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COURSE OF THE CRISIS; 1838-9.
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value, at fourteen cents a pound, were to be made on all that was sent to Humphreys & Biddle, who would "hold on until prices vigorously rally."

If the crops should prove large the "great and powerful interest" would hold back the first supplies of it. This circular was unsigned and was not to be published, but it got into the newspapers and, the New York "Journal of Commerce" having traced it up to Wilder and the leading officers of the Bank, the former published a vehement denial that the Bank of the United States had anything whatever to do with it.[1] It was afterwards stated that this circular was written by Gen. Hamilton of South Carolina.[2]

July 20th, a meeting at Macon called a southern convention to deliberate on the cotton circular and the means of giving stability to the price of cotton. They had before them a circular from southern representatives at New York, in which it was shown that cotton was a regulator of the exchanges and a standard of value. It was resolved that it was necessary to combine the banks with the cotton producers; that the banks of the South should take bills of lading and insurance policies and give post-notes at twelve and a-half cents per pound, so as to hold the crop for a price, the whole being consigned to a few houses in Liverpool and Havre. Just at this time the "Manchester Guardian" declared that there was no market for the amount of manufactured goods which the machinery could make, unless the price was lowered; that the advance in cotton therefore stopped spinning. "The evil does not consist in the high price of cotton so much as in the general distrust of the stability of that price, which is produced by a knowledge of the speculative dealing in the United States." [In fact the crop was short, and if there had been no speculation, the price would probably have been higher than it really was when it was believed that a large amount was kept back. The supply for the last half of the year was twice the amount which had been used in the first half.] It is "one of the most rash and insane speculations of modern times."[3]

Under the State charter the Bank paid four per cent. dividends every half year until July, 1839. It was apparently these large dividends which deluded the small investors, and made them cling to the Bank long after men of affairs knew that it was a mere shell. When it failed this class of investors and foreigners owned nearly all of it. Biddle had then only one share.[4] It is hardly too much to say that the Bank never had any right to pay a dividend after the State charter was taken.

In July the rate for loans at Philadelphia was fifteen per cent. and eighteen per cent.; the United States Bank was contracting. Its stock was at 114. The Bank was still trying to control the sterling exchange; but at New York there was opposition to this policy and a shipment of specie was declared necessary.[5]

At the end of August the money market in England was so stringent

  1. 56 Niles, 249, 258.
  2. 56 Niles, 369.
  3. 56 Niles, 351.
  4. Investigating Committee, May 18, 1841.
  5. 56 Niles, 337.