Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Company Hardy/Dissent McKenna

by William R. Day

United States Supreme Court

248 U.S. 205

Neilson  v.  Rhine Shipping Company Hardy

 Argued: Nov. 5, 1918. --- Decided: Dec 23, 1918

Mr. Justice McKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting.

These cases were submitted with Nos. 361 and 392 (248 U.S. 182, 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 83, 84, 63 L. Ed. 199, 200), and, like them, are proceedings in admiralty under the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1165-1168.

The facts are set out in the opinion of the court. In these cases, as in others, we are constrained to dissent. The principle of decision should be, we think, that declared in our dissent in The Talus, 248 U.S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200. The facts of these cases put more tension upon it, that is, an adhesion to the words of the statute as determinative of its purpose rather than some of its consequences. We have here the somewhat appealing force of a picture of an American ship only able to escape practical internment in a foreign port by a violation of the law, if it be as we have declared it. And this under the sanction of the United States Consul acting under the following regulation of the Department of State:

'237. Advances to Seamen Shipped in Foreign Ports.-The shipment of seamen in foreign ports cannot be considered as within the intention, and hence not within the proper construction of the act referred to in the next preceding paragraph [inserted in the margin]. ^[1] The final clause of the act, which declares that this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to those of the United States, and that in case of violation a clearance shall be refused them, is a clear indication that Congress did not in this section refer to the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, but had in view acts done in the United States alone. The provision of the statute as to payment of advance wages is not intended to apply to seamen shipped in foreign ports.' We are unable to assent. We regard the act of Congress as clear and that the theater of its injunction is the harbors of the United States. It is misleading to dwell upon the jurisdiction of other places, which is but another name for control. The jurisdiction, control, is in and by the United States and the command is that advances shall not be deducted from wages of seamen on vessels, American or foreign, while in the waters of the United States. Where they were made or under what circumstances made are not factors in judgment. They are the mere accidents of the situation and if they reach the importance and have the embarrassment depicted by counsel, the appeal must be to Congress, which no doubt will promptly correct the improvidence, if it be such, of its legislation. We have already expressed our view of the control of the language of the law and that it is a barrier against alarms and faultfinding.

It hence follows that we are of opinion the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in each case should be reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.

Notes

1. '236. No Advance Wages.-Except in case of whaling vessels, it is not lawful to pay any seaman wages before leaving the port at which such seaman may be engaged in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person, or to pay to any one except an officer authorized by Act of Congress to collect fees for such service, any remuneration for the shipment of a seaman. If any such advance wages or remuneration shall have been paid or contracted for the Consul, in making up the account of wages due the seaman upon his discharge, will disregard such advance payment or agreement and award to the seaman the amount to which he would be entitled if no such payment or agreement had been made. Nor should Consuls permit the statute to be evaded indirectly, as by part payment in advance and then stating rate of wages too small. R. S. Secs. 4532, 4533; 23 Stat. L. 55, Sec. 10; 24 Id. 80, Sec. 3; 27 Fed. Rep. 764.'