Third argument taken from the imperfection of Liberty.
III. Thirdly, Liberty is contended for by the patrons thereof as a great perfection. In order therefore to disprove all pretences for it, I will now show that according to all the various descriptions given of it by theologers and philosophers, it would often be an imperfection, but never a perfection, as I have in the last article showed it to be impossible and atheistical.
1. If Liberty[1] be defined a power to pass different judgments at the same instant of time upon the same individual propositions that are not evident (we being, as it is owned necessarily determined to pass but one judgment on evident propositions) it will follow that men will be so far irrational, and by consequence imperfect agents, as they have that freedom of judgment. For, since they would be irrational agents, if they were capable of judging evident propositions not to be evident, they must be also deemed irrational agents if they are capable of judging the self-same probable or improbable propositions not to be probable or improbable. The appearances of all propositions to us, whether evident, probable or improbable, are the sole rational grounds of our judgments in relation to them, and the appearances of probable or improbable propositions, are no less necessary in us from the respective reasons by which they appear probable or improbable, than are the appearances of evident propositions from the reasons by which they appear evident. Wherefore if it be rational and a perfection to be determined by an evident appearance, it is no less so to be determined by a probable or improbable appearance, and consequently an imperfection not to be so determined.
It is not only an absurdity, and by consequence an imperfection, not to be equally and necessarily deter-
- ↑ Le Clerc. Bibl. Chois., tom. xii. p. 88, 89.
being discussed, the tables are completely turned. It is the Atheists who maintain Determinism, while the Christians largely maintain Free Will.—G.W.F.
