and from Russia’s more recent combat experience, given that China has not conducted active combat operations in several decades. In 2021, both countries signed a defense cooperation roadmap pledging to expand military exercises and carry out more patrols, probably to feed their narrative about a strengthening defense partnership. PRC-Russia military exercises since Russia’s war on Ukraine include the following:
- In 2022, China and Russia conducted two combined bomber patrols—their fourth- and fifth-ever—during the same year for the first time. In May 2022, the first coincided with the Quad Summit in Tokyo and the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The second was carried out on November 30th in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan, ECS, and Philippine Sea and included practicing the landing of bombers at each other’s airfields.
- China and Russia conducted their second-ever combined naval patrol in September directly after VOSTOK-22, which preceded the annual bilateral naval JOINT SEA exercise in December. For the first time, the security patrol occurred in the Bering Sea along Alaska’s Aleutian Island chain.
- China also participated in Russia’s capstone VOSTOK-22 exercise in September but decreased the number of personnel it sent. During the exercise, the PLA and Russian navies performed multiple combined maneuvers.
Although Chinese and Russian leaders appear to assess that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of working together, the relationship is still colored by latent tensions and strategic mistrust. The PRC’s strategic mistrust is probably fueled by the perception of the more powerful Russian Empire and Soviet Union historically taking advantage of a weaker China. Despite normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 and the resolution of longstanding border disputes, China remains suspicious of Russia’s intentions. The CCP still draws on Russia’s past humiliation of China—such as the signing of unjust border treaties that ceded large swaths of Chinese territory to the Russians Far East—as a source of nationalism. For Russia, enduring structural inequities, such as geography and its declining population in the Far East, stoke fears that China may encroach on its interests, exploit Russian weaknesses, or relegate Russia as the inferior partner in their relationship.
China’s rise, growing ambitions to establish a military presence in the Arctic, and lackluster economic and military support to Russia during the war in Ukraine probably all contribute to ongoing tensions in the relationship.
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC BUILDING “A STRONG STRATEGIC DETERRENT SYSTEM”
In President Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he set a goal for the PLA to “build a strong strategic deterrent system.” This expands on PLA doctrinal writings from 2020 urging the construction of a “strategic deterrence system with Chinese characteristics” and the PRC’s 2021
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
