Page:A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America.djvu/64

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OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.

which had arrived from his army as the most reliable, they were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least until others could arrive. But, in addition to those which had already arrived, there were the detachments from the invalid corps, called, I believe, the "Veteran Reserves" (of which I was informed there were about 5,000), the heavy artillery regiments, the hundred days' men. and. I suppose, the part of the 8th Corps mentioned by Stanton. To all these may he added the local troops, or militia, and the government employees. Some of the northern papers stated that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city: but on Saturday I was lighting at Monocacy, thirty-five miles from Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear: and, after disposing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move. I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring them up into line. I had then made a march, over the circuitous route by Charlottesville. Lynchburg, and Salem, down the Valley, and through the passes of the South Mountain, which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with Hunter's, Sigel's, and Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war—the unopposed marauding excursion of the freebooter Sherman through Georgia, just excepted. My small force had been thrown up to the very wall of the Federal Capital, north of a river which could not be forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a heavy force and the South Mountain in my rear—the passes through which mountain could be held by a small number of troops. A glance at the map, when it is recollected that, the Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to Washington for the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to take Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the small force under my command. It was supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the lower Valley longer than was necessary: but, an examination of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment was spent in idleness, but that every one was em-