National Strategy for Victory in Iraq/Part 2

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
from the United States National Security Council
Part II

Part II: Strategy in DetailEdit

“America's task in Iraq is not only to defeat an enemy, it is to give strength to a friend—a free, representative government that serves its people and fights on their behalf.”

—President George W. Bush
May 24, 2004


The Political Track in DetailEdit

Strategic Summary: Isolate, Engage, BuildEdit

The political track of our strategy is based on six core assumptions:

  • First, like people in all parts of the world, from all cultures and religions, when given the opportunity, the Iraqi people prefer to live in freedom rather than under tyranny.
  • Second, a critical mass of Iraqis in all areas of the country will not embrace the perverse vision offered by the terrorists. Most rejectionists can over time be persuaded to no longer seek the privileges of dictatorship—and in exchange will embrace the rewards of democratic stability.
  • Third, an enduring democracy is not built through elections alone: critical components include transparent, effective institutions and a national constitutional compact.
  • Fourth, federalism is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq, but instead is a prerequisite for a united country and better governance. Federalism allows a strong central government to exercise the powers of a sovereign state, while enabling regional bodies to make decisions that protect the interests of local populations.
  • Fifth, it is in the fundamental interests of all Iraqi communities—and of the region—that Iraq stays a united country. This shared objective creates space for compromise across ethnic and religious divides and for the steady growth of national institutions.
  • Sixth, Iraq needs and can receive the support of the region and the international community to solidify its successes.

Strategic Logic Behind the Political TrackEdit

Our efforts and those of the Iraqis on the political track are geared toward isolating hard-core rejectionists by expanding avenues for political participation at all levels of government, engaging the region and all Iraqi communities to demonstrate that there is a place for all groups in the new Iraq, and building national Iraqi institutions and international support to advance the rule of law and offer the Iraqi people a solid framework for a better and more peaceful future.

How will this help the Iraqis—with Coalition support—defeat the enemy and achieve our larger goals?

  • Progress in the political process—meeting political benchmarks—will provide momentum against the insurgency and indicate to people “on the fence” that the old regime has passed and that the effort to build a new Iraq will succeed.
  • Inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority protections will demonstrate to disaffected Sunnis that they have influence and the ability to protect their interests in a democratic Iraq.
  • Commitment to democracy—rather than other forms of governance—not only is consistent with our values, but is essential to keeping the long-oppressed Shi'a and Kurds as our partners in Iraq.
  • Increasingly robust Iraqi political institutions expose the falsity of enemy propaganda that Iraq is “under occupation,” with decisions being made by non-Iraqis. Such institutions also provide peaceful means for reconciliation and bridging divides.
  • Due to the historical, cultural, political, and economic links between Iraq and its neighbors, many surrounding countries can help Iraq secure its borders and encourage Sunni rejectionists to renounce violence and enter the political process.
  • Expanding international support for Iraq will demonstrate to Iraqis and the world that Iraq is a valuable member of the international community and will further broaden the political and economic support provided to Iraq.

Progress on the Political TrackEdit

Our Isolate, Engage, and Build strategy is working: Iraqis have hit every political benchmark in their transitional political process—and are on track to hit the next one: elections in December to select a four-year government under a democratic constitution, with full participation from all of Iraq's main ethnic and religious communities.

  • In January, 8.5 million Iraqis defied terrorist threats to vote for Iraq's first freely elected national government and provincial governments.
  • In April, the elected leaders of Iraq's national legislature came together to form a diverse cabinet that represented all groups, despite election results that heavily favored the Shi'a and Kurdish communities.
  • In June, the national legislature formally invited non-elected Sunni Arab leaders to join constitutional negotiations, demonstrating that leaders from all communities understood the importance of a constitution with input from Iraq's major groups.
  • In summer/autumn 2005, Iraq's elected national legislature—and the Sunni leaders invited to join the process—drafted a constitution that was a huge step for Iraq and the region. This draft constitution invests the sovereignty of Iraq in the people and their right to vote, protects individual rights and religious freedoms, and puts forward sophisticated institutional arrangements to safeguard minority rights.
  • By the end of September 2005, approximately one million new voters came forward to check their names on Iraq's voting rolls—the vast majority in Sunni areas. In October, nearly 10 million Iraqis from all areas of the country again defied terrorist threats to vote in the constitutional referendum. The constitution was ratified.
  • Interest in the political process is stronger than ever. More than 300 parties and coalitions are registered for the December elections, and even those who opposed the constitution have organized for the December vote.
  • In a strategic shift, Sunnis are turning to the political process to advance their interests. During the constitutional referendum, turnout in Sunni areas was strong. Although many Sunnis voted against the constitution, amendments made days before the referendum in response to Sunni requests will permit further changes after the new government is established. This and other provisions of the constitution that defer important issues to the new assembly will ensure that elected Sunni leaders are able to influence the shape of the Iraqi state.
  • A recent change in the electoral process also provides all Iraqis a place in the new assembly. In the January 2005 election, representation in the assembly was directly related to turnout, which led to the depressed Sunni numbers in the body. Today's electoral system allocates representation by province, which guarantees that even if communities go to the polls in varying strengths, they will all have representation in the new assembly.
  • Signs of a vibrant political life are sprouting. The constitutional drafting committee received more than 500,000 public comments on various provisions. More than 100 newspapers freely discuss political events every day in Iraq. Campaign posters are displayed openly and in increasing number in most of Iraq's major cities.

As Iraq's political institutions mature, its judicial system has become an independent branch, better able to promote the rule of law:

  • Iraq's judiciary is organized by an independent council of judges, as in most civil law countries. Saddam Hussein's system of “secret courts” has been abolished.
  • One year ago, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq had capacity to prosecute fewer than 10 trials and investigative hearings per month. In the first two weeks of September 2005 alone, the Court prosecuted more than 50 multi-defendant trials, and conducted over 100 investigative hearings. The Court is now expanding its reach throughout Iraq with separate branches in local provinces.
  • Hundreds of judges have been trained since the fall of Saddam Hussein. These judges are now working and resolving cases under Iraqi law. In 2003, approximately 4,000 felony cases were resolved in Iraqi courts. In 2004, they resolved more than twice that number. This year, Iraqi courts are on track to resolve more than 10,000 felony cases.

International support for Iraq's political development is also growing:

  • The United Nations Security Council has enacted a series of unanimous resolutions that authorize the presence of Coalition forces and anchor the Iraqi political process with international backing. In November, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1637, which—at the request of the Iraqi government—unanimously extended authorization for the Coalition forces to operate in Iraq.
  • The United Nations is also playing an important role in Iraq's political transition, and plans to expand its capacity with hundreds of personnel located throughout the country. The Arab League, the European Union, and other important regional actors are all engaged and working to support the Iraqi political process.
  • Iraq is winning wider support from its fellow Arab states as well. In November, the Arab League hosted a meeting in Cairo to promote Iraqi national reconciliation and the political process; Iraqi leaders are being received by Arab heads of state; and many Arab countries publicly supported Iraq's constitutional referendum and called for the broad participation of all Iraqis in Iraq's political process.
  • At the same time, change is coming to the region, with Syrian occupation ended and democracy emerging in Lebanon, and free elections and new leadership in the Palestinian Territories. From Kuwait to Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, there are stirrings of political pluralism, often for the first time in generations.

Continued Challenges in the Political SphereEdit

Even with this solid progress, we and our Iraqi partners continue to face multiple challenges in the political sphere, including:

  • Ensuring that those who join the political process leave behind violence entirely;
  • Building national institutions when past divisions and current suspicions have led many Iraqis to look to regional or sectarian bodies to protect their interests;
  • Nurturing a culture of reconciliation, human rights, and transparency in a society scarred by three decades of arbitrary violence and rampant corruption;
  • Building political movements based on issues and platforms, instead of identity;
  • Encouraging cooperation across ethnic, religious and tribal divides when many wounds are still fresh and have been exacerbated by recent hardships;
  • Convincing all regional states to welcome and actively support the new Iraqi state politically and financially;
  • Building ministerial capacity to advance effective government and reduce corruption.

The Security Track in DetailEdit

Strategic Summary: Clear, Hold, BuildEdit

The security track is based on six core assumptions:

  • First, the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists do not have the manpower or firepower to achieve a military victory over the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. They can win only if we surrender.
  • Second, our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq—to fight terrorists while training and mentoring Iraqi forces—until the mission is done, increasing or decreasing troop levels only as conditions warrant.
  • Third, progress on the political front will improve the intelligence picture by helping distinguish those who can be won over to support the new Iraqi state from the terrorists and insurgents who must either be killed or captured, detained, and prosecuted.
  • Fourth, the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq.
  • Fifth, regional meddling and infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized.
  • Sixth, while we can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term.

Strategic Logic Behind Security TrackEdit

We are helping the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government take territory out of enemy control (clear); keep and consolidate the influence of the Iraqi government afterwards (hold); and establish new local institutions that advance civil society and the rule of law in areas formerly under enemy influence and control (build).

  • Efforts on the security track include offensive operations against the enemy, protection of key communication and infrastructure nodes, post-conflict stabilization operations, and the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces. Coalition transition teams are embedded in all Iraqi Army battalions to provide assistance and guidance when needed.

The model that works is clear—it is resource intensive, requires commitment and resolve, and involves tools across the civilian and military spectrum, including:

  • The right balance of Coalition and Iraqi forces conducting offensive operations;
  • Preparation for such operations through contact and negotiation between local and federal Iraqi government officials;
  • Adequate Iraqi forces to provide security for the population and guard against future intimidation;
  • Cooperation with and support for local institutions to govern after Coalition forces leave;
  • Prompt disbursal of aid for quick and visible reconstruction;
  • Central government authorities who pay attention to local needs.

How will this help the Iraqis—with Coalition support—defeat the enemy and achieve our larger goals?

  • Offensive operations disrupt enemy networks and deprive enemy elements of safe havens from which they can rest, train, rearm, and plan attacks against the Coalition, the Iraqi government, and Iraqi civilians.
  • Localized post-conflict operations—providing security, economic assistance, and support to civilian institutions in newly cleared areas—further isolate enemy elements from the rest of the population and give Iraqis space to participate in a peaceful political process.
  • Infrastructure protection helps ensure that the Iraqi government can collect revenues and provide basic services to the people, which is critical to building confidence in the government and weaning support away from insurgents.
  • Putting capable Iraqis forward in the fight increases the overall effectiveness of U.S.-Iraqi operations, as Iraqis are better able to collect intelligence and identify threats in their neighborhoods.
  • As Iraqi forces become more and more capable, our military posture will shift, leaving Coalition forces increasingly focused on specialized counter-terrorism missions to hunt, capture, and kill terrorist leaders and break up their funding and resource networks.

Progress on the Security TrackEdit

Our clear, hold, and build strategy is working:

  • Significant progress has been made in wresting territory from enemy control. During much of 2004, major parts of Iraq and important urban centers were no-go areas for Iraqi and Coalition forces. Fallujah, Najaf, and Samara were under enemy control. Today, these cities are under Iraqi government control, and the political process is taking hold. Outside of major urban areas, Iraqi and Coalition forces are clearing out hard core enemy elements, maintaining a security presence, and building local institutions to advance local reconstruction and civil society.
  • Actionable intelligence is improving. Due to greater confidence in the Iraqi state and growing frustration with the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists, Iraqi citizens are providing more intelligence to Iraqis and Coalition forces. In March 2005, Iraqi and Coalition forces received more than 400 intelligence tips from Iraqi citizens; in August, they received 3,300, and in September more than 4,700.
  • Iraqi forces are growing in number. As of November 2005, there were more than 212,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces, compared with 96,000 in September of last year. In August 2004, there were five Iraqi army battalions in the fight; now more than 120 Iraqi army and police battalions are in the fight. Of these battalions, more than 80 are fighting side-by-side with Coalition forces and more than 40 others are taking the lead in the fight. More battalions are being recruited, trained, and fielded. In July 2004 there were no operational Iraqi brigade or division headquarters; now there are seven division and more than 30 brigade headquarters in the Iraqi army. In June 2004, there were no Iraqi combat support or service support battalions; now there are a half dozen operational battalions supporting fielded Iraqi units.
  • Iraqi forces are growing in capability. In June 2004, no Iraqi Security Force unit controlled territory. The Coalition provided most of the security in Iraq. Today, much of Baghdad province is under the control of Iraqi forces, the cities of Najaf and Karbala are controlled by Iraqi forces, and other Iraqi battalions and brigades control hundreds of square miles of territory in other Iraqi provinces. A year ago, the Iraqi Air Force had no aircraft; today its three operational squadrons provide airlift and reconnaissance support and Iraqi pilots are training on newly arrived helicopters. A year ago during the operation to liberate Fallujah, five Iraqi battalions took part in the fight. For the most part, they fell in behind Coalition forces to help control territory already seized by Coalition units. No Iraqi units controlled their own battle space. In September 2005, during Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar, eleven Iraqi battalions participated, controlling their own battle space, and outnumbering Coalition forces for the first time in a major offensive operation. Over the last six months, the number of patrols being conducted independently by Iraqi forces has doubled, bringing the overall percentage to nearly a quarter of all patrols in theater.
  • Iraqis are committed to building up their security establishment. Despite repeated and brutal attacks against Iraqi Security Forces, volunteers continue to outpace an already substantial demand. In the past several months alone, nearly 5,000 recruits have joined from Sunni areas. In the recently cleared Tal Afar, more than 200 local volunteers have begun police training before returning to help protect their city. In Anbar, Sunnis have lined up to join the Iraqi army and police, planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.
  • Iraqis are taking on specialized missions central to overall success. Four Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, with more than 3,000 personnel, have completed training and will soon assume the specific mission of guarding vital infrastructure nodes from terrorist attack. A Special Police Unit highly trained for hostage rescue has almost 200 operators and is conducting operations almost every week in Baghdad and Mosul. In the past several months, hundreds of Iraqi soldiers have undergone intensive special operations training and are now in the fight, hunting, killing, and capturing the most-wanted terrorist leaders.
  • Iraq is building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. The Iraqi army now has three officer academies training the next generation of junior officers for its army. In September, NATO inaugurated a new military staff college in Baghdad that will eventually train more than 1,000 senior Iraqi officers each year. Today, however, the vast majority of Iraqi police and army recruits are being taught by Iraqi instructors. By training the trainers, we are creating an institutional capability that will allow the Iraqi forces to continue to develop and grow long after Coalition forces have left Iraq.

Continued Challenges in the Security SphereEdit

Even with this progress, we and our Iraqi partners continue to face multiple challenges in the security sphere, including:

  • Countering the intimidation and brutality of enemies whose tactics are not constrained by law or moral norms;
  • Building representative Iraqi security forces and institutions while guarding against infiltration by elements whose first loyalties are to persons or institutions other than the Iraqi government;
  • Neutralizing the actions of countries like Syria and Iran, which provide comfort and/or support to terrorists and the enemies of democracy in Iraq;
  • Refining our understanding of the constantly changing nature of, and relationships between, terrorist groups, other enemy elements, and their networks;
  • Addressing the militias and armed groups that are outside the formal security sector and central government command;
  • Ensuring that the security ministries—as well as the fighting forces—have the capacity to sustain Iraq's new army;
  • Integrating political, economic, and security tools—and synchronizing them with Iraqi government efforts—to provide the best post-conflict operations possible.

“My aim is 100 percent clear: all the terrorists living here, they go now. Saddam . . . it's finished. He's broken. Now is the new Iraq.”

—Gen. Muhammad al-Sumraa
Iraq 303rd Battalion
Haifa Street, Baghdad
August 14, 2005

The Economic Track in DetailEdit

Strategic Summary: Restore, Reform, BuildEdit

The economic track is based on six core assumptions:

  • First, Iraq has the potential to be not just viable, but prosperous and self-sustaining.
  • Second, a free and prosperous Iraq is in the economic interest of everybody, including Iraq's neighbors and the greater Middle East. A flourishing Iraq can spur economic activity and reform in one of the world's most vital regions.
  • Third, increased economic opportunity in Iraq and a growing economy will give larger numbers of Iraqis an economic stake in a peaceful country, and drain the influence of radicals and rejectionists who recruit the unemployed and thrive on resentment.
  • Fourth, economic change in Iraq will be steady but gradual given a generation of neglect, corrosive misrule, and central planning that stifled entrepreneurship and initiative.
  • Fifth, Iraq can be a reliable and contributing partner in the international economic community, demonstrating the fruits of good governance and transparency.
  • Sixth, Iraq will need financial support from the region and international community as its economy transitions from being guided by command principles and hampered by poor infrastructure to a more self-sustaining posture.

Strategic Logic Behind the Economic TrackEdit

Our efforts have focused on helping Iraq restore its neglected infrastructure so it can provide essential services to the population while encouraging economic reforms, greater transparency, and accountability in the economic realm. The international community has been instrumental in these efforts, but there is room for the international community to do more. Foreign direct investment, over time, will play an increasing role in fueling Iraq's economic growth.

How will these efforts help the Iraqis—with Coalition support—defeat the enemy and achieve our larger goals?

  • The rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure and the provision of essential services will increase the confidence of Iraqis in their government and help convince them that the government is offering them a brighter future. People will then be more likely to cooperate with the government, and provide intelligence against the enemy, creating a less hospitable environment for the terrorists and insurgents.
  • Efforts in the reconstruction realm have significant implications in the security realm when they focus on rebuilding post-conflict cities and towns. Compensation for civilians hurt by counterterrorism operations and the restoration of some economic vibrancy to areas formerly under terrorist control can help ease resentment and win over an otherwise suspicious population.
  • Economic growth and reform of Saddam-era laws and regulations will be critical to ensuring that Iraq can support and maintain the new security institutions that the country is developing, attract new investment to Iraq, and become a full, integrated member of the international economic community.
  • Economic growth and market reform—and the promotion of Iraq's private sector—are necessary to expand job opportunities for the youthful Iraqi population and decrease unemployment that makes some Iraqis more vulnerable to terrorist or insurgent recruiting.

Progress on the Economic TrackEdit

Our restore, reform, build, strategy is achieving results:

  • Oil production increased from an average of 1.58 million barrels per day in 2003, to an average of 2.25 million barrels per day in 2004. Iraq presently is producing on average 2.1 million barrels per day, a slight decrease due to terrorist attacks on infrastructure, dilapidated and insufficient infrastructure, and poor maintenance practices. We are helping the Iraqis address each challenge so the country can have a dependable income stream.
  • Iraq's nominal GDP recovered from its nadir of $13.6 billion in 2003 to $25.5 billion in 2004, led primarily by the recovery of the oil sector. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP is expected to grow in real terms by 3.7 percent in 2005 and nearly 17 percent in 2006.
  • Iraq's exchange rate has been stable since the introduction of its new currency in 2004 and remains so at approximately 1,475 Iraqi Dinar/$1. A stable currency has allowed the Central Bank of Iraq to better manage inflationary pressures.
  • According to the IMF, per capita GDP, an important measure of poverty, rebounded to $942 in 2004 (after dropping to $518 in 2003), and is expected to continue to increase to over $1,000 in 2005.
  • Since April 2003, Iraq has registered more than 30,000 new businesses, and its stock market (established in April 2004) currently lists nearly 90 companies with an average daily trading volume over $100 million (from January to May 2005), up from an average of $86 million in 2004.
  • Iraq is rejoining the international financial community: it is on the road to WTO accession, has completed its first IMF economic health report card in 25 years, and secured an agreement that could lead to as much as 80 percent reduction from the Paris Club for Saddam-era debt.
  • At the October 2003 Madrid International Donors Conference, donors other than the United States pledged over $13 billion in assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq, including $8 billion from foreign governments and $5.5 billion in lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to be disbursed from 2004 through 2007.
  • Iraqi business leaders are decidedly optimistic about the growth of the economy as well as the growth of their own businesses.
    • According to a September poll by Zogby International for the Center for International Private Enterprise, 77 percent of Iraqi businesses anticipate growth in the national economy over the next two years and 69 percent of respondents describe themselves as being “optimistic” about Iraq's economic future.
  • Today in Iraq there are more than 3 million cell phone subscribers. In 2003 there were virtually none.

Continued Challenges in the Economic SphereEdit

Even with this progress, Iraq continues to face multiple challenges in the economic sphere, including:

  • Facilitating investment in Iraq's oil sector to increase production from the current 2.1 million barrels per day to more than 5 million per day;
  • Overcoming decades of Saddam's neglect of Iraq's basic infrastructure;
  • Preventing, repairing, and overcoming terrorist and insurgent attacks against vital infrastructure, especially electricity and oil related nodes;
  • Dealing with an increased demand for electricity;
    • The liberalization of border trade and increased salaries of Iraqis, has led to increased demand for electrical goods since 2003, which has driven up demand for electricity. At the same time, insurgent attacks and dilapidated infrastructure have complicated efforts to bring more electricity on-line. The Iraqis, with our assistance,are working to ease electricity constraints by providing greater security to transmission lines, investing in new generation capacity, and evaluating the prospects of using natural gas—as opposed to inefficient fuels—to keep generators running.
  • Creating a payment system and a banking infrastructure that are responsive to the needs of the domestic and international communities, and that allow transactions involving possible money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes to be detected;
  • Balancing the need for economic reform—particularly of bloated fuel and food subsidies—with political realities;
  • Building the administrative and technical capacities of Iraqi ministries;
  • Ensuring as much reconstruction assistance as possible flows to Iraqi entities (ministries and businesses);
  • Encouraging local and regional capacity building after decades of a highly centralized government, so that reconstruction and essential services can be more evenly distributed throughout Iraq;
  • Facilitating progress toward a market-oriented economy by reforming commercial laws and other bureaucratic obstacles to attract investment and private sector involvement;
  • Encouraging many in the region and the international community to disburse their pledges more quickly and contribute even greater resources to Iraq's reconstruction.

Organization for Victory: The 8 Strategic PillarsEdit

Our strategy for victory along the political, security, and economic tracks incorporates every aspect of American power, with assistance from agencies throughout the federal government, and the involvement of the United Nations, other international organizations, Coalition countries, and other supportive countries and regional states. It is predicated on the belief that we must marshal these resources to help Iraqis overcome the challenges remaining before them.

Each Strategic Pillar contains at least five independent lines of action and scores of sub-actions, with specific objectives being met by military and civilian volunteers, Iraqis, and our international partners.

  • Underlying each line of action is a series of missions and tasks assigned to military and civilian units in Iraq. These missions and tasks are largely classified, but we seek to characterize them in the unclassified appendix that follows. By understanding our organization, Americans can better understand our strategy and the steps we are taking to achieve long-term victory in Iraq.
    • Each pillar has a corresponding interagency working group—where professionals from the National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Commerce Department, Homeland Security, and other agencies coordinate policy, review and assess the progress that is being made, develop new proposals for action whenever necessary, and oversee the implementation of existing policies.
  • Weekly strategy sessions at senior levels of the United States Government ensure that Iraq remains a top priority for all relevant agencies with actions along all the eight pillars of activity integrated and calibrated to changed circumstances whenever necessary.
    • This is the essence of a conditions-based strategy: constantly reviewing conditions as they evolve and changing and redirecting tactics as needed to keep a trajectory towards long-term success.
  • Our team in Baghdad—led by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General George Casey—works to implement policy on the ground and lay the foundation for long-term success.

The following appendix outlines each Pillar to provide a sense of how our mission in Iraq is organized. As these pages demonstrate, there is hard work to do, but the stakes could not be higher, and we are organized for victory to an extent not seen since the end of the Cold War.


“There's always a temptation, in the middle of a long struggle, to seek the quiet life, to escape the duties and problems of the world, and to hope the enemy grows weary of fanaticism and tired of murder. This would be a pleasant world, but it's not the world we live in. The enemy is never tired, never sated, never content with yesterday's brutality. This enemy considers every retreat of the civilized world as an invitation to greater violence. In Iraq, there is no peace without victory. We will keep our nerve, and we will win that victory.

—President George W. Bush
October 6, 2005


Top
Part IContentsAppendix