Page:A discourse upon the origin and foundation of the inequality among mankind (IA discourseuponori00rous).pdf/326

Points concerning Manners, where the Law can preſcribe no Meaſure exact enough to ſerve as a Rule to Magiſtrates, it is with the greateſt Wiſdom that in order not to leave the Fate or the Rank of Citizens at their Diſcretion, ſhe forbids them to judge of Perſons, and leaves Actions alone to their Diſcretion. There are no Manners, but ſuch as vie in Purity with thoſe of the old Romans, that can bear Cenſors, and ſuch a Tribunal amongſt us would ſoon throw every thing into Confuſion. It belongs to publick Eſteem to make a Difference between good and bad Men; the Magiſtrate is judge only as to ſtrict Right; whereas the Multitude is the true judge of Manners; an upright and even an intelligent Judge in that Reſpect; a Judge which may indeed ſometimes be impoſed upon, but can never be corrupted. The Rank therefore of Citizens ought to be regulated, not according to their perſonal Merit, for this would be putting it in the Power of Magiſtrates to make almoſt an arbitrary Application of the Law, but according to the real Services they render to the State, ſince theſe will admit of a more exact Eſtimation.