CONSISTENT U.S. DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN
In response to U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan, Beijing routinely accuses the United States of not abiding by its One China principle. U.S. defense engagements with Taiwan, as one element of the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, remain consistent with our one China policy—as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan has evolved over time in response to the PRC’s capacity and willingness to use military coercion against Taiwan. This evolution does not contradict publicly-stated U.S. policy, and it is in fact required by U.S. policy.
The 1979 TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In 1982, President Reagan clarified in an internal memo—which the United States made public in 2019—that the quantity and quality of U.S. defense assistance provided to Taiwan be “conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” President Reagan further emphasized that this linkage is intended as a “permanent imperative” of foreign policy.
The United States opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo by either side; does not support Taiwan independence; and expects cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. United States defense engagement with Taiwan’s will continue to bolster these positions and be conditioned entirely on the evolving threat posed by the PRC and the interests of the people of Taiwan, as enumerated in U.S. policy.
PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR
The PLA’s coercive and risky air and maritime activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas, continued throughout 2022 and into 2023. The PLA’s coercive and risky activities includes unsafe, unprofessional, and other behaviors that seek to impinge upon the ability of the United States and other nations to safely conduct operations where international law allows. The goal of the PLA’s behavior is to pressure the United States and other nations to reduce or cease lawful operations near areas Beijing claims territorial sovereignty.
Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft have included lasing (i.e., the use of military-grade lasers against a target), reckless maneuvers (i.e., maritime bow crossings and barrel rolls and acrobatics in close proximity to aircraft), close approaches in the air or at sea, high rates of closure (i.e., rapid approaches), discharging objects i.e., chaff or flares) in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.
The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the road; increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of life.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
