Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the fight, and had returned in the afternoon before the change in the fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to change the estimate I had formed of him.[1]
It may be asked, why with my small force I made the attack? I can only say we had been fighting large odds during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of lessening them. It was of the utmost consequence that Sheridan should be prevented from sending troops to Grant, and General Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had expressed an earnest desire that a victory should be gained in the Valley if possible, and it could not be gained without fighting for it. I did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy in his camp and then thought and still think I would have had it, if my directions had been strictly complied with, and my troops had awaited my orders to retire.[2]
CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN
After the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my troops remained in their camp for the rest of the month without disturbance, but on the 26th of October the enemy's cavalry attacked Lomax at Millford and, after sharp lighting, was
- ↑ The retreat of the main body of his army had been arrested, and a new line formed behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field; and he still had immense odds against me when he made the attack in the afternoon.
- ↑ A silly story was circulated and even published in the papers, that this battle was planned and conducted by one of my subordinates up to a certain point, when my arrival on the field stopped the pursuit and arrested the victory. No officer or solider on that day received an order from me to halt, unless he was going to the rear. My orders were to press the enemy from the beginning and give him no time to form,and when I found that my troops had halted, I endavoured to advance again, but I discovered it would not do to press them further. Those who have known me from my youth, as well as those who came in contact with me during the war, know that I was not likely to permit any other plan a battle for me, or assume my duties in any particular. Yet I was always willing to receive and adopt valuable suggestions from any of my officers.There was another false report as to my personal habits during the Valley Campaign, which obtained some circulation and credence, but which I would not notice, except for the fact that it was referred to on the floor of the Confederate Senate by two members of that body. The utter falsehood of this report was well known to all my staff and General Officers, as well as to all others who associated with me.
