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Hami Silo Field on 29 May 2022; see the original document

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Hami Silo Field on 13 February 2023

China: ICBM Silo Externally Completed - Hami Silo Fields

Strategy. The PRC's approach to using nuclear force is based on PLA "deterrence" of an enemy first strike and "counterstrike" when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an adversary's military capability, population, and economy. The PRC's nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with sufficient strength to conduct multiple rounds of counterstrike, deterring an adversary with the threat of unacceptable damage to its military capability, population, and economy. The PLA probably selects its nuclear strike targets to achieve conflict de-escalation and return to a conventional conflict with a remaining force sufficient to deter its adversary. PLA planners would probably avoid a protracted series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary, and state that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. The buildup of the PLA's nuclear arsenal may change the PRC's nuclear strategy in the future, while the PLA insists its nuclear policy remains clear and consistent.

  • The PRC's current approach to nuclear force includes a declaratory "no first use" (NFU) policy, stating it will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any circumstances. This includes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China's nuclear strategy

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China