Page:2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF/59

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

combat forces and combat elements from across the PLA services and other arms and across all domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and tactical levels. PLA writings highlight the multi-domain component of integrated joint operations and the need to coordinate the development of “mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization integration.” The PLA’s “operational regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA leaders and PLA-affiliated academics have pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is out of step with the 2015-era structural command and organizational reforms, and an obstacle to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint PLA.

Since the CMC issued the Outline, the PLA has launched a force-wide effort to study and implement it, including through joint operations undertaken during exercises. The PLA is working to turn the Outline’s vision of joint operations into reality by breaking down institutional barriers and standardizing command systems in practice. Along the way, the PLA seeks to identify shortcoming develop solutions and facilitate the adoption of modern operational concepts.

Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. MDPW is meant to sit atop an “operational conceptual system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional subordinate operational concepts and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, evaluate, and improve these future-oriented operational concepts. The timing of MDPW’s appearance vis-à-vis China’s updated doctrine and military strategic guidelines suggests that MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely amplifying themes and guidance in both while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be able to do to win future wars.

Joint Firepower Strike. PLA writings have long emphasized the importance of joint firepower strikes as a component of large-scale operations. Joint firepower strikes include multiple services combining to utilize their firepower capabilities to create substantial effect and have been explicitly tied to a Taiwan invasion in PLA writings. During the August 2022 Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan, the PLA Rocket Force fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones in waters around Taiwan; this included at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, which was unprecedented. The military drills afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint firepower strike operations.

Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC’s leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important element in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Xi and senior military leaders have continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat readiness so it can “fight and win wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA conducting more training but making its training more rigorous and realistic as well as addressing issues in the PLA’s training and


41
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China