power, and would be completely isolated from all opportunities for expansion.
But, even in spite of insults and provocations, Japan set herself to resist the Russian encroachments by peaceable means and measures, in which she at last had the support of Great Britain and the United States. It was to be presumed that Russia would keep her promise to give up her military occupation of Manchuria and restore to China the administration of the "Three Provinces" on the dates specified in a convention with China signed April 8, 1902. According to this, Russia agreed to withdraw her troops gradually from Manchuria and entirely resign her control thereof within one year.
But when the time came for the final evacuation, Russia showed no sign of intending to carry out her agreement. After futile protests from Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, Japan suggested to Russia to open up negotiations concerning their respective interests in the Far East; and to this Russia assented. It is scarcely profitable to follow the devious windings of these negotiations, which were delayed by Russia on one pretext or another. It is sufficient to state that Japan invited Russia to nothing more than "to subscribe to the policy enunciated by the United States and Great Britain,—the policy of the 'open door' and of the integrity of the Chinese and [the] Korean Empires."
During the course of the prolonged negotiations, Russia was moving troops to the scene of action and making other military preparations. These did not necessarily mean that she anticipated war, but that she at least expected to overawe little Japan and thus obtain her desires.
"The only alternatives for Japan were war or total and permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war, and in fighting, she is fighting the battle of Anglo-Saxondom
