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  • In 2022, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “Nine-Dash-Line,” the Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island, and the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest, ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict. In 2022, the PRC continued to impose a yearly, unilateral three-month fishing ban that includes the waters inside the EEZ of the Philippines and Vietnam to incrementally enforce its de facto maritime claims.

  • The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG and People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions.
  • In November 2022, a CCG vessel forcibly seized apparent PRC rocket debris that had fallen near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island from the Philippines by cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel as it was towing debris back to shore. PRC insisted the debris was returned to them after a “friendly negotiation,” despite the Philippines producing video evidence of the incident and issues diplomatic notes of protest.
  • In March 2022, the Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest after a CCG ship maneuvered within 21 meters of a Filipino vessel near Scarborough Shoal. This was the fourth time in under a year that the CCG had maneuvered dangerously close to Philippine vessels.
  • In December 2022, the Philippines expressed serious concern over reports that the PRC had reclaimed several unoccupied land features in the SCS, notably at four features in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines noted that new construction contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award, while Beijing denied any actions and emphasized dialogue between the two nations.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China