ARM I E S pecuniary contributions, and it is not easy to determine which of the two imposes the greater drain upon national resources. The British nation must shortly decide between compulsion and greatly-increased expenditure ; and while an army habitually required to serve abroad in peace time cannot be recruited by conscription in any form, there is a growing tendency to believe that the application of the ballot for recruiting a militia army may be justified. The past twenty-five years have witnessed the results of organic changes in the British army which began m 1870. It cannot be said that these changes have produced all that was claimed by their advocates or that the criticisms expended upon them were entirely without foundation. The British army has undergone a searching test in the South African war. Grave defects of many kinds have been plainly revealed, and a strong demand for radical reorganization has been the result. The wars of the past quarter-century have not provided any specially striking military lessons, but all have presented points of interest and have emphasized the vital importance of organized preparation in time of peace. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 illustrated the great defensive power of breech-loading small arms, and showed many tactical defects in the training of the Russian infantry. This war, like the war in South Africa of 1899 and 1900, was entered upon with a totally inadequate idea of the military requirements. In both cases certain disabilities on the part of the opposing forces—whether Turks or Boers—gave time which enabled the initial defeats to be redeemed. In the Servo-Bulgarian war of 1885, the militia army of Servia was opposed to a Bulgarian force organized on the German principles and supplemented by Rumelian militia. This conflict presented the remarkable feature that the whole of the superior officers of the Bulgarian army, being Russians, were suddenly withdrawn on the outbreak of hostilities. To the personal leadership of Prince Alexander, to the soldierly qualities of the Bulgarians, and to the remarkable marching power of the Rumelian militia, the victory over the Servians was directly due. A small-bore rifle in the modern sense was employed for the first time by the Servians, and the Bulgarian field artillery opposed time shrapnel to common shell with notable success. The China-Japan conflict of 1894 revealed in the most striking way the great fighting power of the newly-organized Japanese army and the marked ability with which it had been prepared for war. A new military nation may be said to have come into existence, which must play an important part in the affairs of the Far East. The brief Spanish-American war of 1898 plainly indicated the weakness of volunteer organizations and the heavy cost entailed by want of preparation. The small standing army of the United States was not organized for offensive war; but the excellent quality of the troops averted disaster at Santiago. The Spanish forces in Cuba showed little enterprise or capacity j but local conditions had tended to deteriorate their military qualities, and they did not fairly represent the army of Spain. The principal result of this war was to bring about the over-sea expansion of the United States. This has already entailed a considerable increase in their military forces. The Act of Congress of February 1901 authorizes the President to maintain a standing army of 100,000 men, and to raise local forces in the Philippine Islands. In the Greco-Turkish war, loose discipline, bad leading, and want of organization combined to cause the collapse of the Greek army. The conduct of the campaign by the Turks proved that progress had been attained under German instruction since the conflict with Russia; but certain disabilities, which appear to be inherent in Turkish armies, were again
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manifested. Great Britain has been engaged in military operations of a varied character in many parts of the world, thus receiving lessons which were not in all cases turned to full account. A long series of minor campaigns, beginning at Alexandria in 1882, ended at Khartum in 1898. Two considerable wars, in Afghanistan and on the north-west frontier, were carried on by the Government of India. The South African war severely strained British military resources and proved that the standard of preparations had not been adjusted to meet national requirements. No Power has, during the past twenty-five years, acquired experience of warlike operations comparable in extent and variety to that which the British army now has at its disposal. South America has been the scene of several conflicts, of which the Chilian civil war of 1891 was, perhaps, the most important. In this case a military force was organized ad hoc by a German expert and equipped with magazine rifles, which were used for the first time on a large scale. The period, regarded as a whole, has been marked by a great expansion of military forces and by successive and costly re-armaments, both of artillery and infantry. Great attention has been generally devoted to organization and all that is implied in preparation for war. The armies of to-day are larger, better equipped, and more carefully trained than previously; and except in Italy, and possibly in Russia, there are no clear signs that the burdens of military service and of military expenditure are at present pressing with unbearable severity upon the population of Europe. (g. s. c.) British Army. The moment at which the following article was completed (November 1901) was necessarily an exceptional one in the history of the British army. The whole ^ecrujting system of administration which was introduced aad conafter 1870 had undergone many modifications, ditions of and was about to undergo many more. In its general features, nevertheless, the recruiting system remained that which was introduced by Mr Cardwell in the years following 1870. It was adopted in the belief that a much larger number of recruits could be obtained if they had the option of leaving after a comparatively short period with the colours. It was assumed that after three years’ service, at all events in the infantry, a man had learnt all that he was likely to learn, and that it was more economical for the country after that time to pay him for some years a small retaining fee, and call him up only for war. The necessity of sending troops to India and to distant British colonies did not admit of a strict application of this principle to the whole army. Whilst, therefore, the Guards, who do not serve during peace time in distant parts of the empire, and the Army Service Corps, which requires large expansion for war and is not required in India which has its own transport and supply department, have now for a long period been enlisted for three years with the colours and nine years in the Reserve,—the Line, the Artillery, and the Cavalry are mostly enlisted for seven years with the colours and five more in the Reserve. From time to time, however, enlistment for the line for three years has been allowed concurrently with the longer period. The pay of the soldier has been slightly improved. First he was given in 1876 an allowance known as “ deferred pay.” A daily addition to his pay of 2d. a day was credited to him in his accounts; but he was not entitled to receive it till he took his discharge. There was a considerable conflict of evidence as to whether the money was valuable to the soldier in enabling him to start in civil life, or whether it was merely wasted. The
