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the old and the new.
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tendencies have been imputed to it, because it only reaches an "inadequate Deity"—that is, because the conception which I have been able to form and to exhibit of Him, does not contain and reveal His glorious perfections in their whole magnitude and extent. But why should I, a metaphysician, be vilified for not doing what no minister in the pulpit, what no theologian in the world, has ever yet done? I shall have another word to say, by and by, in regard to my theology as represented by Mr Cairns.

I now take up the first part of his statement—that clause in which he says that my system "confounds the province of logic and metaphysics."

First of all, let me state what the province of logic is, and what the province of metaphysics is; for my critic has omitted to do this. Logic sometimes signifies the theory of reasoning (as part, at least, of its province), and sometimes it signifies reasoning itself. Metaphysics is the science of real existence. The former is a science of the abstract—the latter of the concrete. Now, when Mr Cairns states that I confound logic and metaphysics, I am at a loss to know whether he means that I confound metaphysics with the theory of reasoning, or with reasoning itself. He probably means the latter; because he alleges that I "endeavour to reach real existence by formal demonstration." But have just made it plain that I make no such attempt. As has been said and shown, I assume real existence, and make no effort to demonstrate it. In fact, Mr Cairns' allegation that I have confounded the provinces of logic and metaphysics, rests entirely on his mis-statement that I have endeavoured to demonstrate real existence. I have exposed the incorrectness of this latter charge, and therefore the first part of his accusation falls maimed and helpless to the ground. I have not confounded the provinces of logic and metaphysics, because I have not attempted to reach real existence by means of logic, whether logic be understood to signify the theory of reasoning, or reasoning itself.

It is quite true that after real existence has been assumed by metaphysics, I employ logic (in the sense of reasoning) to determine what it is. But no man can find fault with this procedure.