more anxious to see exertion and energy in the government, and enthusiasm in
their armies, than to have my force augmented. The moment is a critical one,
my own situation is peculiarly so, I have never seen it otherwise; but I have
pushed into Spain at all hazards. This was the order of my government, and it
was the will of the people of England, I shall endeavour to do my best, hoping
that all the bad that may happen, will not happen, but that with a share of bad,
we shall also have a portion of good fortune."
The despondency here expressed by the general was not lessened by the information he received in two days afterwards, that the French were not only in possession of Burgos, but also of Valladolid, within twenty leagues of Salamanca, where he now lay with only three brigades of infantry, and without a single gun; and, though the remainder of his army was coming up as fast as possible, he was aware that the whole could not arrive in less than ten days. Instead of the Spanish army of seventy thousand men that was to have joined him here, there was not so much as a single Spanish piquet to cover his front, or to act as guides in the country, of every portion of which the British army, both officers and men, were perfectly ignorant. Sir John Moore immediately communicated the intelligence to the Junta of Salamanca; telling them that he must have the use of all the carts and mules in the country to transport his magazines to Ciudad Rodrigo should it become requisite, and that the troops with three days' provisions should be kept in readiness; but he added, that as he had not yet stopped the advance of the rest of the army from Portugal, he was desirous of assembling it there, and would not retire without an absolute necessity. All this was listened to with calm acquiescence. The general in the mean time found, that though a patrol of horse had neared Valladolid, none of the French infantry had yet passed Burgos, and he gave orders to generals Baird and Hope, to advance upon Salamanca with all speed, but to be upon their guard on the march. The junta of Ciudad Rodrigo about this time ordered twenty thousand dollars to be placed at his disposal, and a letter from lord Castlereagh brought him intelligence that two millions of dollars had been despatched for him on the 2nd of the month, and were already on the way to Corunna. His lordship at the same time told him, that the scarcity of money in England was such, that he must not look for any further supply for some months, and recommended it to him to procure as much money on the spot as possible. Encouraged so far by these advices, Sir John Moore continued to concentrate his forces at Salamanca, though upon what principle does not appear; for he seems to have been filled with the most dismal anticipations. "Every effort," he says, writing to lord Castlereagh on the 24th of November, "shall be exerted on my part, and that of the officers with me, to unite the army; but your lordship must be prepared to hear that we have failed; for, situated as we are, success cannot be commanded by any efforts we can make, if the enemy are prepared to oppose us." To add to all his other grounds of despondency, he considered Portugal as utterly indefensible by any force England could send thither. "If the French succeed in Spain, it will be in vain," he says, in another letter to lord Castlereagh, "to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military force, and from the experience of their conduct under Sir Arthur Wellesley, no dependence is to be placed on any aid they can give. The British must in that event, I conceive, immediately take steps to evacuate the country. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place whence the army with its stores can embark. Elvas and Almeida are the only fortresses on the frontiers. The first is, I am told, a respectable work. Almeida is defective, and could not hold out beyond ten days against a regular attack. I have ordered a depot of provisions for a short consumption to be
