frequent arrests of high-ranking officials and business elites for allegations of taking bribes and abusing power, especially in the financial sector. In November 2022 alone, PRC authorities arrested the Vice Governor of the People’s Bank of China and former CEO of a major PRC telecommunications firm as a result of investigations by CCP anti-corruption bodies.
Effects of COVID-19 on PLA Modernization and Reform Goals. In 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic likely had little effect on the PLA’s modernization and reform goals. At the 20th Party Congress in October, Xi continued to emphasize promoting the modernization of China’s national defense and armed forces. A few months later, in his annual new year's address, Xi highlighted military and strategic achievements from 2022 including the PLA’s 95th anniversary, the launching of the PLAN’s third aircraft carrier, and the completion of China's space station. In 2022, the PLA continued to play a role in COVID-19 response activity, such as mobilizing approximately 2,000 medical personnel to Shanghai during an outbreak in April. The PRC’s recent Government Work Report referenced PLA activities through the last year, including COVID-19 response that boosted China’s national defense mobilization capability.
Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a Party-army, does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the Party. The CCP CMC, currently chaired by Xi, is the highest military decision-making body in the PRC. As a Party-army, the PLA is a political actor. As a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political and governance systems. As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government system, the PLA’s missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to its national defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi has implemented multiple reforms which reduced PLA autonomy and greatly strengthened Party control over the military. Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s absolute control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party.
CHINA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP
As the military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC is technically also a department of the CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at Party Congresses every five years. In the fall of 2022 at the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia ascended to the first Vice Chairman position, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice Chairman. Other CMC members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning members Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. In 2022, the CMC consisted of two vice chairs, the Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission.
Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, and President of the PRC. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to all of his positions for an unprecedented third term at 2022’s 20th Party Congress and the 2023 National People’s Congress.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
