Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/76

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Due to this ownership, Team Telecom warned that CTA "is vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government."[2] Team Telecom indicated that CTA will be forced to comply-and has complied-with Chinese government requests, including those made pursuant to China's recent cybersecurity and national security laws.[3]

In addition to its Chinese government ownership, CTA provides services to Chinese government facilities in the United States.[4]

CTA's U.S. operations provide opportunities for China to engage in economic espionage against the United States. Team Telecom reiterated warnings of other U.S. government officials concerning the Chinese government's cyber and economic espionage efforts against the United States.[5] Through its Section 214 authorizations, Team Telecom noted that CTA has greater "access to more customers, communications traffic, and interconnections with other U.S. common


  1. Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 33.
  2. Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 34.
  3. Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 37-40. In discussions with the Subcommittee, CTA refuted Team Telecom's characterization that it has complied with Chinese government requests, describing it as "misleading and based on fear of some future hypothetical event, not substantiated by any proof of existing conduct." Letter from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, counsel to CTA, to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  4. Letter from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, counsel to CTA, to the Subcommittee (May 22, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  5. Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 41-42.

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