sway’d by no motives in his choice of objects, chuses at a venture; and only makes a right choice, when[1] it happens (as the author justly expresses his notion) that he chuses an object, which he can by his creating power render so agreeable, as that it may be call’d a rightly chosen object. Nor can this faculty be improv’d by any experience: but must ever continue to chuse at a venture, or as it it happens. For if this faculty, improves by experience, and will have regard to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects in themselves, it is no longer the faculty contend’d for, but a faculty mov’d and affected by the nature of things.
So that man, with a faculty of choice indifferent to all objects, must make more wrong choices, than man consider’d as a necessary being; in the same proportion, as acting as it happens, is a worse direction to chuse right, than the use of our senses, experience, and reason.
3. Thirdly, the existence of such an arbitrary faculty, to chuse without regard to the qualities of objects, would destroy the use of our senses, appetites, passions, and reason; which have been
- ↑ P. 10.V. 107, 113. 139, 141. 147.
