310
HISTORY OF INDIA.
[Book II.
-- yt-sA.,,^-^^^--
St. Helkna. — From an original pictvire in East India House.
A.u 1658. station between P]urope and India, tliey were to wait for intelligence from England, and in the event of its not proving favourable, to direct their course to Barbadoes, and tliere remain till assui-ed of a safe return.
P'orrnerly the
Company had been averse to fortifica- tions, or at least U) the expense which it would be necessary to incur in erecting and maintaining them ; but it was constantly becoming more and more ap- parent from the po-
Necessityof Htical state of India, as well as from the preponderating influence of the Dutch, that without fortifications, and the absolute control of them, it would be im- possible to place the trade on a secure and lasting foundation. Accordingly we find the presidency of Surat, in accordance with instructions received from home, examining the west coast of the Indian peninsula, in order to discover some station which, strong by nature, might be made still stronger by art, so as to afl!brd a secure asylum, and recommending for this purpose different stations which the King of Portugal might be induced to cede. It is rather remarkable that one of these was Bombay, which was shortly after to become the property of the British crown as part of the dowry of the Portuguese infanta. On the Coro- mandel coast the same necessity for strong fortification was felt, in consequence of the alarm which had been excited by the near approach of Sevajee to Madi'as when he was marching to his southern conquests. In the Persian Gulf, where the share of the customs of Gomberoon still formed a valuable branch of the Company's revenue, the Persian government had given so many indications of hostility that it was seriously pi'oposed to negotiate the occupation of Muscat. It woiild almost seem that in proposing this occupation some objects of a very questionable, if not piratical natm-e were contemplated ; for among the induce- ments mentioned by the Surat presidency are not merely the beneficial effect it might have on their coast trade on the west of India, but the facility it would give " to seize in retaliation on the Malabar jmiks." In Bengal, notvithstanding various acts of oppression by the governor, the hopeful character of the trade — which seemed capable of being increased to any extent, and rendered peculiarl}' valuable on account of the fine (Qualities of the goods, particulaily saltpetre, raw silk, taffetas, and other manufactures — made a fortified station particiJarly desirable ; but it could not be obtained voluntarily, and the Mogul government still seemed so strong that the idea of attempting to gain it by force would.
Proposed acquisition of Jluscat.
