Page:A biographical dictionary of eminent Scotsmen, vol 8.djvu/301

having been previously raised to the rank of major-general. It was a useless and hopeless campaign against malaria and pestilence; so that, during the siege of Flushing, he was attacked by the prevalent fever that so fearfully thinned the British ranks, and obliged to return home. On his recovery he was sent, with the brevet rank of lieutenant-general, to Spain, to take the command of the British and Portuguese troops in Cadiz. The situation of this important city was extremely precarious. Being one of the few remaining bulwarks of Spanish independence, its possession was keenly contested by the French; and a large army under Soult had so closely invested it, that its capture was daily anticipated. One of those rapid transitions, however, with which that war so largely abounded, averted the downfall of the city. This was the invasion of Estremadura, conducted by Soult in person at the head of 20,000 of the besieging force, leaving Victor, with the rest of the French army, to continue the siege. Soult's brief campaign was one of the most brilliant episodes of the Spanish war: he captured Olivenza, routed Mendizabal at Badajoz, and obtained that powerful fortress by surrender; after which successes he prepared to return in all haste, and resume the siege of Cadiz. But during his brief absence Graham had been as alert and ready for action as himself; and, judging the opportunity best fitted for the purpose, he resolved to raise the siege by an attack upon Victor. With the French and Portuguese under his command, he embarked on the 21st of February, 1811, and landed at Tarifa on the day following. They then pushed forward on their route for Algesiras; but as they had no better road than a mule path, the artillery had to be transported by sea; and, owing to contrary winds, which delayed its arrival, the attack, which was intended to be made on the 28th, was delayed for a week longer. And even this was the least of Graham's difficulties in advancing to action. On the 29th he was joined by La Pena, with 10,000 Spaniards, who forthwith took the command, as if for the sole purpose of showing his utter incapacity to hold it. Graham too soon discovered the impracticability of such a colleague, who sometimes unreasonably hung back, and at other times drove on, as if the French were already defeated and in full flight. So inexplicable, indeed, were his movements, that the British officers suspected that treachery had been ingrafted upon his natural stupidity and obstinacy. At length the combined but ill-assorted army reached the memorable heights of Barossa, upon which Victor sallied from his lines to give them battle. Even at that critical moment La Pena must needs blunder, by requiring Graham to alter his excellent position from the heights to the wood of Bermeya, towards the sea-coast; and when the latter, in compliance, commenced the movement, La Pena immediately followed, thus leaving the ridge of Barossa, the key of the army's position, undefended. Victor, who saw this change with astonishment, instantly moved his force of 9000 French veterans and fourteen guns to take possession of the heights. They advanced to the onset, and meeting with some of the Spanish troops who had not yet left the hill, they attacked and routed them in an instant. The fugitives directed their headlong flight to the British division, already in motion among the difficulties of the wood, and reported that the heights were won, and the enemy at their heels. Justly might Graham at this moment have left his worse than useless allies to their fate, and thought only of a retreat. But this neither suited his daring spirit nor warm-hearted generosity. With his own forces, upon which he could fully rely, he resolved to give battle to the enemy, notwithstanding the advantages of their new position, and the suddenness of