Nicomachean Ethics (Chase)/Notes

by Aristotle

 

NOTES

P. 2, l. 16. For this term, as here employed, our language contains no equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.

There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signification, “The science of Society;” and this includes everything which can bear at all upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity. “Quicquid agunt homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.

The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric (i. 2) ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία ἢν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. He has principally in view in this treatise the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manœuvres of the field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of a πόλις, considering this function to be the real End of each, and this state as that in which the Individual attained highest and most complete development.

The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.

P. 3, l. 23. Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by education. A lame horse one would show to a farrier, not to the best and wisest man of one’s acquaintance: to the latter one would apply in a difficult case of conduct.

Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.

P. 3, l. 35. In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.

P. 4, l. 30. Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations.

The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.

“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term; the initiative being a property of Rule.

“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve (οὔ ἕνεκα), and that of Action (ὄθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men: this then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I resolve upon some course, and this Resolve is the beginning of Action.

The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχαὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν πρακτῶν i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.

Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.

Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:

Whatever gains human praise is to be done;

Public praying and almsgiving gain human praise;

∴Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.

The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.

P. 5, l. 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms γνῶριμα ἡμῖν and γνῶριμα ἁπλῶς.

I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is γνῶριμον ἁπλῶς, but that alone ἡμῖν which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are γνώριμα ἡμῖν which we have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy: for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment: but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right: the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask.

But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post. I. cap. ii. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals. The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things: but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν.

Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known: but then this term denotes either particulars or universals: perhaps we then must begin with particulars: and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting—point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition.”

The objection to this method of translation is, that ἀρχαὶ occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”

Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.

P. 6. l. 1. Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii. 25, ἄπαντα πιστεύομεν κ. τ. λ.: but the other rendering is supported by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. ὁι δ’ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν. χαίρουσι δὴ ὄτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῆ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.

P. 6, l. 11. θέσις meant originally some paradoxical statement by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.

P. 6, l. 13. A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because containing miscellaneous questions.

P. 6, l. 15. It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers to this, and allows that θεωρία constitutes the highest happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man: the reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, θεωρία cannot have place; though, had it been held out from the first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without the trouble of self-discipline.

P. 6, l. 22. Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”

P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus:—

 τὸ πέρας    τὸ ἄπειρον   τὸ εὐθὺ       τὸ καμπύλον
 τὸ περισσὸν τὸ ἄρτιον    τὸ φῶς        τὸ σκότος
 τὸ ἒν       τὸ πλῆθος    τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἑτερόμηκες
 τὸ δεξιὸν   τὸ ἀριστερὸν τὸ ἠρεμοῦν    τὸ κινούμενον
 τὸ ἄρρεν    τὸ θῆλυ      τὸ ἀγαθόν     τὸ κακόν

P. 8, l. 2. Plato’s sister’s son.

P. 9, l. 9. This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being, eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts, and leads to no action.

P. 10, l. 34. i.e. the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.

P. 11, l. 11. i.e. without the capability of addition.

P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief Good. See Book X. chap. ii. δῆλον ὡς οὐδ’ἄλλο οὐδὲν τάγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται.

P. 12, l. 9. i.e. as working or as quiescent.

P. 13, l. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the Topics, I. chap. ix.

P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses. “Fire burns,” is an instance of the former; “Treason is odious,” of the latter.

P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worth while to vary the interpretation of this word, because though "habitus" may be equivalent to all the senses of ἕξις, “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage: we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.

P. 14, 1. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage is to apply καλῶν κἀγαθῶν to things, and let them depend grammatically on ἐπήβολοι. It is to be remembered, however, that καλός κἀγαθὸς bore a special and well—known meaning: also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems more completely brought out.

P. 15, l. 16. “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii.) Aristotle describes pleasure in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure continually result.

P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact, that external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness: not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in fact, the other side of βίος τέλειος.

P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish. He shows therefore that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other reasons why we should think with him.

P. 16, l. 26. This term is important: what has been maimed was once perfect: he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.

P. 17, l. 3. But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?

P. 18, l. 6. The supposed pair of ancestors.

P. 18, l. 12. Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.”

He must mean
either, The man when dead is happy (a),
 or,  The man when dead may be said to have been happy (b).
If the former, does he mean positive happiness (α)?
or only freedom from unhappiness (β)?
We cannot allow (α),
Men’s opinions disallow (β),
We revert now to the consideration of (b).

P. 18, l. 36. The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.

P. 20, l. 12. The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of course, dressed his actors for their parts; not according to their fancies or his own.

Hooker has (E. P. v. lxxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable paraphrase on this. “Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they have no more.”

P. 20, l. 18. Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.”

P. 20, l. 11. The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness; this will be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable: add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.

P. 21, l. 18. This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are either so in esse or in posse.

If in esse, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Those in posse, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.

P. 22, l. 4. Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.

P. 22, l. 13. See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap. ix.

P. 24, l. 23. The unseen is at least as real as the seen.

P. 24, l. 29. The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book, and are here used in their strict philosophical meaning. The ἐγκρατὴς is he who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them under. The ἀκρατὴς is he whose appetites constantly prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.

By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called σωφροσύνη, and the man in it σώφρων. By the same law, the remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are silenced for ever. This state is called ἀκολασία, and the man in it ἀκόλαστος.

P. 25, l. 2. This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, ἔχειν λογόν τινος, really denotes substituting that person’s λόγος for one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the mental furniture, i.e. knowing them.

P. 25, l. 16. ἔξιν may be taken as opposed to ἐνέργειαν, and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the latter, but only for exerting and using the former.

P. 26, l. 2. Which we call simply virtue.

P. 26 l. 4. For nature must of course supply the capacity.

P. 26, l. 18 Or “as a simple result of nature.”

P. 28, l. 12. This is done in the Sixth Book.

P. 28, l. 21. It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies: no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.

P. 29, l. 32. The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὀς are not used here in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then, and then only, cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to the formation of true courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.

P. 30, l. 18. Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the parts of our nature: our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that "passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition." If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony: in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle would have them cultivated: to use an apt figure (whose I know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say, Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. See on this point Bishop Butler's fifth Sermon, and sect. ii. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first part of his Analogy.

P. 32, l. 16. I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word act is so commonly interchanged with action. Πράξις (action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance. Πράγμα (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the former is wrong: if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices. Again, the πράξις may be good though the πράγμα be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the πράξις right. No repetition of πράγματα goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits in the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above, sect. ii. "And in like manner as habits belonging to the body," etc.

P. 32, l. 32. Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue, Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus τί ἐστιν.

P. 33, l. 15. That is, not for merely having them, because we did not make ourselves. See Bishop Butler's account of our nature as containing "particular propensions," in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the Preface to the Sermons.

P. 34, l. 14. This refers to the division of quantity πόσον in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous, whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or solid; those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.

P. 34, l. 27. Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference: thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6; 6 + 4= 10; or vice versa, 10 - 4 = 6; 6 - 4 = 2.

P. 36, l. 3. The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard: we may suppose his λόγος originally to have been a sufficient guide, but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of himself for direction.

P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a viva voce lecture than a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.

P. 37, l. 23. Afterwards defined as

“All things whose value is measured by money”

P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent: it may be illustrated by Horace's use of the term hiatus,

"Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?" A. P. 138.

Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come; if nothing great does come, this is a case of Χαυνότης or fruitless and unmeaning hiatus; the transference to the present subject is easy.

P. 38, l. 22. In like manner we talk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable.

P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler's, which corresponds exactly to the definition of νέμεσις in the Rhetoric.

P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus: to be contraries, things must be generically connected. τὰ πλειστον ᾀλλήλων διεστηκότα των ἐν τψ αύτψ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται. Categories, iv. 15.

P. 42, l. 22. “Δεύτερος πλους is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phædo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously, inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about their preparations for the second cautiously;” and he then alludes to this passage.

P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the recoil.

“Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.”

P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake: still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure: he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he with the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself; he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.”

P. 43, l. 20. Αίσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”

P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being θήρατος, because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being εὐθήρατος, because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen; since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course: and his security against this lessening danger would increase; since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on Moral Discipline in the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book.

P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable Self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)

P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the πράξις; but of the πράγμα, but ignorance of i.e. incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been depraved, i.e. shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired.

P. 48, l. 18. ἔνεκα primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are ἔνεκα that result. From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results: thus ἔνεκα comes to mean not causation merely, but designed causation: and so οὖ ἔνεκα is used for Motive, or final cause. It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his own Motive of action. When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harness" (1 Kings xxii. 34) he did it ἔνεκα του ἀπόκτειναι the King of Israel, in the primary sense of ἔνεκα; that is to say, the King's death was in fact the result, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.

P. 48, l. 22. Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon on Resentment.

P. 48, l. 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using ἐπιθυμία and its verb, equivocally: as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word lust in its ancient signification. Ps. xxiv. 12, "What man is he that lusteth to live?"

P. 48, l. 28. The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction; Aristotle has a primâ facie case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Cardwell's text gives the passage from δοκεἲ δὲ as a separate argument. Bekker's seems to intend αἱ δὲ πράξεις as a separate argument: but if so, the argument would be a mere petitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell's reading in part, but retain the comma at ἅμφω, and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.

P. 50, l. 11. i.e. on objects of Moral Choice; opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character: opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.

"Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”

P. 53, l. 4. The introduction of the words διὰ τίνος seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter ἐν τίνι added to περὶ τί. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.

P. 53 l. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in its nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office: the one chosen is the successful candidate; so of the three βουλευτὰ, the one chosen is the βουλευτὸν προαιρετὸν.

P. 53, l. 22. Compare Bishop Butler's “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons.

P. 53, l. 33. These Words, ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι——βούλευσιν, contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation. for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object—matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind: the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected; the two last constitute προαίρεσις in its full meaning. The word ορεξις means literally “a grasping at or after:” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act: consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, βούλησις, or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (i. 10), where ορεξις is divided into αλογος and λογιστική.

The illustration then afforded by the politics alluded to is this: as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move τὰ ὀργανικἀ μέρη. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter: safe arrival at land is naturally desired; two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods: the question being debated, the former is chosen; this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting; but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the agent never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are in his power and deliberation therefore is useless; consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.

P. 54, l. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, i. 10, ἕστιδ' ἡ μὲν βούλησιτ ἀγαθοῦ ὅρεξις (οὐδεις γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἣ ὅταν οἰηθῆ εῖναι ἀγαθόν).

P. 56, l. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered: so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy. First Part, chap. ii.

P. 58, l. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances, we can only choose how we will act, not what circumstances we will have to act under.

P. 59, l. 19. “Moral Courage” is our phrase.

P. 61, l. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.
"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form; Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.

P. 62, l. 14. For true Courage is required, 1. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.

P. 63, l. 11. This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion. The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.

P. 63, l. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας).

P. 63, l. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata ub vanos tumultus gens.

P. 64, l. 5. In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Bœotian troops, the πολιτικὰ Coroneans.

P. 64, l. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.

P. 68, l. 8. The meaning of the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. x. εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἣ διώκει, καθ αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατἀ σγμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον.

P. 97, l. 2. Perhaps “things which reflect credit on them” as on page 95.

P. 100, l. 12. Book VII.

P. 101, l. 11. Each term is important: to make up the character of justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.

P. 102, l. 1. But not always. Φιλεῖν, for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” μισεῖν but one. Topics, I. chap. xiii. 5.

P. 102, l. 6. Things are ὁμώνυμα which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The ὁμωνυμία is close therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for ὁμωνυμία, “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significates.

P. 102, l. 24. See Book I. chap. i. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ, κ.τ.λ.

P. 104, l. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him: a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person.

P. 105, l. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. iv. 3.

P. 105, l. 31. Cardwell’s text, which here gives παράνομον, yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore
the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice : the particular i.e. as whole to part.
There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.

P. 106, l. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the πολιτεία under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so therefore pro tanto is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does the facts of a good man: but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, iii. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler's first Sermon.

P. 107, l. 17. Terms used for persons.

P. 107, l. 34. By μοναδικὸς ἀριθμὸς is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc., by ὅλως ἀριθμὸς these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.

P. 108, l. 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then,
A : B : : 400 : 600.
A : 400 : : B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respective sums).
A+400 : B+600 : : A : B. This represents the actual distribution: its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.

P. 109, l. 10. i.e. Corrective justice is wrought out by subtraction from the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.

P. 110, l. 3. Her Majesty’s “Justices.”

P. 111, l. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards: it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense.

P. 111 , l. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage, but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words.

P. 111, l. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation: and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offenses, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office.

P. 112, l. 5. χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness; 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.

P. 113, l. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, and vice versa.
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits οὖ at δει άγειν, we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons, i.e. the ratio of equality.
If we admit οὗ, the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above (ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων) since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares: consequently the highest artist will carry on the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both ὑπερόχαι. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes═1 house.

Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes        : 1 house——wrong.
——————    ————————.     100 pr. shoes      : 1 house——right.
——————    ————————.     10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house——wrong.

P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies τὸ ἀδικὸν, which is a violation of τὸ ἴσον, and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.

P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e. numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign: that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.

P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell’s reading (κινητόν οὐ μέντοι πᾶν): “but amongst ourselves there is just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker's text we must take κινητὸν to mean the same as κινούμενον, i.e. “we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell's, κινητὸν will mean “which not only does but naturally may vary.”

P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.

P. 121, l. 13. “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler's Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. ii. 2 Def. of ὀργὴ.

P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell quoted in Cardwell's Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:
“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.”

P. 122, l. 18. As when a man is “justified at the Grass Market”, i.e. hung.

P. 125, l. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share: where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all, this cannot happen.

P. 128, l. 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but one party.

P. 129, l. 25. So in the Politics, i. 2.
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρεξέως πολιτικὴν καὶ δεσποτικήν.
Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience.

P. 130, l. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble, or stone, for instance, in a building.

P. 131, l. 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.

P. 131, l. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i.e. something in his mental conformation answers to that science. The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude.

P. 131, l. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description of ἀρετὴ, II. 5.

P. 131, l. 33. πράξις is here used in its strict and proper meaning.

P. 131, l. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge: when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.
The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good: the Decision then will be always Aye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later.
So far is what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured: but to constitute a good Moral Choice. i.e. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime; or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction; in

other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the ἀκρατὴς—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

P. 132, l. 9. See the note on Άρχὴ on page 4, l. 30.

P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself (ἁπλῶς), or for the sake of something further (ἕνεκά τινος). If the first, then either syllogistically (ἐπιστήμη), non-syllogistically (νοῦς), or by union of the two methods (σοφία). If the second, either with a view to act (φρόνησις), or with a view to make (τέχνη).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles (νοῦς), Deductions (ἐπιστήμη), or Mixed (σοφία). If Contingent, Action (φρόνησις), Production (τέχνη). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)

P. 133. l. 20. The cobbler is at his last; why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of some one: and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.

P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of ὄρεξις before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice: Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be: if this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς.
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ. See Bishop Butler's Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.

P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post. Analytics.

P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (i.e. proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. I.) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by νοῦς, in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance.

All Magnets attract iron	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.
A B C are Magnets
A B C attract iron.
A B C attract iron		(Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C		(Assumed by νοῦς, i.e. the Inductive faculty)
All Magnets attract iron		(Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)

Or, according to the canon quoted above:

A B C are Magnets.
A B C attract iron.

But νοῦς tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be διὰ πάντων but he says in the same place that for this reason we must conceive (νοεῖν) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above), as composed of all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension: it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it, It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends entirely upon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius: the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premise literally false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction as the term is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II. 25, 26. Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI. I. and X.

P. 133, l. 32. The reference is made to the Post Analyt. I. II. and it is impossible to understand the account of ἐπιστήμη without a perusal of the chapter; the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which ἐπιστήμη draws its conclusions: they are to be “true, first principles, incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes or it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)

P. 134, l. 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that the membra dividentia shall be opposed, i.e. not included the one by the other.

P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the ἐπεὶ appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it was in the case of ἐπιστήμη, and will be in those of φρόνησις and σοφία. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected: to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition; which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, I. vi.

P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of φρόνησις is strongly brought out; ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ κύριος τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς ἀδικίας ὅτι φρονίμως ἐποίησεν· ὅτι οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου φρονιμώτεροι, κ. τ. λ.—Luke xvi. 8.

P. 135, l. 5. Compare the ἁπλῶς and καθ ἕκαστα πεπαιδεύμενος of Book I. chap. 1.

P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient; because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme: and “Conscience and Self-Love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
And again:
“If by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness: this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature.
...So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I. chap. v.

P. 136, l. 6. See the note on Ἀρχὴ on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following.—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning ἡ δ ἒξις τῶ ὄμματι τούτω κ. τ. λ.—vii. 4. ἔτι καὶ ῶδε φυσικῶς. κ. τ. λ. viii. 9.—ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ µοχθηρία. κ. τ. λ.—iii. 7 ad finem. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι. κ. τ. λ.

P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist:” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively; διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι᾿ ἀναφορᾶς. I. 12.

P. 136, l. 17. He would be a better Chymist who should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid; and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”

P. 137, l. 13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to Σορία here. “Then wrought Bezaleel and Aholiab, and every wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understanding to know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary.” Exodus xxxvi. 1.

P. 137, l. 27. ἐπιστήμη and Νοῦς, (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function σοφία; ἐπιστήμη takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which Νοῦς supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so Νοῦς might exist independent of ἐπιστήμη, but not this without that. Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being Σοφία. There are three branches of σοφία according to Greek Philosophy, Θεολογικὴ, Μαθηματικὴ, Φυσικὴ. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.

P. 137, l. 29. πολιτικὴ is here used in its most extensive sense, φρόνησίς would be its chief Instrument.

P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is Φυσικὴ Σοφία.

P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them; but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation; as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.

P. 139, l. 27. χειροτέχναι, “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)

P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting

           Self, (which is φρόνησίς proper)
or not-Self, i.e. either one's family=οἰκονομικὴ,
                       or one’s community=πολιτικὴ,

but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished; the former is νομοθετικὴ, the latter πολιτικὴ proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.

P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community? sec Horace's account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. I. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler's first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in fact of enlightened Self—Love and Benevolence i.e. love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about αὐταρκεία.

P. 140, l. 17. More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.

P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.

P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained αἰσθήσει. (Book I. chap. viii.)

P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called ἔσχατα because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process; but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.

P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading ἡ φρόνησις, which gives this sense; “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.

P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post. Analyt. I. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quæstio states the phænomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes ἀγχινοία.

All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.
The moon receives light from the sun,
.·. The moon is bright on the side next the sun.

The ἀγχινοία consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.

P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.

P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.

P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense φρόνησις is concerned with means, not Ends: but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Greet End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which φρόνησις selects as being right means to the Grand End of all.

P. 142, l. 34. The relative οὖ might be referred to τὸ σύμφερον, but that εὐβουλία has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that πρός τι τέλος as opposed to that πρός τὸ τέλος ἁπλῶς.

P. 143, l. 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with συγγνώμη.

P. 144, l. 1. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. φρόνησις is equivalent to εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, γνώμη, and νοῦς (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is φρόνησις, i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the φρόνιμος forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then εὔβουλος—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is συνετὸς—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits γνώμη to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising νοῦς πρακτικὸς or αἴσθησις—while in each and all he is φρόνιμος.

P. 144, l. 7. See note, on p. 140.

P. 144, l. 19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of αἴσθησις. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of νοῦς, i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.

P. 144, l. 25. i.e. of the συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν.

P. 144, l. 27. See the note on Άρχὴ on p. 4, l. 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practical Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by ἐθισμός).

    All that is pleasant is to be done.
    This is pleasant,
.·. This is to be done.

By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss. i.e. on the suggestions of ἐπιθυμία, a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss; Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς. And his analysis of ἀκρασία. (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to ἐπιθυμία suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.

P. 145, l. 4. The consequentia is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by νοῦς. What makes νοῦς to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore, etc.

P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain ὑγίεινα and εὐεκτικὰ; he gives these three uses of the term ὑγίεινον in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,

ὑγίεινον λέγεται	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	τὸ μὲν ὑγίειας ποιητικόν,
		τὸ δὲ φυλακτικὸν,
		τὸ δὲ σημαντικὸν.

Of course the same will apply to εὐεκτικὸν.

P. 146, l. 11.	Healthiness is the formal	$\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$	cause of health.
	Medicine is the efficient

See Book X. chap. iv. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν.

P. 146, l. 17. φρὸνησις is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.

P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.

P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.

P. 147. l. 6. The article is supplied at πανούργους, because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to πανούργος, but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.

P. 147, l. 13. See the note on Άρχὴ on page 4, l. 30.

P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,

“This particular action is——.”

We may paraphrase τὸ τέλος by τί δεῖ πράττειν—τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· i.e. τῆς φρονησέως—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)

P. 147, l. 19. “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.

P. 147, l. 26. The term σωφρονικοὶ must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.

P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. νῦν δὲ φαίνονται ... κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that φρόνησις is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.

P. 152, l. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.

P. 152, l. 17. This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.”

P. 156, l. 12. Another reading omits the μὴ: the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same: it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”

P. 158, l. 4. Major and minor Premisses of the συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν.

P. 158, l. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.

P. 158, l. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott's Red Gauntlet.

P. 159, l. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premiss: it is true, “that all that is sweet is pleasant;” it is true also, that “this is sweet:” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major, i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus; a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided;” at a certain time his αἴσθησις tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided:” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But ἐπιθυμία, being a simple tendency towards indulgence, suggests, in place of the minor premiss “This is excess,” its own premiss “This is sweet;” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (Ἀρχὴ), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”
The solution then of the phænomenon of ἀκρασία is this: that ἐπιθυμία, by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, ἐπιστήμη i.e. ὀρθὸς λόγος easily defeats ἐπιθυμία. The ἀκρατὴς, an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The ἀκόλαστος would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II. Sat. 2).

Quæ virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo

.⁠.⁠.⁠.⁠.

Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes
Verùm hìc impransi mecum disquirite.

Compare also Proverbs xxiii. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc.

P. 160, l. 2. ὅρον. Aristotle's own account of this word (Prior Analyt. ii. I) is εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις; but both in the account of νοῦς and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.

P. 161. l. 16. The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse: the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας.

P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I. chap. v. sect. iv.

P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.

P. 165, l. 4. Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on ὀργὴ in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler's Sermon on Resentment.

P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is Subjoined.

Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects or wrath,^[1]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
.·. Actions of Lust are more unjust.

P. 168, l. 3. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes ἀκρατὴς for ἀκόλαστος removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων: but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS. and old editions is all on this side.
I understand μᾶλλον as meant to modify the word μαλακίας, which properly denotes that phase of ἀκρασία. (not ἀκολασία) which is caused by pain.
The ἀκόλαστος deliberately pursues pleasure and declines pain: if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under μαλακία more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of μαλακία and ἀκολασία may be fitly given respectively.

P. 169, l. 29. “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair.

And there is a mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish.” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men (Sermon xii.).

P. 170, l. 6. Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his Moral Choice to act rightly; but, at the moment of acting, the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice: his Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i., and note on page 128.

P. 171, l. 17. Let a man be punctual on principle to any one engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.

P. 172, l. 21. Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop But1er's first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of note on p. 129.

P. 179, l. 4. Abandoning Bekker's punctuation and reading μὴ ἀγαθόν; yields a better sense.
“Why will he wait it on the supposition that it is not good? He can live even with Pain: because,” etc.

P. 179, l. 25. φεύγει may be taken perhaps as equivalent to φεύγουσι and so balance χαίρουσι. But compare Chapter viii. (Bekker).

P. 183, l. 6. “Owe no man anything, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law.” Romans xiii. 8.

P. 183, l. 20. κεραμεῖς. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod,

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

P. 184, l. 33. In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin, that she

“two stone bottles found,
To hold the liquor that she loved,
And keep it safe and sound.”

P. 187, l. 24. Cardwell's reading, ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά, is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker's.

P. 192, l. 34. The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows; but the Good man can feel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.

P. 195, l. 12. See note on page 68, l.8.

P. 202, l. 28. See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of ταύτον.

P. 203, l. 35. “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.”

P. 206, l. 10. Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.

P. 217, l. 10. “Neither the Son of man, that He should repent.” Numbers xxiii. 19.
“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10.

P. 218, l. 17. “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber; yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition my soul by nature; not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller's Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix't Contemplations, viii.)

P. 235, l. 14. See note, p. 43.

P. 235, l. 24. See Book II. chap. ix.

P. 237, l. 3. See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.

P. 238, l. 2. The notion alluded to is that of the ἰδέα; that there is no real substantial good except the αὐτὸ ἄγαθον, and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that.

P. 238, l. 9. See note on page 136, l. 15.

P. 238, l. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:

From not being to being Generation $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}$ Categories,
chap. xi. From being to not being Destruction From being to being more Increase From being to being less Diminution From being here to being there Change of Place From being in this way to being in that Alteration

P. 238, l. 31. A may go to sleep quicker than B, but cannot do more sleep in a given time.

P. 239, l. 3. Compare Book III. chap. vi. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, κ. τ. λ.

P. 241, l. 6. Which is of course a γένεσις.

P. 241, l. 9. That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole Movement is.

P. 242, l. 7. Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete: the longest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.

P. 245, l. 18. A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the ἀλλοτρία ἡδονὴ of reading a novel, as by the οἰκεία λύπη of gout in the feet.

P. 249, l. 12. I have thus rendered σπουδὴ (οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον); but, though the English term does not represent the depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.

P. 250, l. 12. Bishop Butler, contrà (Sermon XV.).
“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the minor hindrances which attend on learning.

P. 250, l. 30. The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been all the way through connected with ἐνέργεια; but the statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, l. 15.

P. 251, l. 7. That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of Legislators in the last chapter of Book I. and the first of Book II.

P. 252, l. 22. See note, page 146, l. 17.

Footnotes

1. ὕβρις is introduced as the single instance from which this premise is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.