in their own nature, and upon the whole pleasant; and immorality or vice, consists in such actions as are in their own nature, and upon the whole painful. Wherefore a man must be affected with pleasure and pain in order to know what morality is, and to distinguish it from immorality. He must also be affected with pleasure and pain to have a reason to practise morality; for there can be no motives but pleasure and pain to make a man do or forbear any action. And a man must be the more moral the more he understands or is duly sensible, what actions give pleasure and what pain; and must be perfectly moral if necessarily determined by pleasure and pain rightly understood and apprehended. But if man be indifferent to pleasure and pain, or is not duly affected with them, he cannot know what morality is nor distinguish it from immorality, nor have any motive to practise morality and abstain from immorality; and will be equally indifferent to morality and immorality or virtue and vice. Man in his present condition is sufficiently immoral by mistaking pain for pleasure and thereby judging, willing, and practising amiss; but if he was indifferent to pleasure and pain, he would have no rule to go by, and might never judge, will, and practise right.
Though I conceive I have so proposed my arguments as to have obviated most of the plausible objections usually urged against the doctrine of Necessity, yet it may not be improper to give a particular solution to the principal of them. 1. First then it is objected that if men are necessary agents,[1] and do commit necessarily all breaches of the law, it would be unjust to punish them for doing what they cannot avoid doing.
To which I answer that the sole end of punishment in society is to prevent, as far as may be, the commission of certain crimes; and that punishments have
- ↑ Auli Gellii noctes Att., I. 6, c. 2.
