This chapter assumes the existence of a generic matter, as well as something which is to give to it reality, and thus it seems to admit of formative conditions other than those assigned to Vital Principle; the mind too, although said to be immaterial, is likened to a material agent. Aristotle[1] elsewhere, somewhat in conformity with this, says, "even granting that all things may be from one, or more than one primal element, and that the self-same matter may be the source of all beings, yet there is a peculiar matter for each genus, as pituita is the primal matter for sweet and oily, as the matter of bile is for bitter and analogous qualities." An early commentator observes, "matter is the receptacle and subject of forms, without having in itself either figure, quality, magnitude, or place; nevertheless, it is not a mere name, but truly exists as the basis of qualities. Matter exists potentially, bodies actually, with their peculiar character; and matter cannot be separated from form and real existence."
Since, throughout all nature, there is a matter for each genus of entities (that which all belonging to that genus are in potentiality), and a something which is causative and constitutive from its making things what they are, as art impresses its forms upon matter, so those same distinctions must, of necessity, co-exist in the vital principle. Such also is the mind, from its faculty, on the one hand, of becoming all things, and, on the other, of creating all things, as if it were a virtuality like light; for light, in a certain sense, makes colours, being in potentiality, to become colours in reality; and the mind here meant is separate, impassive and homogeneous, being essentially an energizing influence.
That which acts is ever, in fact, more influential than that which is acted upon, as the causative principle is than the matter. Now, knowledge in activity is identical with the subject; but knowledge in potentiality pre-exists in the individual; and yet, strictly
- ↑ Metaphys. VII. 4. I.