Page:2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF/192

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

retreated from military-to-military communications with the United States. The ability of the two sides to now effectively communicate to preempt or manage a potential incident caused by risky PLA behavior is weak and raises the risk of escalation.

In August 2022, the PRC suspended military contacts and exchanges with the United States, claiming the cut-off was in response to the former House Speaker’s visit to Taiwan. Roughly a year on, the PRC continues to point to long-standing U.S. military activities in the Western Pacific, the United States’ Taiwan policy, and Washington’s refusal to remove sanctions on the PRC’s newly-appointed Minister of National Defense, General Li Shangfu, for creating a “negative atmosphere” for talks. The PRC’s long track record of cancelling military-to-military lines of communication in response to perceived offenses suggests the PRC views military channels of communication as a tool to punish or reward the United States for its perceived behavior, versus being inherently valuable to maintaining peace and stability.

High-Level Contacts and Exchanges. High-level exchanges between the U.S. and PRC—such as between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the PRC Minister of National Defense—are an important way to exchange views on the bilateral defense relationship and the international security environment. In the past, the PRC was willing to responsibly engage in high-level dialogue to ensure mutual understanding on a range of policy and operational issues. While DoD continues to seek open lines of communication with the PLA at multiple levels in both operator and policy channels, the PRC now views executing military-to-military communications as a tool to either reward or punish U.S. behavior based on U.S. adherence and respect for PRC core interests.

  • Executed. In 2022, the Secretary of Defense engaged with then-PRC Minister of National Defense, General Wei Fenghe, three times to discuss regional security, bilateral defense relations, and issues of common concern. They met once in June on the sidelines of the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, and once in November on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting + (ADMM+) in Cambodia. The Secretary also held one Defense Telephone Link (DLT) call with General Wei in April 2022 to discuss Russia’s war on Ukraine. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) held one DTL with then-PRC Chairman of the Joint Staff Department (JSD) in July to discuss operational issues.
  • Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. In 2022, the PLA declined, cancelled, or ignored the majority of senior-level contacts. In July, the PLA cancelled a planned DTL call about operational issues between INDOPACOM Commander and the PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) commander. In August, the PLA refused a CJCS DTL call request to the Chairman of the JSD. In August, the PLA refused a Secretary of Defense DTL call request to the PRC Minister of National Defense. In December, the PLA again refused a CJCS DTL call request to the Chairman of the JSD.

Recurring Exchanges. Recurring exchanges serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management and reduce of operational risk.


174
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China