Monsieur Bossu's Treatise of the Epick Poem/Chapter 6
CHAP. VI.
Of the Fable.
[1]ARistotle says, The Fable is the principal Part of the Poem, and that 'tis as it were the very Soul of it. Therefore we must look for the Nature of the Epopéa in that of the Fable, and consider That as the chief Foundation of the Poem, as the Principle that gives Life and Motion to all its parts, and sets all its Faculties on work. We have indeed begun to define the Epopéa by the Definition we gave of the Fable; for the Fable is a Discourse invented to form Mens Manners by Instructions disguis'd under the Allegories of one single Action.
There are several sorts of Fables, which one may treat after very different ways. The Poet forms his from that which is most excellent in each of these sorts.
There are reckon'd three sorts of Fables. The first fall under the Names of Men and Gods, and are call'd Rational; the second are only comprised under the Names of Beasts, and derive their Name of Moratæ from the humane Manners, which are attributed to them; and the last are a Mixture of these two sorts of Personages, and are call'd Mix'd.
The Epick Fables are Rational. Nor do I think that the Liberty Homer has taken of making a Horse speak only once in his Iliad, ought to make this Fable be counted a mix'd one. I should rather reckon this incident among the Machines and Miracles; as we read in the Roman History it sometimes happen'd, and as we know it did in Balaam's Aß.
Besides, 'twas such a common thing in those times to make use of these sorts of Fables, and to bring in brute Beasts, and even Trees speaking: and this Custom was so generally look'd upon as Mark of Learning, a Genius, and Eloquence; that had Homer us'd it oftner, I do not see how any one could blame this Fable for any Irregularity. But in short, this Custom of making Beasts speak is so little relish'd by these last Ages, that even Homer's Example would not make it excusable in any of our modern Writers.
However 'tis, this inconsiderable Incident, which does not hinder but the Epick Fable may be reckon'd among the Rational ones, will not hinder it from being plac'd among the Probable ones; though this Qualification be not at all necessary for the Fable in general.
In fine, the Action of a Fable may be serious, great, and important, or familiar, low, and vulgar. It may be either perfect or defective; writ in Verse or Prose; swell'd to a large Discourse, or express'd in a few Words; recited by the Author, or represented by the Persons who are the sole Actors in it. And all these different ways make no Alteration in the Essence, and in the Nature of the Fable.
Excepting the Representation, which the Epick Poet leaves the Stage to be Master of, he takes always the most excellent, and the most noble Method. So that the Epick Action is grave, important, compleat, and rehearsed in a long train of Verses.
One may add to this, that there are some Fables which consist less in Action than in Speaking; as that Fable, for instance, which ridicules the foolish Vanity of those Men, who attribute all the Glory of an Event to themselves, for the producing of which they contributed nothing but their own unprofitable Presence. The Fable represents them under the Allegory of a Fly, which lighting upon a Chariot, and seeing her self in the midst of a Cloud of Dust, which the Chariot-Wheels and the Horse-Feet raised in the Air, cries out; O Gemini! What a Dust do I make? The Epick is not of this sort of Fables, but of those which imitate an Action.
These then are the Differences which specifie the Epick Fable, and distinguish it from all others. It is Rational and Probable; it imitates an Action that is compleat and important; it is long and rehears'd in Verse; but neither of these Properties change its Nature, nor make it less a Fable, than those which are publish'd in Aesop's Name.
So much for the Sorts and Differences of the Epick Fable, now for its Parts.
[2]Aristotle says, that the Fable is a Composition of several Things. And in truth two Things do compose it, which are as it were its two essential Parts. The one is Truth, which serves as a Foundation to it; and the other is Fiction, which Allegorically disguises this Truth, and gives it the Form of a Fable.
The Truth lies conceal'd; and is that piece of Morality the Poet would teach us. The Romans made use of this very Expression, when they said to [3]Teach Fables and Tragedies, instead of saying to Act and Represent them. The Fiction is the Action or the Words, whereby these Instruction are veil'd. In the Instance we just now propos'd, the Truth is this, that it is ridiculous to brag of any thing we have no hand in: and the Fiction is that pleasant Thought of a Fly riding upon a Chariot, and crying, Bless me! what a Dust do I make?
The Truth lies under no Difficulty here, since the Moral Instruction ought always to be true.
But suppose the imitated Action be taken out of History, would this pass for a Fiction? The Difficulty is the same, if it be taken from a Fable that is already known, since after this manner, the Poet would at little invent and feign it, as if he had found it in History: And yet if the Author feigns nothing, we may well dispute with him the Name of Poet.
To this we answer, that the Poet ought to feign one General Action; then he should look for the Names of some Persons (to whom a parallel Action has either truly or probably happen'd) in History, or some well-known Fables: And lastly, he ought to place his Action under these Names. Thus it will be really feign'd and invented by the Author, and yet will seem to be taken out of some very ancient History and Fable. This we shall explain by what follows: we will begin to do so by the Instance of a Fable compos'd after this Method.