Oregon Historical Quarterly/Volume 22/The Last Phase of the Oregon Boundary Question: The Struggle for San Juan Island
THE QUARTERLY
of the
Oregon Historical Society
VOLUME XXII SEPTEMBER, 1921 NUMBER 3
Copyright, 1921, by the Oregon Historical Society The Quarterly disavows responsibility for the positions taken by contributors to its pages
THE LAST PHASE OF THE OREGON BOUNDARY QUESTION[1]
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAN JUAN ISLAND
By ANDREW FISH
Introduction The Diplomatic Background >The Hudson's Bay Company and Vancouver Island The Hudson's Bay Company and Colonization The Effect of the Gold Rush San Juan Island The Crisis of 1859 General Harney's Vigorous Action The Crisis of 1859 Governor Douglas' Belligerent Response The Advent of Admiral Baynes Washington Intervenes Arrival of General Winfield Scott Generals Scott and Harney Who Was to Blame? President Buchanan's Attitude Later Stages of the Diplomatic Struggle Summary and Conclusion.
INTRODUCTION.
My story concerns San Juan, an island which lies in the Gulf of Georgia and is included in the State of Washington. Though too insignificant a matter to find a place in the general histories of our country, the contest between America and Britain for the sovereignty of these few acres at one particular juncture almost led to hostilities between the small armed contingents on the northwest coast; an event which, in a time when feelings were none too friendly, not inconceivably might have brought on a war between the two powers.
There were anxious moments for diplomats in Washington and London. Contrary to some popular notions, in this case at least the diplomats' anxiety was not to bring on hostilities but to prevent them. The cause of their anxiety was that, far away on the debated frontier, otherwise admirable servants of their governments displayed more patriotism than discretion, and were concerned more with possession than peace. The question was given a considerable proportion of space in one of President Buchanan's annual messages on the state of the nation, where it jostled with affairs that are better remembered, as, for instance, the wild doings in Kansas of one John Brown; and in private notes and correspondence among statesmen an ominous word occurred and recurred, if only to be spoken of as denoting a state of things highly undesirable and to be avoided if at all consistent with national self-respect. The strain was soon over and high politicians breathed freely again. A temporary settlement brought composure, though the final disposition was not made for a dozen years or so. The scene of the final stage of this diplomatic war is Berlin in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-one. In Berlin, the capital of a brand new Empire, the sovereign destiny of little San Juan was discussed by scholars and statesmen of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. It was decided by the Emperor himself while yet the gilt of his crown had lost none of its bright newness. If on the face of it this does not seem to allow self-determination to San Juan, let me hasten to say that the 7, decision awarding the territory to the United States was hailed with joy by the settlers and proclaimed to be an act of justice. If the matter was comparatively trivial to statesmen seeking a solution, peaceful or otherwise, of such problems as slavery in these States and Territories, and the possible consequences to European relations of an Italian war of liberation, with the complications of Louis Napoleon's adventures in that connection, it was of some importance to the handful of pioneer Americans and Britishers of the Northwest the advance guard of European civilization. Mot only were the acres themselves desirable, but upon the just settlement of the dispute depended in some measure the spirit in which the citizens of the two neighbor nations were to dwell together.
Furthermore, it was viewed as one skirmish in the war between the settlers on the one hand and the giant monopoly, the Hudson's Bay Company, on the other. A fundamental antagonism is represented here that between the individualism of the settler whose ideal was that of personal independence, and the characteristic outreaching of an impersonal corporation with its host of servants. Behind this again lay the essential opposition between two economic ideas, an opposition that has been apparent throughout the history of the Pacific Northwest. For the settler the basis of material existence was cultivated land, but for the Company it was wild land; one primarily worked for grain and cattle, and the other traded for furs. The more land under cultivation the fewer fur-bearing animals.
While it is true that in the case of San Juan Island it was grazing land for the incidental business of stock raising that the Company was after, nevertheless the hostility between the aims of the grain-grower and the fur trader accounted for the long-standing bitterness felt by the farmers toward the Hudson's Bay Company, and to a large extent for the outburst of warlike temper over San Juan. The victory of the ranchers meant much more than actual possession of the land It meant that; it meant a victory for the flag; and it also meant a successful blow at the power interested in preventing the spread of the industry and culture of the white man, the power doing its utmost to postpone the inevitable day when the forest should be cleared to make habitations for civilized man, and when the redeemed soil should be turned to his uses. Of course, even in British North America, the demand for settlement could not be denied by the Company for long; but the difference in aims accounted for the hatred shown by settlers to the Company.
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THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND.
The expansion of Europe on the North American continent began with the successful expeditions of the Spanish soldier pioneers ; the realm of the Aztec ruler, Montezuma, in Mexico was effectively annexed to Spain by 1521. Already the Spaniards were in possession of some of the most desirable of the West Indian islands; they had established themselves in Central America, and had penetrated Florida to the north. After Cortez's justly famous capture of Mexico City, various expeditions made brilliant discoveries along the Pacific coast and up through the interior to regions now included in the State of Kansas.
Europe, of course, was not a unit, and expansion was effected through the most intense and bitter rivalry among the leading European nations. After Spain came England. At- tempts at settlement were being made before the sixteenth century had run its course, but not until 1607 at Jamestown, was a permanent foothold gained. From this developed the Old Dominion of Virginia. Separate movements beginning in 1620 produced the New England settlements; royal grants opened up still further tracts of land to English colonists ; and an inconveniently situated Dutch Colony lying between the English northern and southern groups was quietly annexed so that the Atlantic coast from Canada to Carolina was under the same flag.
Not only Spain and England, but France also must expand. She had her intrepid discoverers as had the others; -in 1608 Champlain founded Quebec, and to the north of the English there grew up the great French Empire, Canada. The writing of this magnificent epic was the life-work of Francis Park- man. North, west, and south along the valley of the Missis- sippi went these adventurous Frenchmen, annexing enormous stretches of territory to the French crown. The result was that by claiming the whole Mississippi region under the name of Louisiana any possible expansion of the English was
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blocked a fact that had important consequences for both nations concerned.
Through European complications not wholly germane to our present purpose, France and England were engaged in a mighty war throughout the greater part of the eighteenth cen- tury. The real significance of this great struggle is now clearly seen to be that it was for a world empire affecting the future of such vast but dissimilar countries as America and India. Aside from Europe, and only considering the rela- tive positions of the two countries in America, it is difficult to see how hositilities could have been avoided. The fortunes of war greatly favored England; Wolfe took Quebec in 1759, Amherst took Montreal in 1760, and great victories were won over France and her ally Spain at sea. By the peace treaty England, among other things, got all territory in North America east of the Mississippi between the Hudson Bay on the north and the Gulf of Mexico on the south. To Spain went the territories west of the river. So ended the great struggle between the two leading powers of Europe for world empire, a struggle which was the most important fact of world politics during the eighteenth century. The success of Great Britain was complete and, so far, final.
The pressure of the French removed, the colonies claimed complete self-government in 1776. This claim they success- fully maintained by force of arms ; the peace negotiations which ended the war gave to the new republic the line of the Great Lakes for its limit on the north and the Mississippi on the west. The southern boundary was the subject of a dis- pute with Spain which lasted until 1819 when Florida was added to the United States.
The southern line has little to do with our present purpose, but the acquisition of Louisiana from the French in 1803 has a direct bearing. The territory called Louisiana, stretching from the borders of Canada to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, had been taken from Spain by Napoleon in 1800. In view of France's international
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position her possession of New Orleans was an alarming cir- cumstance to the Americans, who were at the time developing to the west and dependent upon the Mississippi for transporta- tion and upon New Orleans as a port of shipment for their products. By a stroke of policy in which was mingled sa- gacity and sheer good luck Jefferson, who was then president, purchased from Napoleon, hard pressed in Europe and with no leisure in which to develop a colonial empire, not New Orleans only but the whole of Louisiana for what seems to us today the ridiculously small sum of fifteen million dollars. This im- portant step doubled the area of the United States ; it also led to disputes with Great Britain about the northern boundary. This line was eventually fixed in 1818 by a treaty signed by both parties in which it was agreed to accept the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude from the Lake of the Woods to the Rockies. We must remember that forty-ninth parallel, it plays an important part in subsequent events.
The forty-ninth parallel was definite enough so far as it went, but it was not at the time accepted as the dividing line between the possessions of the two powers lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean, the region known as the Oregon Country. Four powers had established and acknowledged rights on the Pacific Coast Spain, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. By agreement with the "United States in 1818, the northern limit of the Spanish sphere was set at the forty-second parallel ; by treaties between the United States and Russia, and Great Britain and Russia, in 1825 the parallel of fifty-four degrees and forty minutes was accepted as the southern Russian boundary. The Oregon country lay in between, having for its eastern boundary the Rocky Mountains. Over this territory the United States and Great Britain waged a long, and sometimes very bitter, diplo- matic war; indeed, it seemed at times as if the matter might be pressed to a decision by more destructive weapons than the arguments of diplomats.
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When on October 20, 1818, 1 the line of the forty-ninth parallel from the Lakes of the Woods to the Rocky Moun- tains was agreed on, the difficulties in the way of a decision as to the Oregon country were too great, and the settlement was postponed by arranging for a joint occupation for ten years, without prejudice to the claims of either party. On the face of it this seemed to be quite fair to all interests, but in reality it greatly favored the Hudson's Bay Company, which soon was well established in the region ; it was in fact the greatest human economic factor. The agreement was renewed in 1828, but the necessity for some permanent form of government was becoming more and more acute, mainly on account of the in- creasing population of American settlers.
The sentiment in favor of the claim of the United States to the whole of the territory was so strong that in May, 1844, the Democratic Convention gave it a place in their party plat- form, declaring that the title of the United States to the whole of Oregon was "clear and unquestionable" and that "no part of the same ought to be ceded to England, or to any other power." During the election the issue was summed up in a phrase which has more alliteration than sound judgment "Fifty- four Forty or Fight !" President Polk adhered to the claim in his inaugural address, but the attitude of the admin- istration soon modified, for on July 12, 1845, James Buchanan, Secretary of State in Polk's cabinet, suggested the forty-ninth parallel, and offered to make free to Great Britain such ports on Vancouver Island south of that line as she might desire. 2 Pakenham, the British Minister at Washington, refused this, but in so doing misunderstood the sentiment of his govern- ment. London was favorable but by the time this news reached Washington the administration was not prepared to renew the offer. A British offer of arbitration made in December of the same year was refused by Buchanan. Then quite suddenly the way opened. As the result of suggestions emanating from Buchanan in February, 1846, and of the ready response in
1 For the diplomatic aspects of this whole question sc John Bansett Moore: History and Digest of International Arbitrations, Vol. I.
2 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29th Cong., lit Sess. (Quoted by Moore.)
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London to the advances so made, by June Pakenham pre- sented a draft treaty which was accepted by the Senate and by the President without the alteration of a word. The boundary was to be along the forty-ninth parallel, but it was provided that the whole of Vancouver Island should remain British ; in the words of the treaty the line should go "to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and southerly through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca's Straights, to the Pacific Ocean." This was substantial victory for Washington as the British claim had been the forty-ninth parallel until it meets the Co- lumbia River, and from thence the line of the river. The navigation of the river was important in view of the business of the fur company whose chief depot was at Fort Vancouver. Fifty- four- forty can hardly have been seriously meant, so that the only concession made by the United States was that with regard to Vancouver Island. With the treaty signed it really seemed as if the long wrangle was finally ended in mutual good will. Little was known by diplomats of the geography of the region, and if they knew there was more than one channel -that might be covered by the terms of the treaty, affecting vari- ously the sovereignty of some small island territories, there is no hint of it in that document. Moore suggests that the negotiators, anxious not to jeopardize again the much desired settlement, refrained from entering into controversy about what must have seemed to them a very small matter. What, after all, are a few pin-points on the map of the great Pacific Northwest? Yet the controversy over a few of those pin- points, and principally over one of them, is the excuse for the present writing-.
THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY AND VANCOUVER ISLAND.
The Hudson's Bay Company, or more properly, the Gover- nor and Company of Adventurers of England Trading into Hudson's Bay, is a corporation whose fortunes are interwoven
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with those of the whole Pacific Northwest. It was originally formed in 1670 and received from Charles the Second of Eng- land a charter securing to them
"the sole trade and commerce of all those seas, straits, bays, rivers, lakes, creeks, and sounds, in whatsoever lati- tude they be, that lie within the entrance of the straits commonly called Hudson's Straits, together with all lands and territories upon the countries, coasts and confines of the seas, bays, etc., aforesaid, that are not already actually possessed by or granted to any of our subjects, or pos- sessed by the subjects of any other Christian prince or state." 3
After the cession of Canada to Great Britain by France in 1763 many traders began to compete with the great Company in their business of bartering with the Indians for furs, espe- cially in the new territories of the west. These individual spec- ulators eventually formed the North-West Fur Company of Montreal. The result of the competition between the servants of the two corporations was deplorable. The Indians were corrupted by liquor; dark stories are told of what white men did to each other in the scramble for the gains of this exceed- ingly profitable employment, and the supply of furs was in some danger of giving out through indiscriminate slaughter. By 1821 the unwisdom of this strife was recognized and an amalgamation took place. A license was obtained granting exclusive trading rights in the regions west and northwest of the old grant. The North-West Company lost its identity, and in 1838 the Hudson's Bay Company procured a new license for monopoly trading rights in the western lands for twenty- one years. This was not renewed on its expiration in 1859. The license of 1838 defined the territory affected thus:
"The exclusive privilege of trading with the Indians in all such ports of North America to the northward and to the westward of the lands and territories belonging to the United States of America as should not form part of any of our provinces in North America, or of any lands or territories belonging to said United States of America, or to any European Government, State or Power." 4
3 See Ency. Brit, llth Ed. Art Hudton'i Bar Company.
4 Quoted in "TA* Trnty of Washington" by Caleb Cuthing p. 217.
From this the interest of the Company in the boundary question becomes sufficiently apparent. This corporation, so typical a product of the Commercial Revolution which has played so large a part in determining the economic structure of modern society, from its headquarters in London was exercising powers of invisible government, retarding a diplomatic settlement, while in the regions concerned it was exercising powers that were not invisible to retard civilization generally and the settlement of farmers in particular. Perhaps after such a statement a word of explanation is necessary. While the Hudson's Bay Company was a sinister influence behind so many of the difficulties of northwestern development it was not because of any extra measure of original sin in the Company or its officials, but simply because of the nature of its operations. The story of its transactions presents the tangled web of good and evil common to all human stories.
This is not the place to do more than note a few of the chief events leading up to those we have specially to consider. Dr. John McLoughlin built Fort Vancouver on the banks of the Columbia River in the years 1824 and 1825 and remained long enough in charge of that station and exercised his power so wisely as to earn, even among the American pioneers, the title "Father of Oregon". The fort was the headquarters of the Company on the Pacific and the center of an extensive and lucrative business, not only with the natives for furs but with the settlers who began to arrive very soon after the establishment of the fort, and who by the forties were entering in considerable numbers. In 1843 the Company saw fit to build a depot and fort at Victoria, then known by its native name of Camosun, at the southern end of Vancouver Island. This was destined to supersede Vancouver as the principal station. The reasons for the change are not far to seek. The boundary question could not be postponed very much longer as American settlers were present in such force in the Willamette Valley by 1841 as to take preliminary steps toward the formation of a government. The subject was being urgently pressed upon the attention of Congress, and in 1843 a provisional government was actually established. Two strong reasons, then, would present themselves for moving headquarters: it was desirable to have a situation on territory that was likely to remain British, and it was necessary to get in front of colonization if trading with the natives was to continue, for furtrading and farming are incompatible. Furthermore, the establishment of substantial commercial interests on the island would strengthen the British claim to possession; nor were the officials of the Company unintelligent in their attitude to the new economic situation presented by the rapid increase in settlement. If the golden days were going when paltry trinkets could be exchanged for valuable pelts procured by innocent Indians, good business in general supplies could be done with the shipping population of the Pacific Ocean. They were in the business themselves and knew how to cater to the skippers of vessels trading with China and the South Seas, or engaged about the perilous business of the whale-fisheries. Victoria was a very suitable spot. There was more reason for the foundation of Victoria than for that of many a western city.
As early as 1837 the south end of Vancouver Island was explored by W. McNeil of the Hudson's Bay post at Fort Simpson.[2] In 1842 (the year American sentiment was strongly expressed) James Douglas, who was factor at Vancouver, made a careful preliminary survey and reported favorably on the site, although the harbor at Esquimalt was better and easier to enter. Camosun was the better place for a fort and there was suitable arable and pasture land in the immediate vicinity. In the spring of 1843 fifteen men under Douglas started out. Men from the northern posts were also ordered to join the party and assist in the work. Douglas and his men touched at Cowlitz where supplies were obtainable; at Nisqually. the "Beaver", first steamship in these waters, awaited them. They left Vancouver on March first and arrived at Camosun on the fourteenth. Father Bolduc, a Jesuit missionary, zealous soul
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that he was, immediately began to exercise his offices upon the Indians and is said to have baptized until exhausted. Douglas gave aid but had also other work to do ; a site for the fort must be selected and material for its erection gathered. The "Beaver" went north for the other part of the expedition, leaving those on the spot to prepare timbers, dig a well and so forth. She was back on the first of June and the work was pushed ahead. In another three months stockades, bastions, store, and dwelling houses were ready. Supplies came from Vancouver and the new community was fairly launched. Roderick Finlayson took command in 1844, and was practi- cally ruler of the island. As an example of the economy of Douglas and the ingenuity of Finlayson it is recorded that Fort Camosun was built without a single nail; nothing but wooden pegs were used. As to the name, it was changed from Camosun to Albert, honoring the Queen's consort, but soon afterwards it became Victoria, whether from fresh access of patriotism or not I am unable to say. Cattle was taken from the mainland ; ground was broken by primitive ploughs ; ships from England began to arrive; whalers called, and presently British naval vessels used it as a station.
Only the regular business of abrading post was carried on for 'some years, but a change took place after the discovery of gold in California in 1848. As a supply depot for mines Victoria got some of the overflow business of San Francisco; also some of the miners preferred to spend the winter in this less expensive and less riotous place. These facts affected the economic situation in that it not only brought more business but provided gold as a medium of exchange. It also caused great excitement and unrest among the population. Finlay- son 6 gives us an illuminating picture of the coming of the strangers into this somewhat primitive society.
"These rough-looking miners landed here from their ves- sels, which entered the harbor early in 1849. I took them first to be pirates, and ordered our men to prepare for action. I, however, entered into conversation with them,
6 See Bancroft p. 181. and finding who they were, was satisfied as to their friendship for us. They had leather bags, full of gold nuggets, which they offered to me in exchange for goods."
This gold he took at eleven dollars an ounce in trade.
In 1849 the first independent party of colonists, that is, those other than Hudson's Bay Company servants, arrived in the colony and it will be necessary to discuss a little the prospects for settlement under the crown grant made to the Company by the British Government.
The Hudson's Bay Company and Colonization.
We have noted the inherent and fundamental opposition of the trader and the farmer in these Indian lands newly opened to the white man. The Hudson's Bay Company officials apparently saw that permanent settlement was bound to come throughout the northwest as it had done in the Willamette Valley, and yet they resisted it as long as they could. If colonization had to go forward, it should be, if they could compass it, just as slowly as they might think best for their interests. They offered to take over from the British Government the whole of the territory now comprising British Columbia (the mainland was then called New Albion) and administer it for settlement. Interest in emigration was keen in England at the time on account of the distress everywhere prevalent (Chartism reached a crisis it will be remembered in 1848), and the government did not dare to grant this even if it had wished to. The Company graciously consented to entertain the idea of restricting their plan to the island, but this offer was opposed from two quarters when the government seemed to favor it. Radical members like Roebuck attacked the scheme on the ground that it gave too much to a great monopoly at the expense of settlers; even Mr. Gladstone opposed it. Another attack from a somewhat different quarter was that of men like James Edward Fitzgerald who had colonization schemes of their own, conceived in a more generous spirit.
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Lieutenant Adam D. Dundas of the Royal Navy, who had spent two years on the Northwest Coast, in a confidential report to the British Government, advised strongly against the grant. 7 . He considered the island "highly favorable for the es- tablishment of a colony" but had "no hesitation in saying that their [the Company's] system would be wholly and totally inapplicable to the nursing of a young colony". However, Sir J. H. Pelly, the Governor of the Company in England, by means not difficult to conjecture, had more power with the Government than all his opponents combined. The matter was debated in the House of Commons and the members of the administration were bombarded with hostile letters but all to small purpose. In 1849 the Crown granted the whole of Van- couver Island to the great Company on condition that it should be opened up for settlement.
"The grant is embodied in a charter, which .... grants the land of Vancouver's Island with all mines to the Company. The condition of the grant is declared to be the colonization of the island. With this object the Company are bound to dispose of the land in question at a reasonable price, and to expend all the sums they may receive for land or mineral (after the deduction of not more than ten per cent for profit) on the colonization of the island, reserving also to the Crown at a reasonable price such land as may be required for naval establish- ments.
"The manner in which these provisions are intended to be enforced is this. The Company are to certify every two years the number of colonists and the amount of their land sold; and after five years Her Majesty's Gov- ernment has power to cause a farther enquiry to be made into the condition of the island. If the result of this enquiry be that the Government is satisfied that the con- ditions of the grant are not fulfilled, the grant may be revoked.
"When the Company's license to trade terminates, i. e., in 1859, Government may repurchase the land on payment of the sums expended by the Company on the island and the value of their establishments." 8
7 Report of the Provincial Archives Department of the Province of British Columbia, 1913, p. 49.
8 Ibid, p. 71.
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Much depended, of course, on the terms upon which land could be procured. These terms were not stipulated in the charter, but were approved by the British Minister for the Colonies. The price was one pound per acre and no lot was to be less than twenty acres. If large tracts of land were taken, the price was the same, and the purchaser undertook to take out with him five single men or three married couples for every hundred acres. All minerals were to remain in the pos- session of the Company but the owner of the land might work coal by paying a royalty of two shillings and six pence per ton. While it was true that the American settler had to provide for his own public improvement and was without the parental guidance of his government, the terms upon which he could procure land touch the farthest limits of generosity compared with these. The British settler by declaring intention to natur- alize might have given to him in the Oregon Country 320 acres without any irksome restrictions and conditions, and if he were married 640 acres would be donated to him. It is clear enough that the Company had determined to control, if they could not prevent, colonization.
Attempts at settlement were made, notably by Captain Grant at Sooke, who took out a party from Great Britain, but the most successful settlers were ex-servants of the Company. They had experience and were more or less used to the ways of the Company.
Victoria was made the political capital by the establish- ment of a government in Jo5Q wifli Blancnard as first governor. There was misunderstanding over the terms of his appoint- ment, and the following year he returned to England, being succeeded bT^ameFT3ou^bs. Jhc : chief tiudson^s Bay otticer oTthe Northwest. "Until! 859 Douglas continued to hold both positions, thus completing control of the monopoly over all the affairs of the colony. All land must be purchased from the monopolizers; they alone had the supplies needed by the settler; they alone provided a market for his product; prices in buying and selling were fixed by them. A petition signed
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by fifteen men and presented to Governor Blanchard when it was known that he had decided to resign, after protesting against the appointment of James Douglas, asked for the crea- tion of a council. The signers evidently had no idea of being able to prevent Douglas' appointment, but thought they might modify the autocracy. The council was formed, but it could scarcely alter the basic facts of the situation. This state of things lasted until 1859 when the reign of the Hudson's Bay Company came to an end. Thegoldj^,shJa.lhe Fraser River and the Cariboo country
^*^^^^i*i^^
completely changed Victoria, giving to it the metropolitan character which it still retains. After the mainland and the island united under one colonial government in 1866 the. city became the^pHtical_capital and so remains.
EFFECT OF THE GOLD RUSH.
The discovery of gold, beginning in 1856, brought great changes to the colony, altering its character and leading- up to the end of the Hudson's Bay Company's regime. The city of Victoria became a base for mine operations, and rapidly -in- creased in size. The chief diggings, which were on the main- land, were reached by ship from Victoria to New Westminster, Fort Hope, or Fort Yale on the Fraser River. The big rush began in 1858, drawing many Americans from Washington, Oregon, and California. The population became predominantly American, both in Victoria and in the mines. Governor Doug- las assumed responsibility for the government of the new region while he was still filling the double role of head of the Government of Vancouver Island and chief factor of the Hud- son's Bay Company. Very soon national jealousies expressed themselves in the regulations about claims and conditions gen- erally at the diggins, while the Company showed a disposition to exact from the miners for transportation all the traffic would bear. This was after it became evident that the move- ment had assumed considerable proportions. In the early days
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the gold seekers found their way from Victoria in canoes, or by whatever better means could be secured. The irruption of these outsiders into his peaceful domain seems to have been unwelcome to the governor. At all events it presented un- wonted problems and raised anxious questions. In the first stages of the movement, as early as May 8, 1858, Douglas wrote in an anxious strain to the Colonial Office in London describing disturbed conditions and voicing fears. 9 Intense excitement, we are told, prevailed even as far south as San Francisco. "Boats, canoes, and every species of small craft, are continually employed in pouring their cargoes of human beings into Eraser's River." The men seemed to be well pro- vided with tools, capital, and intelligence. They had been rep- resented as specimens of the worst population, "the very dregs, in fact, of society." The Governor candidly admits, however : "Their conduct while here would have led me to form a very different conclusion; as our little town, though crowded to excess with this sudden influx of people, and though there was a temporary scarcity of food, and dearth of house accommodation, the police few in number, and many temptations to excess in the way of drink, yet quiet and order prevailed, and there was not a single committal for rioting, drunkenness, or other offences, during their stay here."
Remarkable enough, all must agree. But after all, should these foreigners be welcomed ?
"Taking a view of the subject, simply in its relation to trade and commerce, apart from considerations of na- tional policy, such perhaj>s would be the course most likely to promote the interests of this colony ; but, on the contrary, if the country be thrown open to indiscriminate immigration the interests of the Empire may suffer from the introduction of a foreign population, whose sym- pathies may be decidedly anti-British. Taking that view of the question it assumes an alarming aspect, and suggests a doubt as to the policy of permitting the free entrance of foreigners into British territory for residence without in the first place requiring them to take the oath of allegiance, and otherwise to give such security for their conduct as
9 Copies of Extracts of Correspondence relative to the Discovery of Gold in the Prater's River Distritt in British NortH America. Presented to Parliament July 2, 1858, by the Government. (Copy consulted at the Provincial Archives at Vic- toria, B. C.)
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the Government of the country may deem it proper and necessary to require at their hands."
London had not so much reason to fear the Americans as had Victoria, and the British Government was quite explicit in expressing its sentiments when it sent a dispatch to Douglas through the distinguished Colonial Secretary, Sir. E. Bulwer Lytton. Douglas was commended for his vigilance, and was promised the help he might need for maintaining order and preserving national rights. However:
"It is no part of their [Her Majesty's Government's] policy to exclude Americans and other foreigners from the gold fields. On the contrary, you are distinctly in- structed to oppose no obstacle whatever to their resort thither for the purposes of digging in those fields, so long as they submit themselves, in common with the sub- jects of Her Majesty, to the recognition of Her author- ity, and conform to such rules of police as you may have thought proper to establish."
Remembering that the Governor was still the chief officer of the Hudson's Bay Company's Victoria post and therefore had what might be called the "Company" attitude toward im- migration and the still unsettled claims to the islands in the Gulf of Georgia, we may attach considerable significance to the fact that Sir E. Bulwer Lytton finds it necessary to include in the instructions the following wise injunction:
"Under the circumstances of so large an immigration of Americans into English territory, I need hardly im- press upon you the importance of caution and delicacy in dealing with those manifold cases of international re- lationships and feeling which are certain to arise, and which but for the exercise of temper and discretion might easily lead to serious complications between two neigh- boring and powerful states."
The tide of immigration was too strong to stem; moreover the attempt to stem it was prohibited by express injunction. But the Company still had its trading monopoly and pro- ceeded to exploit, when it was no longer feasible to exclude, the immigrants. (It may be said by the way that the Com
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pany's affairs in the Northwest were investigated by a House of Commons Committee in 1857 and 1858, and, on the recom- mendation made, the monopoly was not renewed when it ex- pired in 1859. This was the result of great opposition both in British Columbia and in England.) Complaints were loud and powerful enough to reach Washington, causing the United States Government to send a special agent to the seat of the trouble. Mr. John Nugent, Special Agent of the United States, was in Victoria and vicinity during October and November, 1858; he presented his report in January, 1859. 10
The grievances of the Americans were sufficiently Sjerious toTiaye been made the subject of conversations withthc iBrit- ish representative. Repeated assurances" of Lord Napier, the British Minister at Washington, had aroused the hope that the heavy exactions would be lightened if the request were presented in specific detail. The Special Agent was to pro- cure first-hand information; also to do what was possible to lessen the friction between the citizens of the two powers. The report states:
"The chief purpose of the special agency intrusted to me I understand to be, to infuse among the citizens of the United States, temporarily resident in the vicinity of Eraser River, a spirit of subordination to the colonial authorities, and of respect for the laws of Great Britain, and, at the same time, by such representations to the Governor of Vancouver Island as circumstances would suggest, to en- deavor to obtain from the functionary the abrogation of the rigorous systems of exactions theretofore pursued, and the adoption for the future of such a policy toward Americans as would not be inconsistent with their right as the citizens of a friendly power, and would, further- more, tend to promote among them feelings of kindness and good will towards the government and the subjects of Great Britain. Some such intervention by the United States was deemed necessary, for the reason that much exasperation was alleged to exist among those of our citizens, then making their way to the Eraser River mines, against the servants of the Hudson's Bay Company and
10 Ex. Doc. No. Ill, 35th Cong. 2nd Sess.
180 ANDREW FISH
the authorities of Vancouver's Island, in consequence of the onerous exactions to which they were said to have been subjected by those officials."
Interesting information is given in the report about condi- tions in general. It is estimated that somewhere between thirty and thirty-three thousand went into the gold region, most of them during the three months of May, June and July of 1858. Those who came first had to use canoes, skiffs, whale-boats and the like, because American ships were excluded from the river and no other transportation was available. Many lost their lives with the destruction of their crazy craft. Presently Mr. Douglas, "Governor of Vancouver's Island and chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company," issued permits to Americans to navigate the river on payment of a fee for each trip. He reserved the right to withdraw permission when he saw fit, which would be, of course, when British vessels were available for the traffic. As the license was issued in the name of the Hudson's Bay Company, Mr. Nugent urges that this was illegal.
"Great Britain had the right to exclude our steamers from the waters of Eraser River, but if Great Britain did not choose to assert that right, how could the Hudson's Bay Company's servants claim to make conditions with our people, and charge toll for the privilege of entering? Admitting that they had the right of exclusive trade with the Indians, that did not give them control of the naviga- tion of the river."
The situation was somewhat Gilbertian ; perhaps Mr. Doug- las-as-Governor generously gave Mr. Douglas-as-Factor the benefit of any doubt there might have been on the subject. At all events while the two offices were combined in one person there was no effective legal check on the actions of the Com- pany. Lawful or otherwise, it made agreements with the steamships of great advantage to itself. Only "Company" goods were to be carried, or such goods as it might permit to be carried ; freight rates for "Company" goods were fixed at about half the rate paid by other traders; no passengers
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 181
might be taken unless they had taken out a mining license costing five dollars per month; two dollars head-money must be paid to the Company for each passenger ; all vessels should be owned and commanded by British subjects. The require- ment as to nationality was a dead letter; it was probably in- cluded so that it might be used if it should serve the purpose of the Company to enforce it. The provision requiring all passengers to have a mining license was particularly irksome, as many used the boats who did not intend to mine. In addi- tion to these charges the Port Collector took twelve dollars a trip for the necessary sufferance. Evasion was not easy, for a ship under command of a lieutenant of the British navy was stationed at the mouth of the river to enforce pay- ment. No distinction was made here between "Company" and government taxes.
"If the passengers were so unfortunate as not to have means to pay mining license, head-money, and sufferance tax, their watches, pistols, knives, or other personal ef- fects were held in pledge for payment. In the absence of such personal effects, bags of flour, beans and coffee, hams, and other provisions were retained, and I have been assured that the deck of the brig was covered with those articles." 11
It is pleasant to note that the disagreeable duty was not carried out in a harsh spirit. Mr. Nugent tells us:
"It is but just to add that the officers immediately charged with the performance of this unpleasant service acted with all gentleness and humanity compatible with their orders, and that they endeavored, by every means in their power, to mitigate the rigor of these amerce- ments."
There remained another impost ; to license fee. head-tax, and sufferance tax was added an import duty of ten per cent. Did this go to the government or to the Company? In answer- ing this question it must be remembered that there was no organized government of the mainland of British North Amer- ica other than that exercised by the Company as an incidental accompaniment of its trading operations. As the Company
182 ANDREW FISH
was not in a position to undertake the more complicated task of government under gold-rush conditions, Mr. Douglas, as Governor of Vancouver's Island, took it upon him to assume responsibility pending instructions from his home govern- ment. There was, of course, no legislating body for the terri- tory in which the mines were located, and it might seem not unnatural for the Governor to impose a duty on imports on his own responsibility. But did Mr. Douglas collect the tax in his capacity as governor or in his capacity as factor? Mr. Nugent reports that the Company collected through its financial agent, Mr. Finlayson, "and not by the collector of the port." In support of his statement that the Company were the bene- ficiaries, he offers a copy of a permit to enter certain goods for the United States Boundary Commission free of duty. It was signed by Finlayson of the Hudson's Bay Company.
An interpretation of the trading rights of the Company as giving power to levy import duties would not have been so easy to the Governor perhaps, if he had not been so inti- mately related to the Factor. On the face of it, this seems to have been an unusually extreme case of nepotism ! Power of office was not merely kept in the family, but under the same hat. That feelings between the Americans and the British were strained is not to be wondered at when the almost omni- potent Company represented Great Britain.
It was not only in levying taxes that the power of the Com- pany was made oppressive; it was charged that government officials, and even the justices, were unduly swayed by national prejudice. Under the peculiar conditions prevailing, much responsibility rested on officers of the government acting at a distance from the capital. It was charged that Americans, after having spent much money in obtaining a necessary flow of water for mining operations, were unjustly deprived of their water rights in favor of some concern in which the official had been given an interest. At the outlying posts of the Company very often the only persons capable of administering law were
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 183
the servants of the Company, and it must have been exasperat- ing to a foreigner not too welcome to begin with, and with a chronic grievance against the well-nigh almighty monopoly, to find himself assailed by someone who was not only an official of the Company but a magistrate into the bargain. What hope of justice was there? Furthermore, at Victoria, whose popu- lation at this time was overwhelmingly American, only those of British nationality could plead in the courts. Now there was a sad dearth of English lawyers, but a good supply of American. They might do all for a client short of conduct- ing the case in court, but into the sacred precincts they might not come at least to function professionally.
There were more serious charges than those concerning heavy taxes, corruption of officers, and denial of civil rights charges involving relations with the Indians. The Indians of the territory were generally warlike. The nature of the Com- pany's business led the officers of the Company to make friends of the natives, for there could be no trade without confidence. The traders were successful in establishing that confidence, and, without doubt, became very skilful in managing their savage neighbors. There is much to admire in the way these British pioneers treated the Indians. The methods were the result of a shrewd blend of sternness and kindness. Good feeling must be preserved, or there would be an end to the supply of furs, and, a still more serious matter, life would be in jeopardy every hour. The "big stick" was always within reach, how- ever, in the form of strict punishment, according to the law. for all infringements, with a strict search for offenders no matter what trouble it involved. Or it might be in the form of a demonstration of the power of the white man's weapons, as in the case in which a few shots from the cannon on the fort at Victoria destroyed a number of Indian huts from which the women and children (the men being at the fort) had been carefully removed. This demonstration was immensely im- pressive. By such methods "Company" servants had real
184 ANDREW FISH
influence with the Indians, and the Indians gave those servants respect and confidence, mingled though it was with fear.
At least the native was at peace with the British as he was not with the Americans. The settler was after his land; he knew it was to the interest of the cultivator to crowd him out of his hunting-grounds, and if in the process it meant his extermination he felt instinctively that these land-hungry farmers would not stop short. To these American home- makers the Indian was a natural enemy ; "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." Right or wrong, the spirit between the native and the Americans could never be the same as that between the native and the British. Hostility was inherent in the situation, however much it might be mitigated by such feelings of humanity as managed to survive in that atmosphere, or however softened by the influence of the missionaries. Un- like the servants of the Company the American farmers were on terms of more or less constant enmity with the uncivilized native.
This difference in attitude made it more difficult then ever for Americans and British to understand each other ; to the British the Americans seemed cruel and bloodthirsty, while to the Americans it looked as if the British were sometimes un- naturally neutral in the deadly feud between the red men and themselves. There were occasions when Americans were glad to have the protection of the Company, generously extended. At other times much needed supplies of ammunition were forth- coming from fellow whites for which the Americans were duly grateful. But it is alleged in Mr. Nugent's report, on the basis of testimony offered to him by military officers and others, that the Company was purchasing American equipment cap- tured by the Indians, thus providing a market for stolen goods, and also that it was selling firearms and ammunition to the Indians at a time when these were more than likely to be used against the Americans. 11 Again, it is stated that "Company" agents went so far as to incite the redskins against the Amer-
11 Ex. Doc. No. Ill, 35th Cong. 2 Sess. p. 8.
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icans by misrepresenting the motives with which the Americans came into 1 the gold region. Says the report :
"Among the Hudson's Bay Company's people, there are some gentlemen of high character and respectability. Mr. McKay, Mr. McTavish, Mr. McLean, and the agent at Fort Ylale, whose name I forget, have exhibited marked courtesy and kindness towards Americans ; but that my strictures upon the generality of the subordinate officers, to whom they were intended to apply, were not too severe will be admitted, when I state on the authority of Colonel Snowden, a citizen of Yuba county, in California, that he learned from several Indian chiefs, that they and their people were led to believe by the representations of the Hudson's Bay Company's servants, that the Americans were coming there to rob them of their cattle, of their food, and their squaws, and were advised by those same evil-minded individuals to commence a war of extermination against our citizens." 12
On the competency of Colonel Snowden as a witness I cannot pass judgment, nor on that of the Indians quoted; consequently, I cannot say how much this evidence may be worth. So grave a charge can only be admitted on the most conclusive evidence. The most convincing thing about it is that it states the logic of the situation, though it is to be hoped that there was no actual incitement. Past question, however, the opposed views regarding the Indian made understanding on this subject between the two white peoples almost impossible. It will be seen from what has been said that the quarrel with the Americans was against the Hudson's Bay Company much more than against the British people. My last quota- tion from Mr. Nugent's interesting document will be on this point.
"From all these petty exactions and oppressions, these denials of justice and evidences of rampant preju- dice, the conclusion is irresistible that whatever may have been the disposition of the British Government, the feel- ing of the Colonial officials and of the servants of the Hudson's Bay Company was aught but friendly toward our people ... I would here remark that from the
12 Ibid. p. 14.
186 ANDREW FISH
officers of the navy stationed near Victoria, and from the English gentlemen residing on Vancouver's Island, the Americans received naught but courtesy, kindness and at- tention, from first to last ; and by none have I heard the acts of the Hudson's Bay Company's servants more strong- ly censured than by subjects of Great Britain who have long resided on the island, and who are cognizant of the many abuses practiced by the Company and its agents."
The British people had small cause to take the Company's side; they had their own serious grievances against it.
It has seemed necessary to dwell upon these things in order to understand the highly charged atmosphere in wJhich the dispute over San Juan in 1859 almost brought about serious bloodshed.
SAN JUAN ISLAND
I have already said that the long boundary dispute over the Oregon country was settled in 1846 by a treaty which con- tinued the boundary along the forty-ninth parallel "to the middle of the channel which separated the continent from Van- couver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel, and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific Ocean." But "the channel which separates the continent from Van- couver's Island" (the Gulf of Georgia) is studded with islands, through which there is more than one navigable passage. Two played prominent parts in the dispute : the Canal de Haro, the most westerly, running for the most part along the coast of Vancouver's Island ; and theJRiosario Strait, the most easterly, running between the islands and the mainland. The important point was that if the Canal de Haro were the boundary the islands would be American, and if the line ran through Rosario Strait they would be British. The_islands involved were San Juan. Orcas, Lopez, Waldron, Blakely, Decatuy, Snaw, and some smaller ones ; in all an area of about one hundred and seventy square miles. 13 San Juan, the most considerable, con-
13 British Columbia by F. H. Howay and E. O. G. Scholefield. p. 301.
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tained about 50,000 acres and was supposed to be of great
>trati-LjiV importance.
"It is fourteen miles long by four and a half in width. Its superficial area is fifty-four square miles ; it is eighteen miles from Victoria; the capital of Columbia, and is six and three-quarter miles from the shore of Vancouver Island," says an official Canadian report of 1872. 14
The Indians had it to themselves until 1850 when the Hud- son's Bay Company established a salmon-packing plant. In 1852 the Oregon Legislature, assuming that the intention of the Treaty of 1846 had been merely to assure to Great Britain Vancouver's Island and that the islands in the channel were American territories, included San Juan in Island County, and the following year it became part of the newly-formed Washington Territory. Subsequently, in 1854, it was included in Whatcom County. It was in 1&53 tha{ {he first steps were taken toward actual occupation \yhen from the British" side tlk- learner " Heaver" laiulcd a I'ock i thirteen Inni'lm! -beep t'>r the Hudson's Hay Company. 15 The accepted version on the American side was that this was done in order to establish a settlement claim to support British diplomacy in the conten- tion over possession not a preposterous assumption. Mr. J. M. Ebey, Collector of Customs for the Puget Sound at this time, in fulfillment of the duties of his office, warned Governor- and-Factor Douglas that the sheep were liable to seizure for having been landed without payment of duty. In reply Doug- las declared that the island was British territory, and forthwith appointed Mr. Charles J. Griffin, the clerk in charge of the sheep, as magistrate. Having no force at his disposal, Ebey could only protest against this and arrange for an account to be kept of all goods so that duty might be demanded at some more favorable time. Mr. Webber was appointed inspector of customs and left on the island. Now, Captain Sangster was collector of customs for Vancouver Island and, by the same
14 Report of the Hon H. L. Langevin, C. I!.. Minister of Public Works, Ottawa, 1872.
15 For the story of the San Juan Controversy see H. H. Bancroft's "History of British Columbia" 1792-1887, Chap. 31. Also Howay and Scholefield's Hritisk Columbia, Chaps. 5 and 6.
188 ANDREW FISH
token, for its dependency San Juan, if the British claim could be made good. He obtained a warrant against Webber for calling himself a custom-house officer, and proceeded to serve it. Webber resisted and threatened "to shoot the first man who interfered with him in the possession of his rightful liberty, saying, first, that he had committed no crime; and, secondly, that he was on American soil, and would not recognize their right to issue any process against him." 16 The incident closed without the arrest being effected. Webber kept the warrant as evidence and stayed on the island for a year when he was forced to leave by hostile Indians. It is illustrative of the attitude of the Indians that Webber found safety at the Hud- son's Bay house on several occasions.
"He (Mr. Webber) was succeeded in office by Oscar
Olney, who left from the same reason after a few months,
and he in turn by the present inspector, Paul K. Hubbs,
Jr., all of whom have, at different times, been compelled,
temporarily, to avail themselves of the protection of Mr.
Griffin, the Hudson's Bay Company's agent, and which, in
justice to him, I must say was always freely accorded." 17
The reason why the Americans had not settled on this island,
so desirable agriculturally, was that the natives from the north
were wont periodically to make raids.
Being part of Whatcom County, Washington Territory, San Juan was, of course, assessed for taxes in 1854. In conse- quence of non-payment by the Company, the sheriff, Ellis Barnes, seized some sheep (over thirty of them) and sold them to the highest bidder. This was a challenge Douglas could scarcely evade, even if he wished to, and he wrote on the 26th of April, 1855, as Governor of Vancouver Island to Governor Stevens of Washington Territory 18 complaining in somewhat legal phraseology that there had been demanded from
"Mr. Charles Griffin, a British subject," by "an armed party of American citizens ostensibly acting under the direction of a person named Barnes, who styles himself Sheriff of Whatcomb County . . . certain monies in payment of Taxes, on behalf and in the name of the United
16 Ex, Doc. No. 77, 36th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
17 Ibid. p. 3.
18 See Douglas' letter and Stevens' reply in the Washington Historical Quar- terly. Vol. 2, ps. 352-3.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 189
States of America, a demand which as a British subject, acknowledging no authority except that emanating from his own government . . . refuses to pay." We may infer that the incident was not without some passion when we read further :
"Mr. Barnes and his followers during Mr. Griffin's ab- sence, and while his servants were, with one or two excep- tions, dispersed at their several occupations did abstract a number of valuable sheep, which they put into boats, and were about to depart with the same when Mr. Griffin returned and demanding restitution of his property was menaced with violence and put in danger of his life." Mr. Douglas thinks it would be a great injustice to assume that the authority 'to levy Taxes on British subjects residing on the Island of San Juan" had been given by Governor Ste- vens ; it would "prove an ungracious requital for the kindness with which you generously vindicated, at Washington, the cause of truth and justice when a groundless charge was brought against the character of this Government." He hopes the Governor will prevent such acts in the future as they "must ultimately lead to dissension and bloodshed." He claims sov- ereignity for Great Britain :
"The Island of San Juan has been in the possession of British subjects for many years, and it is with the other Islands of the Archipelago de Arro declared to be within the Jurisdiction, of this colony, and under the protection of British Laws. I have also the orders of Her Majesty's Ministers to treat those Islands as part of the British Dominions." Nevertheless there seemed to be some doubt, for he adds :
"Wisdom and sound policy enjoin upon us the part of leaving the question to the decision of the Supreme Gov- ernments, and of abstaining from enforcing rights, which neither party is disposed to acknowledge." Dissension would "be productive of the most serious evils," as "both countries will suffer from the absence of that whole- some control which now holds the native Indian Tribes in check." Despite the claim to absolute sovereignty he proceeds :
190 ANDREW FISH
"This Government will be responsible for the acts of British Subjects and punish all offences committed by such on the Arro Islands, and I trust your Excellency is disposed to exer- cise the same vigorous control in that quarter over the conduct of citizens of the United States."
It is to be remarked that the Hudson's Bay Company is not once mentioned in this letter. Mr. Griffin, the aggrieved Brit- ish subject, however, was Mr. Douglas' subordinate in the employ of that Company, and the property seized belonged to the Company and not to Mr. Griffin. It was apparently con- sidered easier to appeal on behalf of a certain British citizen named Griffin than on behalf of a Company already, rightly or wrongly, in bad odour. "The Island of San Juan has been in the possession of British Subjects for many years," pleads the Governor-Factor. In actual possession not so very many after all. It was only on the 13th of December, 1853, that the sheep were landed, an event which represents the first actual settlement, and the letter was written on April 26, 1855, about sixteen months after. It is not known that any use whatever was made of the island before 1850, when the Company began to use it for a few weeks, or perhaps a few months, during the year. On the matter of sovereignty the instructions were quite clear. In September, 1854, presumably after the Sankster- Webber incident already related, Douglas received the follow- ing direct from the Foreign Office in London :
"In conveying to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of your proceedings with respect to the sov- ereignty of the Islands in the Canal de Arro, I have to authorize you to continue to treat these Islands as part of the British Dominions." 19
It did not go through the Colonial Office which would have been the more usual route. Is it a possible explanation that the Hudson's Bay Company in London had more influence at the Foreign Office than at the Colonial Office ?
The reply of Governor Stevens left no room for doubt as to his attitude. San Juan was United States territory, and the
19 Hudson's Bay Company correspondencne. Copy consulted at the British Columbia Archives, Victoria. B. C
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 191
sheriff had acted according to the general laws relating to the
duties of his office. "The ownership remains now as it did
at the execution of the treaty of June 15, 1846, and can in no
wise be affected by the alleged possession of British subjects."
After some arguments in support of his position he concludes:
"I shall take the earliest opportunity to send a copy of
your communication and of this reply to the secretary of
state of the United States, and in the meantime I have to
reciprocate most earnestly your hope that nothing may
occur to interrupt the harmony and good feeling which
should characterize the relations of neighboring states."
Tn nforrjflgr thp mfflpj to Washington, Governor Stevens
made_it an international question. The Com
cidmg to make it a question of diplomacy, presented a claim
for nearly $15,000 ( 2.'XX)-13s ) to the State Department
through the British Minister. The upshot was that Mr. W. L.
Marey. the Secretary of State, wrote to Stevens on July 14,
1855, and to the British Minister, Mr. John F. Crompton,
on July 17, defining the position as it was then understood.
As this point in the history of the question is important (it is
the point at which is fixed the status that was disturbed about
four years later as I shall relate), the communications had
better be given rather fully. To Governor Stevens Mr. Marcy
said:
"He (President Franklin Pierce) has instructed me to say to you that the officers of the Territory should abstain from all acts on the disputed grounds which are calcu- lated to provoke any conflicts, so far as it can be done without implying the concession to the authority of Great Britain of an exclusive right over the premises.
"The title ought to be settled before either party should exclude the other by force, or exercise complete and ex- clusive sovereign rights within the fairly disputed limits. Application will be made to the British government to interpose with the local authorities on the northern bor- ders of our territory to abstain from like acts of exclusive ownership, with the explicit understanding that any for- bearance on either side to assert the rights, respectively,
192 ANDREW FISH
shall not be construed into any concession to the adverse party.
"By a conciliatory and moderate course on both sides, it is sincerely hoped that all difficulties will be avoided until an adjustment of the boundary line can be made in a manner mutually satisfactory. The government of the United States will do what it can to have the line estab- lished at an early period." 20 The note to Mr. Crompton said :
"I am under some apprehension that collision may take place between our citizens and British subjects in regard to the occupation of the disputed points along- the line between Washington Territory and the British possessions on the north of it.
"In the hope of avoiding such a difficulty, I have, by the direction of the President, addressed a letter to the gover- nor of that Territory on the subject, and herewith furnish you with an extract from it. I presume that the govern- ment of her Britannic Majesty will be willing to recom- mend to her subjects along the boundary in question a similar course until the line can be established. In that way I sincerely hope all collision may be avoided." 21
That Governor Douglas was advised is evident from his. ref- erence to the subject in writing to General W. S. Harney on August 13, 1859. He says :
"With reference to San Juan, in particular, I have al- ways acted with the utmost caution to prevent, so far as might lie in my power, any ill feeling arising from collis- ions between British subjects and American citizens, and have in that respect cordially endeavored to carry out the views of the United States government as expressed in a despatch from Mr. Marcy, dated 17 July, 1855, to Her Majesty's minister at Washington, a copy of which I here- with enclose for your information, as I presume that the document cannot be in your pos'session." 22 It would seem, then, as if no trouble could possibly arise. Clear and unmistakable instructions are issued (and apparently accepted in all good faith) to the responsible officials of both
20 Ex. Doc. No. 65, 36th Cong. 1st Scss. p. 6.
21 Ibid, p. 7.
22 Ibid, p. 40,
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nations. Steps were taken in August, 1856 to determine \ finally the boundary when an act was passed appointing a com- I missioner and a surveyor to serve with the British commission. I Archibald Campbell was the commissioner, and Lieutenant John G. Parke was chief astronomer and surveyor. The Brit- ish commissioners were Captain James C. Prevost, R. N. and Captain Henry Richards R. D. Campbell and Parke joined their colleages at Victoria on June 22, 1857. Pending the final disposition, the inspector of customs took account of goods landed, and the county continued to assess for taxes. The ar- rangement looked about as trouble-proof as it could be made, but we are to see how, in spite of it, trouble did occur.
THE CRISIS OF 1859. 1. GENERAL HARNEY'S VIGOROUS ACTION.
\Yithout warning to the British authorities. Captain George Pickett (in a few years to achieve fame at Gettysburg) com- manding Company I). (| th Infantry, landed with hi-, men <".: San Juan July 27, 1859, and the fat was in the- fire. In occupying the island in this way he was acting under orders fronTGeneral W. S. Harney, who, in October,
up the command of the new Department of Oregon. General Harney's military experience had been mainly that of sup- pressing Indians ; he came to Oregon from Utah where he had shown great prowess in this type of warfare. Acting As- sistant Adjutant Pleasanton, in transmitting the General's orders to the Captain, stated the reasons for the step :
"The General commanding instructs me to say the object to be attained in placing you thus is two-fold, viz.: First. To protect the inhabitants of the island from the incursions of the northern Indians of British Columbia and the Russian possessions . . . Secondly. Another serious and important duty will devolve upon you in the occupation of San Juan Island, arising from the conflict- ing interests of the American citizens and the Hudson's
194 ANDREW FISH
Bay Company establishment at that point. This duty is to afford adequate protection to the American citizens in their rights as such, and to resist all attempts at inter- ference by the British authorities residing on Vancouver's Island, by intimidation or force, in the controversies of the above-mentioned parties."
A sufficiently uncompromising order. "Resist" no limit stated "all attempts at interference" no exceptions apparent- ly contemplated.
The gallant captain was as thorough-going as his com- mander, and caused the following unequivocal order to be posted by Second Lieutenant James W. Forsyth, his post adjutant:
"1st. In compliance with orders and instructions from the commanding general, a military post will be estab- lished on this island, on whatever site the commanding officer may select; 2nd. All the inhabitants of the island are requested to report at once to the commanding officer in case of any incursion by the northern Indians, so that he may take such steps as he may deem necessary to pre- vent any further occurrence of the same ; 3rd. This being United States territory, no laws other than those of the United States, nor courts except such as are held by virtue of said laws will be recognized or allowed on this island. By order of Captain Pickett." 23
In a despatch dated August 6 General Harney supported Captain Pickett in this attitude and said expressly:
"The general approves the course you have pursued, and further directs that no joint occupation or any civil juris- diction will be permitted on San Juan Island by the British authorities under any circumstances." 24
To state it mildly, this was not the language of 1855 ; it brought about a new situation.
Some events that took place in 1859 and before, leading up to Pickett's action, should be related.
The commissioners met with difficulties that delayed the work of determining the line, while the Americans wishing to settle on San Juan were getting more and more impatient. We said that the labors of the commission began in 1857. The
23 I quote from H. H. Bancroft's History of British Columbia 1792-1887, p. 618.
24 Ex. Doc. No. 65, 36th Cong. 1st Scss. p. 23.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 195
following year saw the gold-rush, which had so momentous an effect. One result was that disappointed miners drifted back to Victoria and eventually over to the American side in search of new opportunities. Many of these men were Amer- ican, but in any case the land policy of the Hudson's Bay Company made settlement in British territory almost impos- sible. The attractions of San Juan were stronger than fear of Indians""and doubt of status, and a number oTuiereturning miners squatty according to the Company, pre-empted ac- cordfog- to the Americans, on thf island.^ The extent of occupation can be judged from a report by Mr. Henry R. Crosbie, an American magistrate who took part in some of the proceedings connected with the dispute. On May 20, 1859, the Company had
"4,500 sheep, 40 head of cattle, five yoke of oxen, 35 horses, and 40 hogs on the island . . . with about 80 acres fenced and under cultivation, sowed principally with oats, peas, and potatoes. There were attached to the Hudson's Bay Company station, besides Mr. Griffin, eighteen servants, three only of whom were white, and those three were naturalized American citizens, and exer- cised their rights as such at the territorial election held on the second Monday in July last, at which time there were twenty-nine actual settlers on the island." 26 The Hudson's Bay men were a motley crew, some of them South Sea Islanders.
Among the American settlers was Lyman A. Cutler, an- other "embattled farmer," who, as I shall tell, "fired the shot heard" throughout the North Pacific Coast region, the echoes of which were heard far off. In a sworn statement Cutler relates that in April of 1859 "he located on one hundred and sixty acres of land, agreeably to the pre-emption law." This, of course, was presuming that the sovereignty would be awarded to the United States. If San Juan eventually went to Great Britain, accounts as to title would have to be settled with the Hudson's Bay Company or with the Government of British Columbia; and the prospect could hardly be satisfac-
a$ See narrative of Charles McKay in the Washington Historical Quarterly Vol. 2, pp. 290- .203.
26 Ex. Doc. No. 77, 36th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
196 ANDREW FISH
.tory for the farmer. Cutler put in some potatoes, and, as supplies had mostly to be procured from Victoria by row- boat, they had more than ordinary value. Not far off was the Company's establishment, with its accompaniment of live- stock roaming pretty much at large. One of jfche^ hogs r having done some damage to the potatoes, was shot by Cutler. His explanation was that he did it under an impulse of irritation. In any case he went to Mr. Griffin (the Company's agent) and offered to pay any reasonable sum that might be asked. Mr. Griffin angrily demanded one hundred dollars which Cutler would not pay. That same day, "Mr. Dallas, one of the directors of the Hudson's Bay Company," and two other gentlemen, along with Mr. Griffin, came to Cutler's house (their visit had nothing to do with the pig incident originally), and after some verbal wrangling,
"Mr. Dallas . . . stated this was British soil, and if he, Cutler did not make the reparation demanded one hundred dollars he would take him to Victoria; their steamer [the Hudson's Bay Company's steamer Beaver] was in port, and they had a posse at their command." The deposition says farther that "their manner and lan- guage were both insulting and threatening." 27 This incident affords the reason for the occupation so far as it (the occupation) does not refer to defence against the Indians. A somewhat different account of it is given by other witnesses.
Apparently as the result of this encounter a magistrate was appointed 1>y the I British authorities to reside on the island. Mr. John K. DC Courcy was commissioned Justice of the Peace, and took up his duties almost at the exact time at which Pickett landed his forces. In considering the question of who was responsible for disturbing the status of 1855, it would be well to note that the instructions issued to Mr. De Courcy by the Colonial Secretary for Vancouver Island, Mr. William A. G. Young, were dated July 27 the day of Pickett's landing. The policy outlined was determined, and the instructions issued,
27 Cutler's deposition is given in Ex. Doc. No. 65, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 53.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 197
before the occupation was known in Victoria. Said Colonial Secretary Young:
"The Island of San Juan having been, and being still, considered and treated as part of Her Majesty's Domin- ions, you will warn off all persons who may attempt to assert any rights of occupation as against the British Dominion in the Island of Juan." 28 The good Justice might "warn off" but he was told:
"You must in particular be most careful to avoid giving any occasion that might lead to acts of violence." 29 On July 4, 1859, the Americans on the island celebrated Independence Day according to custom. As an important part of the proceedings the Stars and Stripes were hoisted, and the flag remained for several days, so that when General Harney visited San Juan on July 9, on a tour of inspection, it was still flying. The occasion of the visit was fully improved by the settlers in stating their case to the General, both with respect to the Indians and to the Company. As to the In- dians, Mr. Crosbie says 30 that the American settlers had peti- tioned as early as May for protection. They asked General Harney
"to give them a small force, say a detachment of twenty men, something that would give them a feeling of se- curity, as continued apprehension was equally as bad as actual danger: it had prevented the settlement of San Juan and the adjoining isolated islands for years." Murders were being committed, and instead of the occa- sional visitation of troops the farmers asked for permanent protection, their idea being, "Say a small detachment of twenty men." On July 18 General Harney ordered Captain Pickett to land with his company of sixty men, and Colonel Casey to be ready nearby with another company in the steamer "Mas- sachusetts." The General ordered that in the selection of a position Captain Pickett was to "take into consideration that future contingencies may require an establishment of from four to six companies retaining the command of San Juan harbor." It is not likely that he was thinking of Indians when he wrote
28 British Admiralty dispatch**. Copies consulted at British Columbia Archive*. Victoria, B. C
39 Ibid.
30 Ex. Doc. No. 77, 36th Cong., lit Sera. p. 4.
198 ANDREW FISH
that. Governor Douglas displayed the expected belligerency and eventually four hundred and sixty-one soldiers landed with howitzers and fifty tons of ammunition. The story of the disembarkation of the re-inforcements under Colonel Casey almost beneath the noses of the British ships of war is an exciting one. It will be noted that the American occupa- tion was purely military, whereas the British attempt had been civil in character. It happened, however, that a magistrate of Whatcom County, Mr. Henry R. Crosbie, paid a visit to San Juan on July 29, as he says,
"finding there was an English official claiming to be the civil authority of the island, I remained as such [that is as magistrate] on the part of the United States."
From that point, then, the American occupation was both military and civil, with the military predominating.
2. GOVERNOR DOUGLAS' BELLIGERENT RESPONSE.
The agent of the Company, Mr. Griffin, on Pickett's land- ing, protested that the island was the property of Hudson's Bay Company, and that if the occupation on the part of Pickett did not cease he would "feel bound to apply to the civil authorities." The Captain replied that he was there by order of his government and would "remain till recalled by the same authority." On the following day reinforcements began to move from Steilacoom.
By July 29th the great news had reached Victoria. The excitement was intense. Douglas called on the Senior Naval Officer of Vancouver Island, Captain Michael De Courcy, "in the name of the Queen" to assist him in this crisis. "I beg," he says, "you will immediately despatch a powerful vessel of war to San Juan, and instruct the officer in command to pre- vent the landing of any further armed parties of United States soldiers for purposes of occupation, and also the erection of
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 199
fortifications of any description by the party already on the island." In a further note he explained that the civil power would deal with the party already landed; that power would if necessary call "upon all subjects of Her Majesty, civil, military, or naval, to render him assistance as may enable him to carry out the law." Not yet satisfied that all had been done that was necessary, on the 30th he requested that "another powerful vessel of war" be sent, "so as happily by the show of an overwhelming force to prevent the probability of any resistance being shown to the actions of the law, and the consequent prospect of bloodshed."
Ships began to arrive. On the 30th Captain Pickett did not feel comfortable, "lying within range of a couple of war steamers." The "Tribune" was a thirty-gun frigate and lay broadside to the camp. On August 3 he reports to the Gen- eral that "the British ships the 'Tribune', the 'Plumper* and the 'Satellite' are lying here in a menacing attitude." But the guns were silent. Pickett stated the case correctly: "They have a force so much superior to mine that it will be merely a mouthful for them." Yet, despite the orders of the Gov- ernor, no advantage was taken of the superiority of power even when fortifications were erected and reinforcement^ were landed. Captain_ De Courcy ^ffl a moderating influence on
the bellicose I ><>u-la- : lie ur-ed that the riidit to the i>1;md was
-till in dispute, and declared that he
"considered it highly essential to do everything possible to prevent a collision with the United States forces, and not disturb the amicable relations existing between the two countries, more particularly at the present time, when it was not improbable that Great Britain might be in- volved in the war raging in Europe." It will be recalled that this was the time of the Italian war
of liberation from Austria.
It was to be expected that the British authorities would
issue some such proclamation as that of Governor Douglas
dated August 2, in which he "formally and solemnly" pro
200 ANDREW FISH
tested against the occupation, and declared that the sovereign- ty of the island "now is and always has been, in Her Magesty Queen Victoria and her predecessors, Kings of Great Britain." This pronouncement is purely formal, and harmless enough; it only makes clear that the long-standing claim is not to be considered prejudiced by the circumstances of the new situa- tion. On August 3 in his message to the Legislative Council and House of Assembly of the Colony of Vancouver's Island the Governor quite properly harked back to the note of Mr. Marcy written in 1855, and declared he could only conclude that, the commission not yet having completed its work, that General Harney was acting without authority from his gov- ernment. Quite in the spirit of Mr. Marcy the Governor says:
"Convinced that any assumption, on either side, of exclusive right to the disputed territory would simply be a fruitless and mischievous waste of energy, neither de- tracting from nor adding to the claims of either nation, wise and considerate policy enjoins upon us the part of leaving so important a national question for settlement by the proper authorities, and of avoiding complications foreign to the views and wishes of and probably embar- rassing to both governments."
The tone of this does not harmonize with that of the instruc- tions to, and conversation with, the naval authorities, and even this moderate message promises that the detachment of royal engineers and royal marine light infantry ordered from New Westminster by her Majesty's ship "Plumper" will be landed at San Juan "to protect the lives and property of British subjects."
There was great activity on August 3 at San Juan. Cap- tain Hornby of the "Tribune" requested by letter that Captain Pickett would confer with him on the ship, but for some rea- son or other the request was refused. Captain Pickett had no objection to meeting Captain Hornby at the camp, how- ever, and Captain Hornby seemingly did not consider his
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 201
dignity in jeopardy by making the visit. Captain Hornby thought joint military occupation would equalize the positions of the re.spective powers, and offered this plan. General Harney subsequently_refused it, and on the same day, August 6, sent a reply to Douglas' proclamation in which a somewhat garbled account of the alleged attempted arrest of an American citizen is made the reason for the occupation. Nothing about Indians this time. The letter makes one thing clear ^tlje.jjen- p ral k not agriiy gp special orders from his government.
"As military commander of the departmenTof Oregon, assigned to that command by the orders of the President of the United States, I have the honor to state, for your information, that by such authority invested in me I placed a military command upon the island of San Juan to protect the American citizens residing on that island from the insults and indignities which the British au- thorities of Vancouver's Island and the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company recently offered them." Leaving nothing to chance, the next day the General sent a request for a ship to the Senior Naval Officer on the Pacific, at San Francisco. On the day following that, Colonel Casey was authorized to reinforce with four companies of soldiers.
THE ADVENT OF ADMIRAL BAYNES.
About this time there arrived on the scene a bluff and hearty old salt in the person of Rea r- Adm iral JR^ L._Baynes, Commander in Chief of the British naval forces in the Pacific. who supplied the necessary common sense. He refused to go
^ ^ ^MfeMMkMl^ggy^^MMAMMMM^AbAMftAMHMi^HMMi W^MBM^M^0M0Mfl"^^VBHbM
to war over the shooting of a [n^. When told <>f Douglas orders he exploded with "Tut, tut ! no, no ! the damned fools !" 31 I do not know how the authority was distributed between Douglas and Baynes ; the Admiral avoids the tone of positive authority in addressing Douglas. He was for avoiding a clash, feeling that the ultimate question of 8ftYt"**8Tl1iYi a ****** 8 11 ' could^be settled only by the two governments. He told the Governor Tfiat he did not think that the United States officers
202 ANDREW FISH
would "molest, or allow to be molested, the few British sub- jects on the island," and continues in this strain :
"Wherever your Excellency may, from circumstances, feel yourself called on to take active measures on the point in question, I trust they may be such as I can cordially concur in. I feel confident that a joint military occupation would complicate the boundary question still more, by evils that would result from it. I will therefore conclude by trusting that your Excellency has modified your views on this subject, as it would be painful to me in the extreme to find that I could not act in accordance with your views."
This was written the day after an excited debate in the House of Assembly, during which it had been angrily de- manded :
"Why were the troops not landed according to prom- ise?" The Speaker of the House complained:
"His Excellency sends troops and ships. Why all this expense and show, if for parade? Why were not the troops landed? Instead of fighting, her Majesty's Cap- tains take to diplomacy . . . They should have land- ed their troops and avoided all degrading negotiations. But more troops have landed, in spite of post captains and admirals. Yes, a militia must be raised. We must defend ourselves, for the position we occupy today would make the iron statue of Wellington weep, and the strong statue of Nelson bend his brow." 32
But the breezy old Admiral did not see it that way; four days after the outburst in the House, and three days after his diplomatic rebuke of Douglas, he wrote very positively to Captain Hornby. "It is now my positive order," he said, "that you do not on any account whatever take the initiative in commencing hostilities by firing on them, or on any work they may have thrown up." 33 This "plain, little, big-hearted,~un- assuming, lowland Scotchman, lame, but full of salt and fresh fun" 34 brought cool sea breezes into the super-heated atmo- sphere. Through him actual hostilities were definitely pre- vented.
31 See the Angus McDonald Memoirs printed in the Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 8, p. 195.
32 British Colonist, Victoria, August 17th, 1859.
33 Admiralty Dispatches.
34 Angus McDonald, Chief Trader at Fort Colville 1852-1872. See Washing- ton Histortcal Quarterly, Vol. 8, p. 195.
LAST PHASE -OF OREGON BOUNDARY 203
On the American tide Coloney Casey displayed a more mocleratfr spirit than his general, or than Captain Pickett. In reporting to General Winfield Scott, General Harney related the story of Pickett's adventures in a way that shows the Gen- eral's turn for heroics:
"The senior officer of three ships-of-war threatened to land an overpowering force upon Captain Pickett, who nobly replied that whether they landed fifty or five thou- sand men, his conduct would not be affected by it; that he would open his fire, and, if compelled, take to the woods fighting." 35
Though brave and capable, Colonel Casey does not seem to have had the lust for martyrdomThe sought rather to reach an agreement uith tin- foe. lie vi-ite<l tin- har!>. >r of F.M|uimalt on August ll and there tried to come face to face with Admiral Baynes for conference. Only what seems to the layman an unimportant point of etiquette prevented Baynes would not go to Casey on the "Shubrick," nor would Casey go to Baynes on the "Ganges." General Harney expressed regrets that this visit had been made, and pushed along war-like preparations, taking up the matter of war supplies with Governor Gholson of Washington Territory.
WASHINGTON INTERVENES AND SCOTT ARRIVES.
British sanity bore u[<n the filiation from the threat -pare- of the Pacific; American wisdom came from the east. When despatches from the west reached Washington, negotiations had reached the point where Lord Lyons i British Minister) was proposing the middle passage as a compromise. The news of the occupation was a shock. Acting Secretary of War Drinkanl wrote to Ilarney: "The President was not prepared to learn that you had ordered military possession to be taken of the Island of San Juan." If Harney had reason to think that the British authorities were about to disturb status, then he was right to anticipate them. The President was especially anxious to know if he had consulted with Commissioner Camp-
35 Ex. Doc. No. 65, 36th Cong., 1st SMS., p. 28.
204 ANDREW FISH
bell before acting. (He had not done so.) It should be made clear to the British authorities that the action was not an attempt to pre- judge the question of sovereignty.
It was decided that Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, Commander-in-Chief, be sent "to assume the immediate com- mand, if necessary, of the United States forces on the Pacific Coast." This act in itself showed that the issues involved were very important ; also that the government was not satis- fied that Harney was equal to the occasion. The attitude of Washington was correct in every particular, and the instruc- tions given Scott show a wide difference between the view of Harney and that of the President. Much, of course, must be left to the discretion of Scott as he would have much fuller knowledge when on the spot than the government could possibly have.
I "His (the President's) main object is to preserve the I peace and prevent collision between the British and Amer-
- ican authorities on the island until the question of title
can be adjusted by the two governments . . . The President perceives no objection to the plan proposed by Captain Hornby, of her Majesty's ship "Tribune," to Captain Pickett; it being understood that Captain Pick- ett's company shall remain on the island to resist, if need be, the incursions of northern Indians on our frontier set- tlements, and to afford protection to American residents thereon." 36 (It will be recalled that Hornby's proposal was to institute a joint military occupation. This had been refused by Harney.)
If hostilities should have broken out before Scott arrived? "In that event, it would still be your duty, if this can, in your opinion, be honorably done, under the surround- ing circumstances, to establish a temporary joint occupa- tion of the island, giving to neither party any advantage over the other. It would be a shocking event if the two nations should be precipitated into a war respecting the possession of a small island, and that only for the brief period during which the two governments may be peace- fully employed in settling the question to which of them the island belongs."
..' r i? ~ r T <
36 Ibid, p. 27.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 205
But if the British, because of their superiority of available resources, shall have actually seized San Juan? This was looked at as a possible but not a probable event ; but
"if we must be forced into a war by the violence of the British authorities, which is not anticipated, we shall abide the issue as best we may without apprehension as to the result." 37
Thanks to Admiral Baynes f no blood had been abed, and General Scott had no urinus t rni1 Mfi ffl
pose. Joint military occupation was in due course proposed to Governor Douglas, but the Governor countered with a plan to withdraw the soldiers and have joint civil occupation. The menace of Indians seemed sufficient reason to General Scott for maintaining some forces on the island, and Douglas, after the General had refused civil occupation, submitted the sug- gestion of joint military occupation to his government. On November 3 Douglas wrote to Scott :
"Should you, sir, after the explanations I have herein
given in reference to my official powers and position, pro-
ceed to carry out your pacific mission, and divest the
large military force now on San Juan of its menacing
attitude by removing it from the island, we will instantly
withdraw the British naval force now maintained there;
and as soon as I receive the instructions of my govern-
ment, I shall be glad to co-operate with you in arrang-
ing a plan for the temporary maintenance of order and
protection of life and property upon the island."
A positive assurance was given that nothing should be done
by British authority to prejudice the status established by the
Marcy correspondence of 1855. For his part Scott issued
orders immediately for the evacuation of the island, except-
ing that one company under Captain Hunt should remain.
Pickett was not to stay. Hunt was given copies of the cor-
respondence so that he would understand
"the spirit in which it is expected you will execute the delicate and important trust confided to you, the general having full confidence in your intelligence, discretion, and
~37IWd.
206 ANDREW FISH
(in what is of equal importance in this case) your court- esies." 38 (The italics are the General's.) Subsequently, the plan outlined to Douglas by Scott in his "project of a temporary settlement" was accepted by the British Government. In March, 1860, a force of Royal Marines under Captain (ieor^v Ilazalgette, equal to the American force. was stationed on San Juan; the two forces, at opposite ends of the island, carrying out_ their duties until final settlement in 1871, in perfect friendliness.
GENERALS SCOTT AND HARNEY.
The responsibility for the crisis, so far as the American side is concerned, rested squarely with Harnev; Pickett was sup- ported in all he did by his general; Harney acted without orders from Washington. We have seen that he was not
supported at general headquarters ; General Scott in large measure reversed his (Hartley's) policy. Further evidence of disapproval is given by the suggestion of Scott that Harney should accept a transfer to St. Louis. Scott expected that the British would ask for Harney's removal and told Harney so, suggesting that in such a case it would be a relief 'to the President if Harney were no longer in that command. A con- ditional order to report at St. Louis was sent by Scott, but it was left to Harney to decide for himself whether he should take advantage of it. Said Scott : "If you decline the order, and I give you leave to decline it, please throw it into the fire." Harney elected to stay where he was; he could not believe that there could be any embarrassment to the Presi- dent in this, nor could he "suppose the President would be pleased to see [him] relinquish [the] command." After Scott left for the east, Pickett was re-instated in his command and Harney issued orders in connection with his duties that could scarcely be harmonized with General Scott's instructions. This led to his recall to Washington, where a reprimand was ad- ministered by the Secretary of War not a severe reprimand,
38 Ibid, p. 76.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 207
/as the Secretary had regard for his "known high character
- and distinguished services," and Pickett was again removed.
There were, unfortunately, other subjects in dispute be- tween these two officers, and something like a quarrel ensued. Late in 1859 or early in 1860 Scott wrote very strongly to the Adjutant-General. He said:
"In dismissing this most nauseating subject [court- marshalling of an officer for alleged insubordination], I beg permission to add, that the highest obligations of my station compel me to suggest a doubt whether it be safe in respect to our foreign relations, or just to the gallant officers and men in the Oregon Department, to leave them longer, at so great a distance, subject to the ignorance, and caprice of the present head-quarters of that depart- ment." 39
It was not until June, 1860, however, that the recall was issued. The sympathy of the people in Washington Territory was strongly with Harney, as is shown by resolution passed by the legislature.
WHO WAS TO BLAME/*
The rebuke to Geneql Harney seems to have been de- served. Both sides, of course, wCTe^Emmng title, but the
real status was that neither government was to take action implying sole sovereignty until the Commission issued its findings. On the basis of the Hudson's Bay pig affair Iferpqy seized the territory and proclaimed through Pickett that "no laws other than those of the United States, nor courts except such as are held by virtue of said laws, will be recognized or allowed on this island." He
he consult with GammisMOncrjIaiPpbell. Pickett evidently felt the weakness of his case wnen, as he plainly says, he "en- deavored to impress them [the three British captains] with the idea that [his] authority [came] directly through [Har- ney] from Washington." In the same communication we have this:
39 Ex. Doc. No. 65, 3fitii Cong., lit Sf. pp. 190-1.
208 ANDREW FISH
"I must add that they [the captains] seem to doubt the authority of the general commanding, and do not wish to acknowledge his right to occupy this island, which they say is in dispute, unless the United States govern- ment have decided the question with Great Britain. I have so far staved them off, by saying that the two gov- ernments have without doubt settled this affair; but this state of affairs cannot last, therefore I most respectfully ask that an express be sent me immediately on my future guidance." 40
This shows at least that Pickett was uneasy; there is no evidence that Harney was.
Commissioner Campbell was surprised at the occupation. That Pickett should land troops seemed to him natural enough it had been done before when Indians threatened, but that 1'icket t should refuse to allow liritish forces to land for the protection of their nationals was strange. He saw Pickett's confidential instructions and wrote to Harney that he could only suppose it "possible, if not probable" that he had received instructions from the War Department for the occupation of the island. Not having heard from the State Department him- self, however, he felt "considerably troubled lest there might be some misunderstanding." He advised "caution; so 'as to prevent if possible any collision, which," he thought "under no circumstances ought to be allowed to occur." He expressed a fear that Harney's action might "somewhat embarrass the question," and declared, "I shall be greatly relieved to learn that you have some authority from the government for the decisive step you have taken." 41 Inferentially, then, Campbell blames Harney, for there was no "authority from the gov- ernment for the decisive step." In his explanation to the commissioner Harney declared that the relative claims of the two governments were not in any way affected by his action. "The British authorities chose to violate treaty stipulations made in good faith, and maintained by the United States in good faith, by attempting to arrest an American citizen on San Juan Island to carry him to Victoria to be tried by British
40 Ibid, p. 17.
41 Ibid, p. 59.
LAST PHASE OF OREGON BOUNDARY 209
laws. To prevent a repetition of this outrage, until the gov- ernment of the United States could be apprised of it, I have placed troops on the island, with such orders as I have deemed necessary to effect this object." To the Adjutant General at Washington he made the somewhat indefinite statement that he "disclaimed any intention of asserting any sovereignty over the island of San Juan, beyond that which the necessity of the case had demanded." 42 Ambiguous as this is I decline the task of harmonizing it with the proclamation of Pickett. That proclamation was the establishment of a complete Amer- ican sovereignty or words are meaningless. But did Great Britain violate the treaty as Harney alleges? That would make some difference, certainly.
The gravamen of the charge against the British authorities was that they attempted to arrest an American citizen and take him to Victoria for trial tinder British laws for an of- fense committed against a British subject. The offense was not denied (indeed, the offender, perhaps needlessly, avowed Tils'" deed) a Hudson's Bay Company's hog was shot but the incident of the alleged attempted arrest is variously de- scribed. Harney did not get his story straight. As explained to Douglas the soldiers were ordered to San Juan
"to protect the American citizens residing on that island from the insults and indignities which the British au- thorities of Vancouver's Island, and the establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company recently offered them, by sending a British ship-of-war from Vancouver's Island to convey the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company to San Juan for the purpose of seizing an American citizen and forcibly transporting him to Vancouver's Island to be tried by British laws.' 43
This inaccurate account gave Douglas a fine opportunity to deny the charge. That Harney was reflecting the popular feeling in identifying the Company with the government there can be no doubt, nor can it be doubted that there was some justification. It was not, however, technically correct, and Douglas, could point out that the Company's officers had no
42 Ibid, p. 38.
43 Ibid, p. 22.
210 ANDREW FISH
more rights than had other British citizens. By this time Douglas' connection with the Company was at an end, though the severance was very recent. His resignation of all official connection with, and interest in, the Company had been de- manded by the British Government as a condition of the appointment as Governor of British Columbia toward the end of 1858. The Governor emphatically says :
"To the reported outrage on an American citizen I beg to give the most unhesitating and unqualified denial. None of her Majesty's ships have ever been sent to convey the chief factor or any other officer of the Hudson's Bay Company to San Juan for the purpose of seizing an American citizen, nor has any attempt ever been made to seize an American citizen and to transport him forcibly to Vancouver's Island for trial."
Of course not; Mr. Dallas, who was accused of the attempt to arrest, was not chief factor but a director of the Company, and President of Council in North America; he did not go in a war-ship but in the Company's trading-steamer; he did not go for the purpose of seizing anybody, he happened to be there at the time; nor did he attempt to forcibly transport Cutler, for, as Cutler himself deposes, he was only threat- ened. Mr. Dallas denied even the threatening, and gave a different account of some of the other details of the affair. "No demand of $100, or any other sum of money, was made upon him [Cutler], nor did I threaten to apprehend him, or take him to Victoria. On the contrary, I stated distinctly that I was a private individual, and could not interfere with him. I have fortunately three unimpeachable witnesses to prove this." 44
Among the contradictory statements we have to find suf- ficient evidence to warrant Harney seizing the island if he can be warranted at all. He was demonstrably at fault in his account of some parts ; other parts are in doubt through con- flict of evidence. Beyond cavil the culprit was not actually arrested and no force was used upon him, even if we concede
44 The British Colonist, June 7th, 1860. that he was threatened. Harper's reaction was to send 461 soldiers and several field-guns to take exclusive possession—a steam-hammer to kill a gnat. The truth seems to be that Harney took die prevailing hostile view of the Hudson's Bay Company (a view that was in a large measure shared by the British residents on Vancouver Island) and allowed himself to take stronger action than his instructions permitted. On the other hand, Douglas, but recently chief-factor for the Company at Victoria and apparently still willing to support the Company's aggressive policies, studiously refrained from committing acts that were technically wrong. He sent a magistrate to the island before Pickett landed, as the result of the pig-shooting, but the limit of the commission was "to warn off all persons who may attempt to assert any rights of occupancy as against the British Dominion." Specifically the justice was to be "most careful to avoid giving any occasion that might lead to acts of violence." This is far short of sole occupation by force of arms, and in any case Harney knew nothing of this commission when he issued orders to Pickett. After the seizure, Douglas was ready to fight; he ordered the naval force to respond to the call for help when the call should come from the civil authorities. Furthermore, the orders were explicit that the Americans were to be prevented from landing more troops.
This was war, and so it was understood at the time. Duncan George Forbes Macdonald, surveyor with the British boundary commission then on the spot, writing in 1862 declares:
{{left margin|4em|{{fine|"In this San Juan affair, let the people of England never forget how nearly we were thrown into all the horrors of war, at a time when the States were not, as now, disunited and helpless, by the intemperate policy of His Excellency Governor Douglas, who is Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Colony of British Columbia and its dependencies. But for the arrival of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Baynes, K.C.B., at the eleventh hour, war with America was certain. This I know, having been upon the island when His Excellency's commands were received. The good old Admiral and the captains of his fleet boldly refused to adopt a course which would have created a rupture between England and America. These noble upholders of the British Flag contemplated with true feeling the awful effect of the boom of cannon and the roll of musketry. To the chivalry and forbearance, therefore, of these wise and valiant men the two kindred nations owe much indeed. It would be an unpardonable omission were I not to make special mention of Captain Hornby, of the "Tribune," who, although under the most positive instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to declare war at once, took upon himself the responsibility of delaying the execution until the arrival of the Admiral, who was daily expected."[3]}}}}
For additional evidence I quote from Angus McDonald who has already been referred to. McDonald as Chief-factor at Fort Colville for the Hudson's Bay Company would not naturally be suspected of bias against Douglas. He writes:
"Although Governor Douglas and Colonel Hawkins, the British commissioner, were rather in favor of a war, the lucky arrival of Admiral Baynes muzzled their designs in a council of war held at Victoria, where he told the Governor that if ordered to attack the American camp on San Juan he would refuse doing it, and he hooted the idea of raising a war with America for such nonsense, it having as reported been started by a personal quarrel over a Hudson's Bay Company's pig."[4]
The Admiral seems to have shared in a measure the popular British opinion of the Company. Captain Hornby, writing to his wife on December 4, 1859, says:
"I hear that the Governor has got much praise in England for keeping peace with the Yankees. That is rather good, when one knows that he would hear of nothing but shooting them all at first and that peace was only preserved by my not complying with his wishes, as I felt he was all in the wrong from the start."[5]
This evidence is hardly impeachable. To Baynes, Douglas urged that he had "clear and definite instructions" from his government "to treat the islands in the Haro Archipelago as part of the British Dominion"; but, as Baynes pointed out
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in a despatch to the Admiralty, American squatters had been permitted to locate themselves without being warned off, also an American deputy collector of customs. 48 The only instruc- tions I have found were those issued before the Marcy cor- respondence of 1855, and these could hardly be appealed to with fairness. On the evidence, then, Harney would seem to hayjejheen technically atJauIt. but Pouglas must take his snare
of^the hn^-hf!} of Mame. Harney disturbed the status with- V out sufficient^cause, but Douglas would have brought about
blood-hoi over a teihnical 1 -reach that could ea-ily have been settled 1>y di[>li -nucy. and wa- so -ettled when wiser men than
rJouglas restrainedTum. We have seen that the aggressiveness
and greed of the Hudson's Bay Company had much to do with producing the state of mind in which the Americans of the region were prepared to take arms if necessary in support of Harney. The honors for preventing bloodshed should be shared among the British naval officers, cabinet officers at Washington and General Win field Scott. The General seems to have been amused by the heroics of his subordinates of the Oregon department. 49
PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S ATTITUDE.
This San Juan seizure was looked upon as a very serious affair by President Buchanan, even though his administration was harrassed by domestic dissensions as serious as any that ever tortured this country. In correspondence with Lord Clarendon (whom he had known in London), among other matters, the action of Harney was referred to. 50 Lord Clar- endon wrote :
"This affair at San Juan, tho' more serious than the one at Nicaragua, is of a similar character. The over- zeal (which Talleyrand so much deprecated) and the over-slowness and the over-desire to make political cap- ital without reflecting on the consequences, of employes. have caused difficulties which put the firmness and good faith of both governments to the test. I am much mis-
48 Admiralty Dispatches.
49 See his Memoirs, or note in Moore: Internatnional Arbitrations, p. 222.
50 See Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 10.
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taken if you did not learn the proceedings of General Harney with as much regret as Lord Malmesbury did those of Sir W. Ouseley [in the Nicaragua business]. Lord M. disowned his Plenipotentiary, and you seem to have taken the best course open to you under the circum- stances by sending General Scott to supersede General Harney at least I hope I am not wrong in so inter- preting the object of the mission with which he is charged."
His Lordship is quite sure that the claim of Great Britain is sound, but thinks that above all things a collision should be prevented so that a calm judgment might be rendered.
"John Bull's usual habit," he says, "is to take things quietly, but his dander has been roused by the high- handed proceedings of General Harney more than I ever remember upon occasions of the kind, and this miserable business might be productive of the most disastrous con- sequences. May God of His infinite mercy avert from us all the responsibility and guilt of such disasters." The President's answering letter did not discuss Harney, but urged that his (the President's) action in sending Gen- eral Scott must have satisfied even Lord John Russell.
Lord John, the British Foreign Minister at the time, had sent a disquieting despatch to Lord Lyons at Washington ; it was this that was disturbing President Buchanan. We must come back to this dispatch shortly, when we shall understand the President's perturbation. Should Lord John act upon the principle he had enunciated and take possession by force, "I say with you," declared the President, "May God of his in- finite mercy avert from us all the responsibility and guilt of such disasters !" He was sadly disappointed at the turn events had taken for, as he said, he "had earnestly hoped to settle all the dangerous questions between the two countries during [his] presidential term." "This was," he said, "one of the prime objects of my ambition but I now find it impossible." He fears that the influence of the leaders of the Hudson's Bay Company "has been and will be exerted, not in favor of peace but of war." "It worries me to think that after a two years' sue
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cessful trial to unite the people of the two countries in the bonds of kindred and intimate friendship, all my labor may prove to have been in vain." He is sorry to notice from the date of Lord John's dispatch that it could not have been in- spired by the knowledge of Harney's conduct.
The third annual message of the President, delivered on December 15, 1859, was taken up to the extent of about one- tenth by San Juan. Competing for attention were many other questions, some of which have assumed a greater place in our history. The message deals among other matters with "recent sad and bloody occurrences at Harper's Ferry," the Supreme Court decision which established the right of every citizen "to take his property of any kind, including slaves, into the com- mon territories belonging equally to all states of the con- federacy," the execution of laws against the African slave trade, and the necessity of a Pacific railway. Not much is said about Harney. It was not the proper time to discuss "the weight which ought to be attached to the statements of the British colonial authorities, contesting the accuracy of the information^ on which the gallant general acted," but it was due to him that his own reasons should be presented. The admiral is praised because "he wisely and discreetly forbore to commit any hostile act." There can be no doubt of the validity of the American title, and in the meantime American citizens will be "placed on a footing at least as favorable as that of British subjects," and a company of soldiers will remain to protect their interests.
We may now leave the discussion of this dangerous crisis, thankful that it was passed without more serious and regret- table consequences. It ended with the agreement to establish joint military occupation. From 1860 until after the final award of the arbitrator in 1871 an equal number of American soldiers and British marines camped on the island, maintain- ing friendly relations throughout the whole time.
216 ANDREW FISH
LATER STAGES OF THE DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE."
The dispatch from Lord John Russell to the British Am- bassador which distressed President Buchanan so much was dated August 24, 1859, and contained the following offending passage :
"Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, under any circumstances, maintain the right of the British crown to the Island of San Juan. The interests at stake in con- nection with the retention of that island are too import- ant to admit of compromise, and your Lordship will, consequently, bear in mind that whatever arrangement as to the boundary line is finally arrived at, no settlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty's Gov- ernment which does not provide for the Island of San Juan being reserved to the British Crown." 52 The interests at stake were those of defence ; it was sup- posed that the island was of very great strategic value. This view was held by both Britons and Americans. This aspect of the matter was not an unimportant one at that time, how- ever it may look now, but for Lord John Russell to say that "no settlement would be accepted which did not provide for the island being reserved to the British Crown" was surely to pre- judge the case and to utter sentiments contrary to the spirit of the Marcy correspondence. We have seen how it upset the President. He complained :
"We all believed that the line ran through the Canal de Arro. Under this impression you may judge of our astonishment when we found that Lord John, in his first diplomatic note, gives us fair notice that Great Britain never will surrender the subject-dispute. He waits not to hear what can be said on this side of the water in support of our title, but informs us in effect that he had pre- judged the case."
The main outline of the dispute may be recalled. The commissioners were disputing over the interpretation of the treaty of 1846 the British claimed the Archipelago on the
51 I am indebted to Moore's International Arbitrations for much of the in- formation used in this section.
52 Quoted by Alexander Begg in his History of Britsh Columbia, p. 244.
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ground that the Rosario channel was the one intended by the Treaty ; the Americans, on the ground that the Canal de Arro (or Haro) was intended. The British ca^e rested on the wording of the treaty Inn this wording \va~ ambiguous. The channel should have three characfenstTcs to meet tfie terms of the treaty contended the commission: (1) it should sep- arate the continent from Vancouver's Island; (2) it should admit of the boundary line being carried through it in a south- erly direction ; (3) it should be a navigable channel. The Haro channel, while it was with difficulty navigable, did not separate from the continent as it was already separated by another channel, and it made it necessary to run the boundary line west before it could run south. This is about as near to verbal quibbling as makes no difference. The. American commissioner maintained that the Haro strait should be the boundary because it was the widest, deepest, and largest vol- ume of water and was the one usually marked on the maps at the time of the treaty. As it washed the shores of Van- couver Island it was the only one that could be said to sep- arate the continent from the island. The word "southerly" was not used in its strict sense but as opposed to northerly. The general intention to make Haro the line was shown by the report of Mr. McLane, who conducted the negotiations, to Mr. Buchanan, then at the state office; also by the fact that this report was submitted to the Senate along with the treaty. Furthermore, Senator Benton's speech made it clear how the treaty was generally understood. When the Rosario channel had first been mentioned by Mr. Crampton (British Minister) it was not asserted that it was the channel intended but merely that it had been surveyed and used and "it seemed natural to suppose that that was the one intended." Moreover, the Haro channel had also been surveyed and used by Spain and by the United States.
The British commissioner^ had^ secret instructions to com- promise on the middle passage, and in his dispatch
218 ANDREW FISH
Russell definitely authorized Lord Lvooa to negotiate on this
basis. The central channel would fit the language of the treaty, and it would be a useful compromise as to the islands, leaving only one important island to Great Britain San Juan This offer was made in a spirit of accommodation it was pointed out; the British government would not acknowledge that its claim to the Rosario straits was not valid.
The offer was refused and the commission, having done what it could, and being still unable to agree on interpreta- tion, adjourned proceedings in 1867. The Civil War had intervened and San Juan had been pushed into the background by considerations of much greater moment. Much more serious differences had arisen between the two governments that over the "Alabama" being the most thorny. Other sub- jects of dispute were naturalization, fisheries, and reciprocity with Canada. A convention was signed on January 14, 1869, by Mr. Reverdy Johnson and Lord Clarendon by which it was agreed to submit the case to the arbitration of the Presi- dent of Switzerland. However, in 1871, the matter was still unsettled and among other questions was submitted to the Joint High Commission between the United States and Great Britain. Again the old offers were made, again without suc- cess. Britain then proposed arbitration. The United States agreed to this if the arbitrator was to be instructed to deter- mine whether the boundary should go through the Rosario or Haro straits, and refused to accept the proposal that he should have the right to compromise on some other channel. The acceptance of this limitation was a distinct diplomatic victory for the United States and was probably decisive in getting a favorable award later. The German Emperor, fresh from thrilling scenes in Paris, was chosen arbitrator. He was to determine "finally and without appeal which of those claims is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the Treaty of June 15, 1846." Fortunately for the United States her representative at Berlin was pre-eminently fitted to conduct
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her case. George Bancroft, the historian, had been a member of Folk's cabinet when the Oregon Question was one of the liveliest political issues ; he had also been the American repre- sentative in London. He was an expert on the subject in dis- pute ; his knowledge of American history was vast. In Berlin he was to win a final diplomatic victory, and clear from the slate the last vestige of dispute about the Northwestern bound- ary. In charge of Britain's interest was the same Admiral James C. Prevost, who, as Captain, had acted as boundary commissioner.
It seems reasonable to snppoae that when the Treaty of 1846 was drafted neither government had one particular chan- nel in mind, probably for lade of knowledge of the geography of the region^ Maps <Bd not agree ; Vancouver's chart (prob-
alily used by the 1'ritMi government ' bad the Tana! de A IT-' marked but he himself used the Rosario strait. The strength of the American_aJiowever L jro8^i_tfae_ge^yal intention as shown in the negotiations, and the general sense in which it was understood at the time of the acceptance of tlk- treaty. fn the discussion preliminary to the treaty Buchanan (then Secretary of State) offered to make free to Great Britain any port or ports she might desire south of parallel forty- nine on Vancouver Island, if that line should be accepted. Great Britain stood out for free navigation of the Columbia and Buchanan withdrew his offer. A little later Pakenham (for Great Britain) urged parallel forty-nine or the arbitra- tion of "some friendly sovereign or state." This was refused, and the matter hung fire. A few months passed and in Febru- ary, 1846, Buchanan let McLane (who was acting in London for the United States) know that from the temper of the Senate he judged that parallel forty-nine would be accepted. McLane talked to Lord Aberdeen who agreed to submit a proposal through Pakenham. Fresh from his conversation with Aberdeen, McLane reported to the State Office that tie proposal would likely be to divide at parallel forty-nine to
220 ANDREW FISH
the Canal de Haro and the Straits of Fuca. President Polk, writing on the very day the draft was presented, observed to McLane :
"Neither does it provide that the line shall pass through the Canal de Arro, as stated in your dispatch. This would probably be a fair construction." A week later Buchanan used these words :
"Thence along the middle of this channel and the Strait of Fuca, so as to render the whole of that island to Great Britain." The island, of course, was Vancouver.
To permit Great Britain to retain the whole of Vancouver
Island was in fact the only reason for deflecting the line at all from parallel forty-nine. Senator Benton in the Senate definitely mentioned the Haro Channel, showing clearly how he understood the arrangement. Aberdeen in his instructions to Pakenham did not, it is true, mention any definite channel, but he said nothing about any islands except that of Vancouver "thus giving us the whole of Vancouver's Island and its harbors." The same general understanding on the part of Sir Robert Peel is plain enough "but that the middle of the channel shall be the future boundary, thus leaving us in pos- session of the whole of Vancouver's Island, with equal rights to navigation of the straits." Nevertheless, the Canal de Haro is not "the middle of the channel" constituted by the Gulf of Georgia. From something that happened, George Bancroft when minister of London, got suspicious that there might be difficulties of interpretation and asked for some charts to be sent to him charts which he had caused to be prepared when he was at the Navy Department. Benton had said that the islands were of no value, but Bancroft knew better. He (Blancroft) asked permission to claim the Haro Strait if a dispute arose; Buchanan, however, thought it im- probable that Great Britain would seriously make a claim for anything east of the Haro Channel. Bancroft thought this was true of the ministry but said he had reason to think that
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the Hudson's Bay Company wished to get some of the islands in the gulf. It was in 1847 that Bancroft wrote this ; in 1850 the Hudson's Bay Company began salmon-packing operations on San Juan. By 1848 Lord Palmerston in London and Mr. Crampton in Washington were asking for charts and sug- gesting that the boundary depended first of. all on interpreta- tion of the treaty rather than on a survey. Mr. Crampton said that only one channel seemed to have been surveyed that used by Vancouver. If this construction was accepted then the channel near the mainland would be the boundary, giving the only important island to the United States Whidby. The other islands, it was said, were of little or no value. But nothing was done about it.
Then followed events already related incorporation of San Juan into Washington Territory, the trouble over assessments and customs, the Marcy correspondence, the appointment of the commission, the difference of interpretation, the slow progress of the negotiations, the impatience of American settlers and intending settlers to have the matter decided, the shooting of the Hudson's Bay Company's pig, the military occupation by Harney, the agreement on joint military administration, and the submission of the case to arbitration. On October 21, 1872, the Emperor announced his award to be that the Haro Channel was "most in accordance with the true interpreta- tions" of the treaty of 1846. On March 10, 1873, a protocol was signed at Washington by Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, Sir Edward Thornton Minister of Great Britain to the United States, and Admiral Prevost by which the boundary was finally determined. No further trouble occurred; in a few weeks the marines were withdrawn and the United States held undisputed sovereignty.
Thus another chapter of Northwestern history was closed. On the merits of the case the decision appears to have been quite just; one cannot doubt that the only object in departing from parallel forty-nine short of the Pacific Ocean was to
222 ANDREW FISH
give Great Britain the Island of Vancouver and that only. The foundation of the British claim, a verbal ambiguity, was essentially weak.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The point of highest interest in this story as I have told it is the forcible military occupation of San Juan in 1859 by General Harney's soldiers. I treated it as an incident in the westward movement of the white man's civilization in the Europeanization of America in the supersession of barbar- ism. This truly was the important process taking place at the time. The struggle for possession of San Juan was a minor affair between groups of whites with their more or less serious causes of disagreement. I traced sketchily the spread of the dominion of the United States across the continent and showed how the Oregon Question was raised and settled, leaving the disposition of the islands of the Gulf of Georgia somewhat uncertain. Something of the part taken in these matters by the Hudson's Bay Company has been indicated. I showed them migrating from the Columbia to Vancouver Island. We saw how the opposed economic interests of the Company and the American farmers aggravated national animosities. An- other disturbing factor was the gold discovered on British soil and eagerly sought by American adventurers. I recounted the disabilities of American miners in the situation and the efforts of their government to provide a remedy. The history of San Juan Island and how it came to be the scene of the explosion of American exasperation has been told. We have followed together the details of the occupation, the reasons given for it, and the response of the British authorities to it. Particular attention was given to the parts played by General Harney, Governor Douglas, and Admiral Baynes. We saw a satisfactory settlement effected by General Scott on the one side and Admiral Baynes on the other. I have tried to find out
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who was to blame and am obliged to conclude that Harney through Pickett disturbed the status established by Marcy in 1855. Both sides were pledged to refrain from acts involving the implication of sole sovereignty pending the result of the work of an international commission. Pickett's proclamation on San Juan was an assertion of sole sovereignty. As the land- ing was directed more against the Hudson's Bay Company and the British authorities than against hostile Indians it amounted to seizure by force. In the upshot Harney's policy was in effect repudiated by the government. Douglas, on his side, seemed disposed to fall back on instructions earlier than 1855 and, on the theory of sole British sovereignty, to put all to the test of arms. He issued orders that really meant war. Had not naval officers refrained from executing his orders hostilities must have occurred. The worst was averted by Admiral Baynes, who took the situation out of Douglas' hands. I pointed out that the British claim to San Juan rested on a verbal ambiguity in the Treaty of 1846, that the commissioners disagreed hopelessly on the interpretation of the doubtful passage, and that arbitration was eventually agreed upon by the two governments. Strong evidence has been produced that the plain intention of the treaty was to run the boundary through Haro Straits, thus leaving the islands on the American side of the boundary, and that it was understood in this sense by the various officers of the American government concerned. The final award made by the German Emperor in 1871 in favor of the United States would therefore seem to be a just one.
But did it really matter whether San Juan was American or British ? It mattered to the individuals who wished to take land on the generous American terms. Under the settlement the private interests of the Hudson's Bay Company were, of course, protected, but the Company could no longer retard nor control land cultivation. The crown rights of the Company on Vancouver Island expired in 1859, but, while it then be- came easier to get land, the British policy was not so generous
224 ANDREW FISH
to the home-seeker as the American. The outcome of the dispute made a real economic difference to some few indi- viduals, llroadly. however, the matter was not of vast im- portance. The civilized white stranger was crowding the native barbarian off the soil, and the dispute over San Juan was between two groups of about equal culture. The stand- ards of life would have been broadly the same whatever the issue. As things are and have been in the world, the Amer- ican and British peoples may indulge themselves in legitimate pride and thankfulness that the Oregon Question in its various phases was settled without recourse to the stern arbitrament of war. The contest was at times acrimonious, but never, we may be thankful, bloody. In spite of dangerous lapses of judgment on the part of individuals of both nations, the affair of San Juan did not mar the record. The over-zeal of em- ployes was counter-balanced by the calmer judgment of more responsible officials. If to our sorrow we have often to reflect that men are not equally wise, at least we may take comfort from the fact that they are not equally foolish.
- ↑ Offered as part fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of A. M. at the University of Oregon, May, 1931.
- ↑ Bancroft: History of British Columbia p. 84.
- ↑ Macdonald's British Columbia and Vancouver Island, London 1862, p. 257.
- ↑ Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 8, p. 195.
- ↑ Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 8, p. 195 (note).