III. Third Argument, taken from the imperfection of liberty, and the perfection of necessity.p. 56.
IV. Fourth Argument, taken from the consideration of the divine Prescience.p. 71.
V. Fifth Argument, taken from the nature and use of rewards and punishments in society.p. 75.
VI. Sixth Argument, taken from the nature of morality.p. 77.
Several Objections consider’d.p. 78.
1. That if men are necessary agents, punishments are unjust,lb.
2. That if men are necessary agents, punishments are useless,p. 82.
3. That if men are necessary agents, reasoning, intreaties, admonitions, blame, and praise are useless,p. 85.
4. That if the period of man’s life be fix’d, physick, &c. is useless,p. 87.
5. How can a man act against his conscience, and how can his conscience accuse him, if he knows he acts necessarily, &c.p. 89.
6. How can such an action as the murder of Julius Cæsar in the senate be necessary, &c.p. 90.
Authorities for what has been advanc’d.p. 91.
The notion of Liberty maintained by the Author.p. 97.
