NIS 41B, South Korea, Country Profile/A Protege's Progress
A Protege's Progress
The "special relationship" that exists between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea—ROK) developed from the defeat of Japan in World War II, and particularly as a result of U.S. support in blood and treasure following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Since that time U.S. forces have remained in South Korea to bolster its defenses. In return, South Korea provides a base that enables the United States to maintain a forward defense position in the Far East. More recently, ROK troops stood alongside the U.S. forces in serving as South Vietnam's principal allies. South Korea, moreover, is becoming an increasingly significant trading partner and an attractive location for U.S. investment. (U/OU)
To Koreans, at least, this relationship is both more natural and has deeper roots than is generally realized by Americans. Throughout most of its more than a thousand year history as a unified country, Korea was under Chinese protection, but when China declined and fell prey to European imperialism in the 19th century, Korea was left exposed to rival Japanese and Russian ambitions to gain control of the strategic Korean Peninsula. Like Japan, Korea had gone into seclusion in the early 17th century and, as the "Hermit Kingdom" isolated itself from all foreign contacts except those with China. This isolation was ended abruptly in 1876 when Japan, aping Commodore Perry, sent a military expedition to the port of Chemulp'o (now Inch'on)[1] and "opened the door" to Korea. Unable to protect Korea, China advised it to negotiate treaties with the Western powers in order to establish a body of foreign interests sufficiently extensive to thwart any dangerous expansion of Japanese influence. Beginning in 1882, therefore, Korea concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States and by 1886 had negotiated similar agreements with all major European powers. The United States secured the lead over the other Western powers because many Koreans, aware of American commercial interest in their country and often acquainted with American missionaries and educators, had come to feel that the United States did not have the territorial ambitions of Japan and the other great powers and thus might make an ideal successor to China as Korea's patron and defender. (U/OU)
The U.S.-Korean Treaty of 1882 seemed to meet both Korean and Chinese hopes because it included a clause that promised America's "good offices" in any difficulties Korea might have with a third nation. The Koreans were disillusioned, however, to discover that this clause remained a dead letter against persistent Japanese encroachment and, finally, annexation of their country in 1910. Korean hopes were dashed in 1919, when they found that President Wilson's principle of national self-determination was applied in Europe but not to Asia. Hope was not raised again until World War II when the Allied Powers promised at Cairo in 1943 to liberate Korea and make it a free and independent state "in due course" after Japan's defeat. Fulfillment of this promise was thwarted after Japan's collapse, however, when the United States and the U.S.S.R., becoming locked in the "cold war," were unable to agree on the form of a united Korean state. The result was that the arbitrary division of Korea at te 38th parallel—a temporary expedient adopted in 1945 for the sole purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces then in the country—was frozen. By mid-1948 two separate states had emerged, the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. (U/OU)
The partition disrupted the Korean economy because most of the mineral ores and most of the modern economic infrastructure that Japan had developed were in the north. Lacking an industrial base, the largely agricultural South needed massive foreign economic aid to survive. The South Koreans felt that the United States, having participated in the division of the country, was responsible for supporting them. The United States, therefore, was obliged to shoulder the burden of supporting the less naturally endowed but more populous South. After the ROK Government was established, the United States considered it had largely fulfilled its obligations and, after Soviet forces had been withdrawn from the North, withdrew all of its forces in mid-1949, leaving only an ongoing economic aid agreement and a small military advisory group. (U/OU)
In June 1950 Soviet-equipped North Korean forces launched a highly successful surprise attack across the 3th parallel and quickly overran most of the South. By September, U.N. forces under U.S. command had driven the North Koreans out of the South, but when they then drove on towards the Manchurian border Chinese "volunteers" entered the war in great strength. After much shifting back and forth, a military front was eventually stabilized along the 38th parallel and an armistice signed in July 1953. The war reduced South Korea to complete dependence on the United States, and even after the war massive infusions of U.S. aid were required for relief and reconstruction as well as for equipping and maintaining the army of 600,000 men that the South felt it needed to guard against renewed attack from the North, The extensive and continuous U.S. commitment can be gauged from the fact that economic aid to South Korea totaled $5.6 billion during U.S. FYI1946-72 and military aid $5.7 billion during FY 1950-72. (U/OU)
In the 20 years since the armistice was signed at P'anmunjon, South Korea's economic dependence on the United States has been greatly reduced. It is a success story largely of the 1960's, during which the ROK Government under President Pak dedicated itself to a major effort to develop a viable economy, alleviate widespread poverty, and lessen dependence on foreign aid. Two successive and highly powerful 5-year plans (1962-71) made it possible to virtually terminate U.S. grant aid by the end of the 1960's. In the military realm, South Korea is still heavily dependent on the United States for sophisticated weapons systems and modernization in general, but South Korea now shoulders a major portion of its defense burden. (U/OU)
Internationally, the Pak government has progressively ordained its contacts and role, normalizing relations with Korea's ancient for, Japan, in 1965 and winning diplomatic recognition from a growing number of states (88 in mid-1973). A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States in 1966 accorded South Korea a proud symbol of equality, and its military participation in South Vietnam was considered by Seoul to represent an important role in world affairs, as well as measure of its continued close ties with the United States. (U/OU)
Since the birth of the republic, South Korea has taken on the character of a wayward ward rather than that of a puppet. Its venerable but wily and irascible first president, Syngman Rhee, was the undoing of many an American adviser and of some important U.S. policies, particularly during the Korean war. While the present President, who first came to power through a military coup in 1961, finally came around—in response to U.S. prodding and the pressure of public opinion—to the restoration of civilian government in 1963, a decade later he similarly demonstrated his independence of U.S. sensitives by an abrupt abandonment of all but the most superficial trapping of democracy. (C)
An equally striking manifestation of Seoul's independent initiative was the opening of secret, high-level talks with North Korea in early 1972 looking toward reunification of the peninsula. Pointing to the "delicacy" of his negotiations with the North, in late 1972 President Pak assumed almost complete dictatorial control by proclaiming martial law and carrying out a sweeping reorganization of the government. Whether or not such steps were necessary, ROK diplomacy since that time has moved more rapidly and flexibly than before. (U/OU)
Despite Seoul's new confidence in its ability to talk to P'yongyang, its moves on the domestic front could over time critically undermine the Pak regime. The great strides made in modernizing not only not only the military machine but also most aspects of material existence, which have encouraged Pak to venture upon reunification talks, may be brought to naught if domestic opinion becomes disaffected with the increasingly autocratic rule which he has imposed. (C)
- ↑ For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself.