continue the grievances of the state for a long time, and unless there be an express provision for deposing him, the choice of another in his place, would involve the whole body in tumult and disorder.
The power of choosing another supreme magistrate at the end of a reasonable time, obviates these objections. The substantial difference between a mixed monarchy and a republic formed on a proper distribution of powers, is therefore confined to the term of service of the supreme magistrate.
The powers of every government are only of three kinds; the legislative, executive, and judicial. This natural division, founded upon moral order, must be preserved by a careful separation or distinction of the powers vested in different branches. If the three powers are injudiciously blended; if for instance, the legislative and executive, or the executive and judicial powers are united in the same body, great dangers may ensue, and the effect would be the same, whether such powers are devolved on a single magistrate or on several. In the wise distribution of these powers, in the application of suitable aids and checks to each, we may attain the optime constituta respublica, which is the object of general desire and admiration.
It has been reserved for modern times and for this side of the Atlantic, fully to appreciate and soundly to apply the principle of representation in government The advantages, which occasionally arise to an individual, of being able to commit his cares and concerns to another, who in the exercise of such authority is considered as the principal himself, are elevated and ennobled by being transferred to the concerns of an entire community. Without the representative principle,
