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modernization effort. It also is an acknowledgement that the PLA feels itself to be behind the world’s most capable militaries and that they have not yet achieved that standard.

SLOGAN	ARTICULATION
“Five Incapables”	Cannot judge the situation Cannot understand the intention of higher authorities Cannot make operational decisions Cannot deploy forces Cannot deal with unexpected situations
“Two Incompatibles”	Does not meet the requirements of winning local war under informatized conditions Does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century
“Two Big Gaps”	Does not meet the requirements for national security Lack of capability compared to the level of the world’s most advanced militaries
“Two Inabilities”	Inability to fight a modern war Inability of officers at all levels to command in modern war
“Three Whethers”	Whether the armed forces can constantly maintain the Party’s absolute leadership Whether the armed forces can fight victoriously when needed by the Party and the people Whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead forces and command in war

SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

The PRC probably was caught off guard by Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred 20 days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing and the signing of a “no limits” partnership. Although Russia’s was on Ukraine has tested the strength of the elevated relationship, the PRC has sought to preserve its close ties with Russia while promoting its own image as a responsible great power and its “neutrality” in the war. Xi has also stood by Putin as the war entered its second year and resisted Western pressure to isolate and impose costs on Russia for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. The PRC’s perception that Washington and NATO are responsible for starting the conflict, along with its sympathy for Russia’s security concerns, has driven the PRC’s response to the conflict.

To provide diplomatic cover for Russia, Beijing has parroted Russian narratives when they align with the PRC’s criticism of the United States and refrained from condemning its conduct or

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China