- designs to lessen its reliance on foreign engines, such as the WS-15 to replace Ukrainian AI222 engines that power its L-15 trainer aircraft. Russia’s war on Ukraine probably will impede China’s ability to acquire military equipment and maintenance services from either country.
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION
There have been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens. These include procuring and exporting controlled items to China and economic espionage, according to a U.S. Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement. The PRC’s efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included aviation technologies, radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits, radiation-hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval and marine technologies, signals decoders, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military communication jamming equipment, and dynamic random access memory. Cases from 2022 include the following:
- In November 2022, an MSS intelligence officer was sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to steal technology and proprietary information from companies based both in the United States and abroad. The MSS intelligence officer attempted to steal technology related to a U.S. aviation company’s exclusive composite aircraft engine fan module—which no other company in the world has been able to duplicate—in order to advance China’s commercial and military aviation efforts. The MSS intelligence officer also openly talked about efforts to obtain U.S. military information in addition to commercial aviation trade secrets. The espionage operation was executed with full coordination between the MSS and China’s aviation entities.
- In September 2022, a federal district court jury convicted a Chinese national of acting illegally within the United States as an agent of the PRC. The Chinese national was tasked by the MSS with providing biographical information on certain individuals for possible recruitment. The individuals included Chinese nationals who were working as engineers and scientists in the United States, some of whom worked for U.S. defense contractors. This tasking was part of an effort by the MSS to obtain access to advanced aerospace and satellite technologies being developed by companies within the United States.
PRC CYBER-ENABLED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.
170
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
