On the Road to Insurrection/Concerning Compromise

by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Concerning Compromise

September 3, 1917.

THE word compromise indicates in politics the renunciation, by virtue of an agreement with another party, of certain of one's claims. The idea that the crowd has of the Bolsheviks, and the idea promoted by the gutter press, is that the Bolsheviks consent never and with no one to any compromise.

This idea flatters us, as well as a part of the revolutionary proletariat, for it proves that even our enemies are compelled to recognise our fidelity to the fundamental principles of Socialism and of the revolution. But, truth to say, this idea does not correspond to reality. Engels was right when in his criticism of the Manifesto of the Blanquist Communists (1873) he mocked the latters' declaration: "No compromise!" That is but a phrase, said he, for it often happens that circumstances impose a compromise on a party in battle, and it is stupid to condemn oneself never "to accept payment of a debt by instalments." But the duty of a truly revolutionary party is not to proclaim an impossible renunciation of every sort of compromise, but to know throughout all compromises, in so far as such are inevitable, how to remain faithful to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary goal; to its duty of preparing for the revolution and of educating the mass whom it must lead to victory.

For instance, the fact of participating in the Third and Fourth Dumas was a compromise, a temporary abdication of revolutionary claims.^[1] But it was a compromise that had to be, for at that time the correlation of forces provisionally excluded the possibility of carrying on a mass struggle. To prepare for that struggle one had to know how to work inside that farmyard that was the Duma. History has shown that the Bolsheviks well understood the issue in this case.

We are at present concerned not with a compromise forced upon us, but with a voluntary compromise.

Our party, like every other party, aspires to political power. Our aim is the dictatorship of the revolutionary proletariat. Six months of revolution have confirmed with extraordinary exactitude in the most forceful and startling manner, the justice and inevitability of that contention, precisely in the interests of the revolution. For without the dictatorship of the proletariat the people will be unable to obtain either a democratic peace, or the return of the land to the peasants, or complete liberty (that is to say, an entirely democratic republic). The march of events during these six months of revolution, the struggle of classes and of parties, the development of the crises of April 20–21,^[2] of June 9–10,^[3] of June 18–19^[4] and July 3–5,^[5] and of August 27–31,^[6] have shown and proved it.

We are now faced with such a sudden, such a surprising upheaval of the Russian revolution, that we are in a position as a Party to propose a voluntary compromise, not to the bourgeoisie, our direct and principal enemy, but to those adversaries who are nearer to us, to the petit bourgeois democratic parties in office, to the S.-R.'s and to the Mensheviks.

It is only by way of exception, it is only in virtue of a special situation which apparently will last a very short time, that we can propose a compromise to those parties, and that we ought, it seems to me, to do so.

What is a compromise to us is the return to our demand of before July: All power to the Soviets! Formation of a Government of Social Revolutionaries and of Mensheviks responsible before the Soviets.

Now, and only now, during a few days, or perhaps one or two weeks, could such a Government be created and peacefully consolidated. It very much looks as if it could assure the peaceful progression of the revolution and would contribute to the progression of the world movement towards peace, towards the victory of Socialism. It is only for the sake of this peaceful development of the revolution, it is only in order to profit from this precious possibility, such as is extremely rare in history, that the Bolsheviks, partisans of the world revolution and of revolutionary methods, could and should, in my opinion, agree to such a compromise. The substance of this compromise would be that without pretensions to participation in the Government (a participation impossible for an internationalist without the effective realisation of the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants) the Bolsheviks would renounce their demands for the immediate handing over of all power to the proletariat and the poor peasants, and their employment of revolutionary methods to achieve the triumph of the demand. On the other hand, the compromise would involve two conditions whichrequire nothing new of the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks, namely, absolute liberty of agitation and the calling of the Constituent Assembly at the fixed date, or even within a shorter period.

The Mensheviks and the S.-R.'s in their capacity as the Government bloc would consent (supposing the compromise to be accepted) to form a Government entirely and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, to whom would be handed over all the machinery of power.

Therein would lie the "new condition." The Bolsheviks, it seems to me, should impose no other condition, for they could count on the fact that the entire liberty of agitation and the immediate realisation of a new democratisation in the composition of the Soviets (which would be re-elected) and in their functioning would by themselves assure the peaceful progression of the revolution, the peaceful cessation of the conflict of parties within the Soviets.

Perhaps this is no longer possible? Perhaps. But even if there remains one chance in a hundred that chance makes an attempt worth while.

What would the two contracting parties, the Bolsheviks on one hand, and the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc on the other, gain by this "compromise"? If they gain nothing thereby the compromise is evidently impossible and accordingly useless to talk about. Whatever difficulty its realisation may now present (after July and August, two months equivalent to a score of years of peaceable torpor), it seems to me that it is not yet quite impossible, and what makes me think this is the decision taken by the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks not to participate in the Government with the Cadets.^[7]

The Bolsheviks will gain from this compromise in that they will secure the ability freely to propagate their point of view and the possibility of exercising their influence in the Soviets, thanks to the effective realisation of integral democracy. Nominally everyone already grants this freedom to the Bolsheviks. In fact, it is impossible under a bourgeois Government or under a Government in which the bourgeoisie joins, to wit, under any Government other than that of the Soviets. Under the Government of the Soviets this freedom would be possible (we do not say absolutely assured, but possible). Therefore, it is in order to try and realise this possibility that it would be convenient, at such a painful time, to make a compromise with the present majority in the Soviets. We have nothing to fear under a regime of genuine democracy for life is on our side, and even the tendencies that are developing within the womb of the parties of our adversaries, the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks, will in time confirm the justice of our position.

The Mensheviks and the S.R.'s would gain by this compromise in the sense that they would obtain at one stroke the complete possibility of realising the programme of their bloc, by resting on the immense majority of the people and in assuring themselves of the ability to use "peacefully" their majority in the Soviets.

In this bloc, necessarily heterogenous both as a coalition and because the petty bourgeois democracy is always less homogeneous than the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, two voices would, apparently, make themselves heard.

One would say: "Our path is neither with the Bolsheviks nor with the revolutionary proletariat. The latter's demands will be extravagant, and it will, by means of demagogue orations, drag the poor peasants in its wake. It will demand peace and a rupture with the Allies. And that is impossible. We are nearer to the bourgeoisie, with whom we have had a mild quarrel—a quarrel is not a rupture—over the Kornilov incident. We have quarrelled—well, we can make it up. Moreover, the Bolsheviks 'concede' us absolutely nothing, for all the insurrections that they'll try will be totally crushed as was the Commune of 1871."

The other voice will say: "To base one's arguments on the Commune is to reason superficially and even sillily. For, first of all, the Bolsheviks have learned a little from the experience of their precursors of 1871: they will not fail to put their hand on the State Bank, nor will they hesitate to march on Versailles; and the Commune, had it done that, might have won through. Furthermore, the Commune could not immediately offer the people what the Bolsheviks can if they take power, that is to say: land to the peasants, the immediate proposal of peace, effective control of production, an honourable peace with the Ukrainians, the Finns, &c. The Bolsheviks, in common parlance, have ten times as many trumps in their hand as had the Commune. The Commune implies a painful period of civil war, a prolonged stoppage to civilisation's peaceful development; it will facilitate the machinations of all sorts of MacMahons and Kornilovs, a grave danger to our bourgeois society. Is it reasonable to run the risk of the Commune?

"But the Commune is inevitable in Russia, if our bloc does not take power, if the situation remains as it has done from May 6 to August 31. The spirit of every workman, of every revolutionary soldier will without fail turn towards the Commune, he will believe in it, he will attempt to achieve it. The people, he will say to himself, is perishing; war, famine, ruin are decimating its ranks more and more seriously as each day goes by. Only the Commune can save us. Let us sacrifice ourselves, let us all die if need be, but long live the Commune! These are the thoughts which will fatally come into the minds of all the workers, and the Commune to-day will not be so easy to defeat as in 1871. The Russian Commune will have throughout the whole world allies a hundred times more mighty than the Commune of Paris. Is it sensible to take the chance of the Commune? Moreover one could not say that the Bolsheviks are granting us nothing by their compromise. In all advanced countries intelligent ministers highly appreciate every accord, small as it may be, with the people during war. And, as these ministers are business men, genuine ministers, their example is not to be disdained. Again, the Bolsheviks are rapidly becoming stronger, in spite of the repressions to which they are subjected and the feebleness of their Press. … Is it in these conditions reasonable to run the risk of the Commune?

"We have our majority assured, the most impoverished sections of the peasant class will not stir for a long time yet; we have a good period of tranquillity before us; after that we shall see.

"It is improbable that in an essentially agricultural country the majority will follow the extreme elements. Therefore, in a truly democratic republic, insurrection against the recognised majority is an impossibility."

So will speak the second voice.

Perhaps, among the partisans of Martov or of Spiridonova^[8] there will be a third voice saying: "Comrades, I am genuinely indignant that, reasoning about the Commune and the possibilities of its realisation, you both of you range yourselves without hesitation on the side of its foes. In one form or another you are both on the side of those who crushed the Commune. I am not going to agitate for the Commune, I cannot promise in advance to fight in its ranks as every Bolshevik will do; nevertheless I must say that if, in spite of my efforts the Commune survives, I shall rather help its defenders than its foes. …"

The divergences in the bosom of the "bloc" are considerable and inevitable, for the democratic petty bourgeoisie includes a mass of nuances, from the bourgeois who would become a minister to the flea-bitten bourgeois almost disposed to adopt the platform of the proletariat. And what, at one moment or another, will be the outcome of this clash of contrary views? No one can tell.

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The above lines were written on Friday last, September 1, but as a result of unforeseen circumstances (history will tell that under Kerensky not all the Bolsheviks were free to choose their domicile where best it suited them), they did not reach the editorial offices on the same day. So, after reading Saturday's and Sunday's papers, I said to myself: I think it is already too late to propose a compromise. The few days during which the peaceful development of events was still possible have already passed. Yes, everything points to this. By one way or another, Kerensky will leave the Social-Revolutionary Party and consolidate his position with the help of the bourgeois without the S.-R.'s, thanks to their inaction^[9] … Yes, everything clearly shows that the days during which the possibility of setting forth on the path of peaceful development became by chance available have gone by beyond recall. There remains nothing to do but to send these notes to the editorial department accompanied by a request that they may be entitled "Belated Reflections"; even belated reflections are not, at times, without their uses.

1. Formerly opposed by a fraction of the Bolsheviks.
2. A crisis caused by a note in which Miliukoff, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, promised to the Allies to continue the war until guarantees (Constantinople, &c.) were obtained. It led to the retirement of Miliukoff, and the formation of the first Coalition Government of May 6.
3. A demonstration, arranged for the tenth of June by the Central Bureau of Factory Committees and the Bolshevik Party, to protest against "industrial anarchy and lock-outs by the employers," had to be cancelled on the 10th, on account of the opposition of the Congress of Soviets then assembled.
4. On the 18th, the demonstration prepared by the opportunists changes into a triumph for the Bolshevik slogans: All Power to the Soviets! Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers! Down with the political offensive! On the 19th a bourgeois counter-demonstration took place.
5. A crisis caused by the resignation of the bourgeois ministers, leading to a spontaneous demonstration of the workers and soldiers that came under the direction of the Bolshevik Party, but was crushed by the Government which thenceforward gave itself over to reaction.
6. A stroke by Kornilov's Commander-in-Chief to get, with or without Kerensky, the military dictatorship.
7. In fact, on August 31 the Petrograd Soviet had voted by 279 to 115 with 51 abstentions against the participation of the Cadets (Liberals) in the Government: "The sole issue is the constitution of a Government formed of representatives of the proletariat and the peasant class."
8. Martov, Internationalist Social-Democrat, occupied with his group a place apart; so did the Left Social-Revolutionaries, such as Marie Spiridonova.
9. September 1, Kerensky actually formed his "Directory" with Tereschtchenko, and laid an interdict on the internationalist newspaper Novaia Zizn; the Central Executive Committee convoked a packed "Democratic Conference" as a counter to the Congress of Soviets arranged for the end of September. The Social-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic ministers, Zarondny, Avxentiev and Skobelev resigned.