history]
CHINA
of Haiphong and Hanoi situated on the delta. The object of the French was then, as it is now, to find a trade route to Yunnan and Szechuen from a base of their own, and it was hoped the Red river would furnish such a route. Tongking at the time, however, was infested with bands of pirates and cut-throats, many of whom were Chinese rebels or ex-rebels who had been driven across the frontier by the suppression of the Yunnan and Taiping rebellions, conspicuous among them being an organization called the Black Flags. The Annamese Government undertook by the treaty to restore order, and France had promised help. Some years having passed without any improvement, France, which meanwhile had kept a small guard at Haiphong, sent reinforcements (1882), nominally to assist the Annamese troops in putting an end to disorder. The Annamese officials, however, declined to receive them as friends, opposed their progress, and the expedition took the form of a military occupation. China, meanwhile, began to take alarm at the near approach of a strong military power to her southern frontier. When the treaty of 1874, which gave France trading privileges, was communicated to her, she seems to have treated it with indifference as she treated the Japanese treaty with Korea, and neither in the one case nor in the other took any steps to see that the provisions were carried out. Now, however, she began to protest, claiming that Annam was a vassal state and under her protection. France took no notice of the protest, declaring that the claim had merely an archaeological interest, and that, in any case, China in military affairs was a quantile nfyligeable. France found, however, that she had undertaken a very serious task in trying to put down the forces of disorder in Tongking. The Black Flags were, it was believed, being aided by money and arms from China, and as time went on, her troops were more and more being confronted with regular Chinese soldiers. Several forts, well within the Tongking frontier, were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. Operations continued with more or less success during the winter and spring of 1883-84. Both sides, however, were desirous of an arrangement, and in May 1884 a convention was signed between Li Hung-Chang and a Captain Fournier, who had been commissioned ad hoc, whereby China agreed to withdraw her garrisons and to open her frontiers to trade, France agreeing, on her part, to respect the fiction of Chinese suzerainty, and guarantee the frontier from attack by brigands. The arrangement was satisfactory to both sides, but, strange to say, it was completely frustrated by a series of unfortunate misunderstandings which led to a renewal of hostilities. No date had been fixed in the convention for the evacuation of the Chinese garrisons, and Fournier endeavoured to supplement this by a memorandum to Li Hung-Chang, at the same time announcing the fact to his Government. In pursuance of this arrangement the French troops proceeded to occupy Langson on the date fixed (21st June 1884). The Chinese commandant refused to evacuate, alleging, in a despatch which no one in the French camp was competent to translate, that he had received no orders, and begged for a short delay to enable him to communicate with his superiors. The French commandant ordered an attack, which was repulsed with severe loss. Mutual recriminations ensued, the French declaring the resistance an act of treachery, and the Chinese declaring that the French had broken faith by advancing before the date fixed. The whole question turned on the unfortunate memorandum of Captain Fournier. The Chinese alleged that in deference to Li HungChang’s representation, Captain Fournier had agreed to postpone the date of evacuation, and himself erased the original figures and inserted others, attesting the alteration by putting his initials in the margin ; and they produced the original document so altered. Captain Fournier affirmed, on his honour, that he had made no alteration, and declared the whole thing an impudent forgery. On whichever side the truth lay, the result was greatly to embitter the feeling on both sides. From Paris there came a demand for a huge indemnity as reparation for the insult. The Peking Government offered to carry out the convention, and to pay a small indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding. This was refused, and hostilities recommenced, or, as the French preferred to call them, reprisals, for the fiction was still kept up that the two countries were not at war. Under cover of this fiction the French fleet peaceably entered the harbour of Foochow, having passed the forts at the entrance to the river without hindrance. Once inside, they attacked and destroyed the much inferior Chinese fleet which was then quietly at anchor, destroying at the same time a large part of the arsenal which adjoins the anchorage (23rd Aug. 1884). Retracing its steps, the French fleet attacked .and destroyed with impunity the forts which were built to guard the entrance to the Min river, and could offer no resistance to a force coming from the rear. After this exploit the French fleet left the mainland and continued its reprisals on the coast of Formosa. Keelung, a treaty port, was bombarded and taken, Oct. 4th. A similar attempt, however, on the neighbouring port of Tamsuy was unsuccessful, the landing party having been driven back to their ships with severe loss.
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The attempt was not renewed, and the fleet thereafter confined itself to a semi-blockade of the island, which was prolonged into 1885 but led to no practical results. Desultory operations were continued in the neighbourhood of Shanghai and Ningpo, two old vessels were taken and burnt, but the two or three really powerful boats which the Chinese then possessed took refuge behind the guns of Port Arthur, whither the French admiral did not care to follow them. By way of bringing pressure on the Chinese Government, the French at this time declared rice contraband of war, in order to stop the supplies going forward to the capital by sea. Even this, though raising an interesting point in international law, had no practical effect. Meanwhile the Chinese had been greatly emboldened by the successful defence of Tamsuy, and the failure of the French to push home such successes as they had gained. Preparations on a great scale were made to continue the war, and a rising tone was noticed, not only in the acts of the Government, but throughout the country. The new-born native press assiduously encouraged this feeling, and from this time forward began to count as a factor in the situation. Troops were massed on the frontier of Tongking, and the French forces which had pushed their way as far as the border were compelled by overwhelming masses of the enemy to fall back on their base in the delta of the river. Negotiations for peace, however, which had been for some time in progress through the mediation of Sir Robert Hart, were at this juncture happily concluded (April 1885), and the French cabinet was thereby relieved from a very embarrassing situation. The terms were practically those of the Fournier convention of the year before, the demand for an indemnity having been quietly dropped. China, on the whole, came out of the struggle with greatly increased prestige. She had tried conclusions with a first-class European Power and had held her own. In material resources she had not been weakened. The provincial fleet at Foochow had indeed been destroyed, but it was of no serious value as a fighting force. On the other hand she had saved her three armoured cruisers, the value of the new fortress of Port Arthur as a naval base had been proved, and, most satisfactory of all, she was not crippled by the exaction of an indemnity. Morally she might claim a victory. Reasonings such as these, however, omitted to take note of the fact that France was never more than half-hearted over the war. No effective support was given to the French admiral from home, the number of troops sent to Tongking was inadequate to the task they were called on to perform, and no opportunity was afforded to see how Chinese soldiers would stand up against regular European troops. Incorrect conclusions as to the military strength of China were consequently drawn, not merely by the Chinese themselves—which was excusable—but by European and even British authorities, who ought to have been better informed. China was lulled into a false security which proved disastrous when the day of trial came. For the time, however, the lessons of the war were so far learned that the necessity for a strong fleet became generally recognized, and means were at once adopted to that end. War vessels were ordered both from England and Germany, and Admiral Lang, who had withdrawn his services while the war was going on, was re-engaged together with a number of British officers and instructors. The completion of the works at Port Arthur was taken in hand, and a beginning was made in the construction of forts at Wei-hai-wei as a second naval base. A new department was created for the control of naval affairs, at the head of which was placed Prince Chun, father of the Emperor, who since the downfall of Prince Kung in 1884 had been taking a more and more prominent part in public affairs. A tour made by Prince Chun in the spring of 1886, in the course of which he visited Port Arthur and Chefoo escorted by the fleet, attracted much attention, as being the first time that a prince so near the throne had emerged from palace seclusion and exchanged friendly visits with foreign admirals and other representatives. From 1885 to 1894 the political history of China does not call for extended notice. Two incidents, however, must be recorded, the first being the conclusion of a convention between Great Britain and China, in which the latter undertook to recognize British sovereignty in Burma, to delimit the frontier, and to promote overland trade intercourse between the two countries. Great Britain, on the other hand, consented to the continuance of the customary decennial tribute mission to jgg4 be despatched by the “highest authority in Burma,” the members, however, to be Burmese, and she also consented not to press a mission which the Indian Government were proposing to send to Tibet and to which China had agreed. The recognition of Chinese suzerainty implied in the sending a tribute mission was sharply criticized, but in point of fact it has never been acted on and is now forgotten. The other incident was the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet (May 1885). Rumours of Russian intrigues in Korea, coupled with recent proceedings in Afghanistan, made it appear desirable that Great Britain should have a naval base farther north than HongS. III. — 5
