just as the rapidity of a falling body is proportional to the number of seconds that the fall lasts? You thus affirm a certain quantitative relation between labour and market value. Very well; but have you, then, made mensurations, observations—quantitative measures that alone could confirm a quantitative assertion?
You can say that, broadly speaking, the exchange value of goods grows if the quantity of necessary work is greater. This is how Adam Smith expressed himself; but then he was wise enough to add that under capitalist production the proportionality between exchange value and the amount of necessary labour exists no more. But to jump to the conclusion that consequently the two quantities are proportional, that one is the measure of the other, and that this is a law of Economics, is a gross error. As gross as to affirm, for example, that the quantity of rain that is going to fall to-morrow will be proportional to the quantity of millimetres that the barometer will have fallen below the average established at a certain place in a certain season.
The man who first remarked that there was a correlation between the lower level of the barometer and the quantity of rain that falls—the man who first remarked that a stone falling from a great height has acquired a greater velocity than a stone that has only fallen one yard, made scientific discoveries. That is what Adam Smith did as regards Value. But the man who would come after such a general remark has been made, and affirm that the quantity of rain fallen is measured by the quantity the barometer has fallen below the average, or else, that the space traversed by a falling stone is proportional to the duration of the fall and is measured by it, would be talking nonsense. Besides, he would prove that scientific methods of research are absolutely strange to him. He would prove that his writings are not scientific, however full of words borrowed from scientific jargon. But this was exactly what was done by those who made the above-mentioned affirmation about Value.
It must be noticed that if the absence of exact numerical data be alleged as an excuse for the superficial dealing with economic matters of which we spoke previously—this is no excuse at all.
In the domain of exact sciences we know very many cases where two quantities depend upon each other, so that if one of them increases, the other increases as well—and yet we know that they are not proportional to each other. The rapidity of growth of a plant certainly depends, among other causes, upon the quantity of heat it obtains. Both the height of the sun above the horizon and the average temperature of every separate day (deduced from many years' observations) increase every day after March 22. The recoil of a gun increases when we increase the quantity of powder in the cartridge. And so on.
But where is the man of science who, after having noticed these relations, would conclude that consequently the rapidity of growth of the plant and the quantity of heat it receives, "the height of the sun above the horizon and the average daily temperature, the recoil of the gun and the quantity of powder in the cartridge are proportional? that, if one of the two increases twice, or thrice, the other will increase at the same ratio? in other words, that the one is the measure of the other? A man of science knows that thousands of other relations, besides that of proportionality, may exist between the two quantities; and unless he has made a number of measurements which prove that such a relation of simple proportionality exists, nobody will ever dare to make such an affirmation.
Yet this is what economists do, when they say that labour is the measure of value! Worse than that, they even do not see that they only make a mere suggestion, a guess. They boldly affirm that their affirmation is a Law; they even do not understand the need of verifying it by measurements.
In reality, the relations between such quantities as the growth of a plant and the heat it receives, the quantity of powder burned and the recoil of a gun, etc., are too complicated to be expressed by a mere arithmetical proportion. And this is also the case with the relation between Labour and Value. Value in exchange and the necessary Labour are not proportional to each other; Labour is not the measure of Value, and Adam Smith had already noticed it. After having begun by stating it was, he soon noticed that this was true only in the tribal stage of mankind. Under the capitalist system, value in exchange is measured no more by the amount of necessary labour. Many other factors come in in a capitalist society, so as to alter the simple relation that may have existed once between labour and exchange value. But modern economists take no heed of that: they go on repeating what Ricardo wrote in the first half of the nineteenth century.
The same remark which we make concerning Value applies to most of the assertions that are made by the economists and the so-called "scientific Socialists," who continually represent their guesses as "natural laws." Not only do we maintain that most of these would be "laws" are not correct, but we are certain that those who believe in such "laws" would themselves recognise their mistake as soon as they would realise, as naturalists do, the necessity of submitting every numerical, quantitative statement to a numerical, quantitative test.
All Political Economy takes, in an Anarchist's view, an aspect quite different from the aspect given to it by the economists, who, being unaccustomed to use the scientific, inductive method, even do not realise what a "natural law" is, although they very much like to use this expression. They even do not notice the conditional character of all so-called natural "laws."
In fact, every natural law always means this:—"If such and such conditions are at work, the result will be this and that.—If a straight line crosses another line, so as to make equal angles on both its sides at the crossing point, the consequences will be such and such.—If those movements only which go on in the interstellar space act upon two bodies, and there is not, at a distance which is not infinitely great, a third, or a fourth body acting upon the two, then the centres of gravity of these two bodies will begin to move towards each other at such a speed" (this is the law of gravitation). And so on.
Always, there is an if—a condition to be fulfilled.
Consequently, all the so-called laws and theories of political economy are nothing but assertions of the following kind:—
"Supposing that there always are in a given country a considerable number of people who cannot exist one month, or even one fortnight, without earning a salary and accepting for that purpose the conditions which the State will impose upon them (in the shape of taxes, land-rent, and so on), or those which will be offered to them by those whom the State recognises as owners of the soil, the factories, the railways, etc.—such and such consequences will follow."
Up till now, the academic economists have always simply enumerated what happens under such conditions, without specifying and analysing the conditions themselves. Even if they were mentioned, they were forgotten immediately, to be spoken of no more.
This is bad enough, but there is in their teachings something worse than that. The economists represent the facts which result from these conditions as laws—as fatal, immutable laws. And they call that Science.
As to the Socialist political economists, they criticise, it is true, some of the conclusions of the academical economists, or they explain differently certain facts; but all the time they also forget the just-mentioned conditions and give to the economic facts of a given epoch too much stability, by representing them as natural laws. None of them has yet traced his own way in economic science. The most that was done (by Marx in his "Capital") was to take the metaphysical definitions of the academical economists, like Ricardo, and to say: "You see, even if we take your own definitions, we can prove that the capitalist exploits the worker!" Which sounds very nice in a pamphlet, but is very far from being Economic Science.
Altogether, we think that to become a science, Political Economy has to be built up in a different way. It must be treated as a natural science, and use the methods used in all exact, empirical sciences; and it must trace for itself a different aim. It must take, with regard to human societies, a position analogous to that which is occupied by Physiology with regard to plants and animals. It must be a Physiology of Society.
Its aim must be the study of the ever-growing sum of needs of society, and the means used—both formerly and nowaday for satisfying them. It must see how far these means were, and are now, suitable for the aims that are kept in view. And then—the purpose of each science being prediction and application to the demands of practical life (Bacon said so long since)—Political Economy must study the means of best satisfying the present and future needs with the least expenditure of energy (with economy), and with the best results for mankind altogether.
It is thus evident why our conclusions are so different in many respects from those arrived at by the economists, both academic and Social Democratic; why we do not consider as "laws" certain "correlations" indicated by them; why our exposition of Socialism is so different from theirs; and why we draw from the study of the tendencies of modern economic life conclusions so different from their conclusions as regards what is desirable and possible; in other words, why we come to Free Communism, while they come to State Capitalism and the Collectivist Wage System.
It is possible that we are wrong, and they are right. But the question as to which of us is right, and which wrong, cannot be settled by means of Byzantine commentaries as to what such or such a writer intended to say, or by talking about what agrees with the "trilogy " of Hegel; most certainly not by continuing to use the dialectic method.
It can be done only by studying the facts of Economics tn the same way and by the same methods as we study natural sciences.[2]
By using still the same method, the Anarchist comes to his own conclusions as regards the different political forms of society, and especially the State. We are not impressed in the least by assertions such as the following: "The State is the affirmation of the idea of supreme Justice in Society," or "The State is the Instrument and the Bearer of Progress," or "Without State—no Society."
True to our method, we study the State with the same disposition of mind as if we studied a society of ants or bees, or of birds which have come to nest on the shores of an Arctic lake or sea. To repeat here the conclusions we have come to in consequence of such studies, would be needless. We would have to repeat what has been said by Anarchists from the times of Godwin till the present day, and which can be found with all necessary developments in a number of books and pamphlets.
Suffice it for our purpose to say that for our European civilisation (the civilisation of the last fifteen hundred years, to which civilisation we belong) the State is a form of society that was developed only since the sixteenth century, and this under the influence of a series of causes which one will find mentioned, for instance, in my essay, "The State: its Historic Rôle." Before that, and since the fall of the Roman Empire, the State—in its Roman form—did not exist. If we find it, nevertheless, in historical school-books, even at the outset of the barbarian period, it is a product of the imagination of historians who will draw the genealogical trees of kings—in France, up to the heads of the Merovingian bands, and in Russia, up to Rurik in 862. Real historians know that the State was reconstituted only upon the ruins of the mediæval free cities.
On the other side, the State, considered as a political power, State-Justice, the Church, and Capitalism are facts and conceptions which we cannot separate from each other. In the course of history these institutions have developed, supporting and reinforcing each other.
They are connected with each other—not as mere accidental coincidences. They are linked together by the links of cause and effect.
The State is, for us, a society of mutual insurance between the landlord, the military commander, the judge, the priest, and later on the capitalist, in order to support each other's authority over the people, and for exploiting the poverty of the masses and getting rich themselves.
Such was the origin of the State; such was its history; and such is its present essence.
Consequently, to imagine that Capitalism may be abolished while the State is maintained, and with the aid of the State—while the latter was founded for forwarding the development of Capitalism and was always growing in power and solidity, in proportion as the power of Capitalism grew up—to cherish such an illusion is as unreasonable, in our opinion, as it was to expect the emancipation of Labour from the Church, or from Cæsarism or Imperialism. Certainly, in the first half of the nineteenth century, there have been many Socialists who had such dreams; but to live in the same dreamland now that we enter in the twentieth century, is really too childish.
A new form of economic organisation will necessarily require a new form of political structure. And, whether the change be accomplished suddenly, by a revolution, or slowly, by the way of a gradual evolution, the two changes, political and economic, must go on abreast, hand in hand.
Each step towards economic freedom, each victory won over Capitalism will be at the same time a step towards political liberty—towards liberation from the yoke of the State by means of free agreement, territorial, professional, and functional. And each step made towards taking from the State any one of its powers and attributes will be helping the masses to win a victory over Capitalism.
- ↑ I am mentioning here an objection which I borrow from a recent correspondence with a German doctor.
- ↑ The following few abstracts from the letter of a well-known biologist, a Belgian professor, which I received while I was reading the proofs of the French edition of this work, will better explain what is meant by the above lines; the passages in straight brackets […] are added by me:—
"In proportion as I advance in the reading of 'Fields, Factories, and Workshops,' I become more and more convinced that henceforward the study of economic and social questions will only be accessible to those who have studied natural sciences and are imbued with the spirit of these sciences. Those who have received the so-called classical education only are incapable of understanding the present movement of ideas, and are equally incapable of studying quite a number of special questions.
"……The idea of integration of labour, and of the division of labour in time [that is, the idea that it would be advantageous for society if every one could work alternately in agriculture industry, and intellectual pursuits, in order to vary his work and to develop his individuality in all directions], is sure to become one of the corner-stones of economic science. There is a mass of biological facts which are in accordance with the above underlined idea, which show that this is a law of Nature [in other words that in Nature an economy of energy is often obtained by this means]. If we examine the vital functions of a living being during the different stages of its existence, or even during different seasons, and in some cases during different hours of the day, we find an application of that of labour in time, which is intimately connected with division of labour between the organs (Adam Smith's law).
"Men of science unacquainted with natural sciences are incapable of understanding the real scope of a Law in Nature; they are blinded by the mere word law, and they imagine that a law like that of Adam Smith, has a fatal force from which it is impossible to escape. When they are shown the other side of this law—i.e., its deplorable result from the point of view of individual development and happiness—they reply 'This law is inexorable,' and very often this reply is; given with a sharp intonation which shows a feeling of infallibility. But the naturalist knows very well that science knows how to annul the bad effects of a natural law: that very often the man who tries to go against Nature achieves his aim.
"Gravity makes physical bodies fall, but the same gravity makes a balloon rise [aviation with machines heavier than air is another recent example in point]. For us it is so simple; but the economists of the classical school seem to have the greatest trouble in understanding the scope of such an observation.
"The law of division of labour in lime will be some day the counterpart of the law of Adam Smith, and it will permit us to obtain the integration of work in the individual."