I
Chap. X.] ATTACK ON THE NABOB'S CAMP. o5I»
The report of the deputies left no room for further negotiation, and Clive a.d. ns;. determined to attack the nabob's camp in the morning. His force consisted of 650 men, forming the European battaUon, 100 artillerymen with six tield- pieces, 800 sepoys, and GOO sailors, wlio had been landed at midnight, and Attack t.y
clive on tlie
armed with firelocks. Ihe enemy mustered about 40,000 men, most of them ..iiw/s encamped between the ditch and the lake, but a considerable part with the *^'""'* general, Meer Jaftier, within the ditch, to protect the nabob in his quarters in Oinichund's garden. The attack was made, but proved far less successful than had been anticipated. Clive, in a letter addressed to the secret committee at home, gives this summary account of the matter: — "About three o'clock in the morning, I marched out with nearly my whole force, leaving only a few Euro- peans, with 200 new raised bucksarees, to guard our camp. About six we entered the enemy's camp, in a thick fog, and crossed it in about two horn's, doing considerable execution. Had the fog cleared up, as it usuall}' does about eight o'clock, when we were entire masters of the camp without the ditch, the action must liave been decisive ; instead of which it thickened, and occasioned our mistaking the way." The loss on his part was severe, amounting to 120 Europeans, 100 sepoys, and two field-pieces; and his troo})s were not only dispirited, but blamed the attack as ill-concerted. Orme is decidedly of this opinion, and says that "the men ought to have assembled at Perring's Redoubt, which is not half a mile from Omichund's garden, to which they might have marched in a spacious road, capable of admitting twelve or fifteen men abreast." This seems plausible, but an obvious objection is, that, by that an-angement, facility of attack would have been purchased by leaving the nabob an easy outlet to join the main body of his army, and thus escape. By beginning with the main body, and proceeding gi-jidually towards the nabob's head-quarters, he took the best means to secui-e his person, and, to all appearance, would have succeeded but for a natural event of unusual occurrence, and therefore not anticipated. The moral effect, however, was as gi'eat as if the success had been complete. The nabob, having received a practical specimen of the kind of enemy he had to deal with, was much more disposed to be pacific.
The very next day after the attack he employed Runjeet Roy to write a The luib-.i..
.. ^ p 111 r • 1 ' iutiiiii(late<l,
letter contaming proposals oi peace, and under the pretext oi proving his concludes a sincerity, though probably more with a view to his own personal safety, retired '**"^^ with his whole army, and encamped about three miles north-east of the lake. Here, after various measages of negotiati(ni brought and cairied by Runjeet Roy and Omichmid, a treaty was concluded on the 9th of Febniary. Its lead- ing terms were — that the nabob should restore the Company's factories, but with only such of the plundered eflects as had been regularly brought to account in the books of his government — permit them to fortify Calcutta in any wa}' the}' should think expedient — exempt all merchandise with their dustuks from fee or custom — and confirm all the ])rivileges granted to them since tlieir fii-st
