vigorous hostilities would induce the Nabob to make peace or reparation, and considered the force proposed as unequal even to the retaking of Calcutta: he therefore insisted "that it ought to be sufficient to attack the Nabob even in his capital of Muxadavad; at least, a battalion of 800 Europeans, with as many Sepoys as could be transported, not less than 1500: that as the squadron, if divided, would be of little service any where, the whole should proceed to Bengal; that such an armament would soon decide the contest; that after peace was made, the squadron, with a large part of the troops, might return to the coast, and arrive in the month of April; before which time, the nature of the Monsoons rendered it improbable that the French armament, since it had not yet appeared, would be able to make their passage to the coast. In the mean time the detachment sent to the relief of Mr. Bussy had deprived the government of Pondicherry of the means of making any attempts, in the Carnatic, which the force of Madrass could not easily frustrate." This opinion, after many and repeated objections, became at last the unanimous sense, of the council.
This resolution was communicated to Admiral Watson, who after consulting his council of war, consented to it. Some difficulties arose about the disposition of the captures which might be made by the squadron: but this was soon adjusted by an agreement, that whatsoever property should be taken which had belonged either to the company, or to English individuals, or even to natives, who were tenants of the company when the Nabob commenced hostilities, should be restored without diminution to the proprietors; but that whatsoever should be taken which had never belonged either to the company, or to such as were under their protection, should become without participation or reserve the property of the squadron.
But other points of equal moment to the success of the expedition still remained to be decided: and, indeed, by having been mingled without distinction with the more general questions, they had helped not a little to perplex and protract the deliberations of the council. These points were: Who should command the land forces? What
