these various appearances of propositions to me, being founded on my capacity, and the degree of light propositions stand into me; I can no more change those appearances in me than I can change the Idea of red rais’d in me. Nor can I judge contrary to those appearances: for what is judging of propositions, but judging that propositions do appear as they do appear? which I cannot avoid doing, without lying to myself: which is impossible. If any man thinks he can judge a proposition, appearing to him evident, to be not evident; or a probable proposition, to be more or less probable than it appears by the proofs to be; he knows not what he says, as he may see, if he will define his words. The necessity of being determin’d by appearances, was maintain’d by all the old Philosophers, even by the Academicks or Sceptiks. Cicero says,[1] You must take from a Man his senses, if you take from him the power of assenting; for it is as necessary the mind should yield to what is clear, as that a scale hanging on a balance should sink with a weight laid on it. For as all living creatures cannot but desire what is agreeable to their natures, so
- ↑ Academ. Quest. lib. 2.
