not this be the whole rescue?" I answer, simply because we are prevented, by a necessity of thinking, from conceiving it to be the whole rescue. We cannot suppose a time when time itself, and every thing else, was in a condition of absolute nonsense, and therefore we must suppose something more than finite intelligence to rescue the universe from contradiction; and this is, and can be, nothing else than an infinite and all-ruling mind.
Again, he asks, "Or is it demonstrated that other finite intelligences besides the human may not exist in eternal succession, and render this higher Being superfluous?" I answer, that it is perfectly demonstrable that an eternal succession of finite intelligences cannot necessarily exist, because there can be no necessity in an eternal series when there is no necessity in any of its parts; and, from the very conception of finite intelligence, no one finite intelligence exists necessarily. Therefore, inasmuch as it is both demonstrable and demonstrated, that an eternal succession of finite intelligences cannot necessarily exist, and inasmuch as it is also demonstrated that intelligence must necessarily exist—this Higher Being, this necessary and infinite intelligence is not "rendered superfluous."
He asks finally, by way of clenching the invalidity of my argument, "or is the principle of sufficient reason a demonstrative principle, making the opposite a contradiction, as, according to Professor Ferrier, all demonstration ought to do?" I answer, yes—the principle of sufficient reason is a demonstrative principle, making the opposite a contradiction. There is one necessary and infinite intelligence, because one such is a necessity of thinking; but there is not more than one, because a contradiction is involved in the supposition that there should be two or more necessary and infinite intelligences when one such is all that the necessary laws of reason constrain us to admit.
I have thus met, and overthrown at every point, Mr Cairns' attempt to invalidate my argument in favour of the Deity, drawn from the necessities of thinking. I am not called upon to prove the validity of my argument—that is done sufficiently in the Institutes—I am only called upon to demonstrate the frivo-
