have a will to eat or use an egg; otherwise he must let them alone. And he also experiences, in relation to all things which are the objects of his choice, that he must have a precedent will to chuse; otherwise he will make no choice. No man marries one woman preferably to another, or travels into France rather than into another countrey, or writes a book on one subject rather than another, but he must first have a precedent will to marry, travel and write.
It is therefore contrary to experience, to suppose any choice can be made under an equality of circumstances. And by consequence it is matter of experience, that man is ever determin'd in his willing or acts of volition and choice.
Doing as we will.4. Fourthly, I shall now consider the actions of men consequent to willing, and see whether he be free in any of those actions. And here also we experience perfect necessity. If we will thinking or deliberating on a subject, or will reading, or walking, or riding, we find we must do those actions, unless some external impediment, as an apoplexy, or some intervening cause, hinders us; and then we are as much necessitated to let anaction
