5. Nearly Two Decades after Obtaining Section 214 Authorization, Team Telecom Recommended CTA's Authorizations Be Revoked and Terminated
Nearly 20 years after CTA obtained Section 214 authorization, 13 years after entering into a security agreement, and two years after its last site visit, Team Telecom recommended the FCC revoke and terminate CTA's Section 214 authorizations because of "substantial and unacceptable" national security risks.[1] Team Telecom argued that the national security environment had changed significantly since 2007 and the national security concerns associated with CTA's operations could no longer be mitigated.[2] Team Telecom's arguments for revocation generally fell into the following categories.[3]
CTA's Section 214 authorization allows it to expand services without further FCC approval. Team Telecom explained that CTA uses its Section 214 authorizations to provide "regulated and unregulated services as a 'one-stop' provider of a 'full suite of communications services."[4] Team Telecom warned that, with its facilities-based authorization, CTA does not require further FCC approval to expand its network or upgrade its equipment.[5] "The potential for [CTA] to increase its capabilities . . . heightens the national security and law enforcement concerns . . . ."[6]
CTA's Section 214 authorization allows it to build relationships with U.S. carriers. Team Telecom also warned that CTA's facilities-based authorizations allow it to request interconnections with U.S. carriers.[7] CTA has already established relationships with major U.S. carriers, including Verizon, CenturyLink,
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56. CTA told the Subcommittee that Team Telecom did not inquire whether CTA would be prepared to consider another security agreement prior to submitting its recommendation to the FCC. Letter from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, counsel to CTA, to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee). Team Telecom's recommendation, however, stated that Team Telecom felt further mitigation would be insufficient "because the underlying foundation of trust that is needed for a [security] agreement to adequately address national security and law enforcement concerns is not present." Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 53.
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 1-2.
- ↑ The information described below is based on Team Telecom's recommendation. CTA informed the Subcommittee that it disputes Team Telecom's allegations and "explicitly denies the assertions that it has engaged in intentional hijacking or that its licenses provide opportunities for China to engage in espionage against the United States." Letter from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, counsel to CTA, to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 8 (citing General FAQs, China Telecom Americas, https://www.ctamericas.com/faqs). Team Telecom referenced CTA's provision of international private lines, mobile virtual network operator, MPLS VPN, SD-WAN, Ethernet, data center, and cloud services. See Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 8-10.
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 11-12.
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 12.
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 11-12.
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